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RESUMÉ 
Ce mémoire aborde 1 ' émergence du Mouvement Vert en Iran en tant que foule 
manifestante connectée (Networked Protesting Crowds [traduction libre]). Nous 
soutenons que la foule manifestante est une forme d' action collective dont les pratiques 
collectives se produisent dans un Kairos , soit un moment opportun. Nous défendons 
que la foule manifestante, en tant qu ' action collective, s' articule dans la sphère 
politique. En utilisant les technologies d' informations connectées (TIC), la foule 
manifestante connectée parvient à produire des discours politiques et des réseaux de 
revendications à 1 ' échelle mondiale. Dans ce mémoire, nous mettons en relation le 
Mouvement Vert, en tant que foule manifestante connectée, avec 1 'historique des 
mouvements sociaux en Iran. 
Cette recherche démontre que le discours politique du Mouvement Vert était en effet 
la suite d' une articulation et d'une re-articulation des discours politiques provenant de 
la révolution constitutionnelle de 1906. De plus, nous démontrons que les technologies 
d' information connectées ont toujours joué un rôle important dans la formation du 
discours politique. À travers l' histoire du pays, nous constatons que les foules 
manifestantes forment différentes entités propres à leurs discours politiques et à la 
façon dont elles protestent en tant que collectif. Cela signifie que la foule manifestante 
du Mouvement Vert, à 1' instar de ses prédécesseurs, est en mesure de produire plusieurs 
discours en utilisant les TIC. Finalement, la foule manifestante s' est formée une identité 
à partir de pratiques collectives lui permettant de se définir comme tel tout en lui 
donnant cet éthos précis. 
Mots clés: la foule manifestante, le mouvement vert, la société en reseaux, les 
mouvements sociaux, démocratie agonistique, Iran, Kairos 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis looks at how the Green Movement in Iran emerged as Networked Protesting 
Crowds (NPC). It argues that a protesting crowd is a form of collective action with 
particular collective practices that produces itself in a Kairos (an opportune moment). 
We argue that a protesting crowd, as a collective action, articulates and communicates 
the political in the realm of politics. We further argue that Networked Protesting 
Crowds are protesting crowds that use Information Communication Technologies 
(ICT) as tools for communicating the political discourse and producing networks of 
grievances globally. The protesting crowds of the Green Movement, hence, were 
political collectives who articulated the political discourse in the politics of the country 
and globally. By using a historical approach, the thesis brings importance to the context 
of the Green Movement in relation to the history of social movements in Iran. 
The research shows that the political discomse of the Green Movement was indeed a 
continuation of the articulation and re-articulation ofpolitical discourses that were born 
from the constitutional revolution of 1906. It also shows that through the history of 
social movements in Iran, the usage of ICTs have al ways played an important role for 
articulating the political discourse. Lastly, it demonstrates that through the history of 
country, protesting crowds formed different identities based on their political discourse 
and the way they protested as protesting crowds. This meant that protesting crowds of 
the Green Movement, just like their predecessors, were able to articulate severa! 
political discourses by using ICT as tools for communication. Lastly, this protesting 
crowd was able to form its identity from collective practices that made it recognize 
itself as a protesting crowd. This in retmn gave the protesting crowds of the Green 
Movement its precise ethos. 
Key words: Protesting Crowds, Green Movement, Networked Society, Social 
Movements, Agonistic Democracy, Iran, Kairos 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most apparent forms of collective action in any social and/or revolutionary 
movement is the gathering of crowds in a public space as a collective force. The idea 
behind this thesis cornes because of a necessity seen in understanding the protesting 
crowd from a communicational perspective. The study of social movements is indeed 
very vast. What I bring forward in this thesis is a precise focus on the idea of protesting 
crowds and the impact of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) on 
protesting crowds as collective actions. This thesis takes a particular case, the Iranian 
Green Movement in 2009, and seeks to understand the protesting crowds of this 
movement and the way they formed and articulated their discourses during the post-
electoral unrest in the country. The importance of the idea ofprotesting crowds is that 
it looks at a particular type of crowds and sees it as an agent that articulates the political 
discourse. Theoretically, I first look at kairos (opportune moments) to argue that 
protesting crowds produce themselves in an opportune moment. I then look at the 
articulation of political discourse in the Green Movement and how such articulation by 
the protesting crowds show that they are political subjects that articulate the political 
discourse in the politics of the country. I finally argue that the way the protesting 
crowds construct their identity as weil as their collective ethos is through their 
collective practices and through their political articulation. Methodologically, I look at 
how political discourses were articulated in the history of the country and how such 
history has influenced the articulation of discourses of the protesting crowds of the 
Green Movement. I also look at the particular collective practices of the protesting 
crowds of the Green Movement and seek to understand the significance of these 
practices as part of the antagonistic discourse of this protesting crowd. Through the 
analysis of the protes ting crowds online and offline, I show that the Green Movement 
was able to form Networked Protesting Crowds (NPC) in order to make their 
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movement globally noticed. 
For me, the protesting crowds used technology as tools for the benefit ofthe articulation 
of discourse. Hence, technology is a tool that is creatively used by protesting crowds 
as a way to articulate and propagate discourses. 
The Global Context of the Green Movement 
The history of social movements in modern Iran is of great complexity. Since late 19th 
century, Iran has faced two major revolutions . The first , the constitutional revolution, 
occurred in earl y 1900 and led to the formation of a parliament and a constitution while 
the second, the Islamic Revolution, happened in 1979 and resulted in the change in the 
governmental system of Iran from monarchy to Islamic Republic. The aim of this thesis 
is to understand the protesting crowds of the Iranian Green Movement in 2009. The 
way by which this thesis answers this question is through historical research and 
discourse analysis. In order to do so, it first looks at the history of social movements in 
Iran briefly in order to understand where the discourses of the protesting crowds in Iran 
in 2009 came from and what the implications of these discourses are in relations to 
history. In this thesis, we look at three major forces that made up the protesting crowd 
of the Green Movement: the women, the student, and the reformist movement. The 
thesis finally looks at several cases where protesting crowds were produced either on 
the streets or online and used opportune moments to produce themselves through 
particular collective practices. In this chapter, the thesis lays out its central problem by 
reviewing the literature on social movement theories and crowd theories and shows the 
limitations of these theories in explaining the protesting crowds of the Green 
Movement in Iran. It then poses the central question of the thesis along with its central 
hypothesis. 
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The 2009 presidential election in June was indeed a turning point in the history of the 
country. After the defeat of the reformists in the 2005 election, many reformist groups 
and social groups (religious and non-religious) "mobilized together and presented two 
reformist candidates in order to change the socio-political state of the country that was 
created by Ahmadinejad" (Safa, 2013). Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi 
were the two hopeful candidates from the reformist movements while Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad and Mohsen Rezai were representing the conservative side of the 
political spectrum (An~arï, 2010). The presence of the two reformist candidates indeed 
created a momentum for the possibility of change in political, economie, as weil as 
social policies that were implemented during Ahmadinejad ' s presidency. As Harris 
(20 12) argues, one of the important elements that added to the intensity of the 2009 
election was the atmosphere of the country and specifically the city of Tehran during 
the election campaign. The presence of supporters of both conservative and reformist 
candidates created momentum in the few weeks before Election Day. Also, the 
candidate debates that were projected in many parks across the city attracted supporters 
of both si des of the spectrum in these public spaces: 
"After each night' s televised debate, small and medium-sized groups, mostly young people, 
would congre gate on Tehran ' s main streets and square off in rau cous y et ci vi 1 debate. Chanted 
slogans were colloquially crafted and passed along via cellphone text message or by face-ta-
face contact" (Harris, 2012, p. 440). 
This, in return, started the tensions between the supporters of both sides in the weeks 
before the election. It also allowed limited freedom of expression in terms of the 
support for each candidate. On June 8, a pro-Mousavi human chain was formed along 
Tehran ' s Valiasr Street while a large rally by the supporters of Ahmadinejad was 
organized in the Mosalla-ye-Tehran mosque (Harris, 2012). As Harris observed, "it 
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was the very act of attending these interaction rituals that gave rise to the collective 
solidarity and emotional effervescence that generated the perception of low 
participation costs" (Harris, 2012 p. 440) 1• 
The voter turnout on the Election Day was between 80-85% and the state declared 
Ahmadinejad a winner with 64% ofthe vote (Harris, 2012, p.441 ). The state was clearly 
expecting sorne sort of pro test from the reformist si de since it started arresting Mousavi 
and Karroubi strategists within the first two days of the elections (Harris, 2012). 
However, the presence of large protesting crowds in Tehran and other major cities was 
something that neither the government, nor the media and commentators outside of the 
country were expecting (Mil ani, 201 0). Also, the usage of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) such as cellphones and social media was 
something that took the government off guard. In the days that followed, the protests 
continued and the crackdown on protesters intensified. However, the protesting crowds 
were able to reach and mobilize many individuals and groups outside of the country in 
support of the movement. This, in turn, made the Green Movement a global movement 
and put international pressure on the government of Iran in response to the ir crackdown 
of the protest. The Green Movement was not able to succeed in many ways in their 
demands and was stopped after almost a year. However, the legacy of the movement 
put severa! seeds of change in the political dynamic of the country and to the eyes of 
many observers was the inspiration for the Arab Spring that started right after it 
(Kw-zman, 2012). Many critics became pessimistic at the end of the movement and 
blamed many factors including the discow-se of the movement (Harris, 2012), heavy 
reliance on the Internet and specifically Twitter (Morozov, 2009), and choice of an 
What Harris means by this is that the collective, and al most ritualistic, practices that created 
the hype before the election helped to create momentum whereby the participants ofthese practices 
saw participation in the election as a low-risk practice that may result in great change in their lives in a 
positive way. 
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alliance between different discourses (Hossein Ghazian in Zareh, 201 0) as sorne of the 
reasons why the movement did not succeed. However, the fact remains that the post-
election movements became an important part of the country' s modern history. 
CHAPTERI 
PROBLEMATIC 
The Green Movement was a social movement in Iran. lt consisted of protes ting crowds 
that participated in protestations against the results of the election and other 
dissatisfactions that were rooted in the present situation in the country. The first 
problem to look at is to understand the current literature in the study of social 
movements and where can one situate the Green Movement and its protesting crowds 
within the se frameworks of study. The next sections, hence, aims to define the concept 
of protesting crowd and fi nd where the concept fits within the current theories on social 
movements. It finally poses the central question as weil as the supporting questions that 
guide this research. 
1.1 Social Movements 
The current theoretical frameworks on the study of social movements were created 
largely in the 1970s by two groups. In the United States, the Resource Mobilization 
School came as a critique of the limitations of collective behaviour theories explaining 
social movements (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Meanwhile, in Europe, at around the 
same time, the New Social Movement theory was developed as a critique of the 
limitations of Marxist theories in explaining social movements as movements 
of class (Buechler, 1995). In what follows , 1 shall explain each school briefly. 
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1.1.1 Resource Mobilization 
Resource Mobilization theory came to look at when and how actors in a social 
movement secure the surrounding resources to confront and fight their exclusion from 
conventional political channels (Polletta & Jasper, 2001 , p. 286). The Resource 
Mobilization theory argues that the political actors in a social movement "adopt 
strategies to environrnental constraints and opportunities on the basis of cost-benefit 
calcul us" (Polletta & Jasper, 2001, p. 292). This idea arose parti ally from the critique 
of collective behaviour theory and particularly the emergent norm theory (Smelser, 
1964; Turner & Killian, 1957). The emergent norm theory looked at how established 
structures are questioned through the emergence of new norms that may become new 
structures. Hence, "In the field of collective behaviour, one such effort involves the 
assertion that new norms or beliefs 'emerge' in situations where old ones fail or few 
precedents exist" (Granovetter, 1978, p. 1421 ). The collective behaviourists argued that 
individuals, as a collective, follow certain collective behaviour or change to new forms 
of collective behaviour as new norms emerge. ln this sense, the individual in this type 
oftheory is not completely aware of his or her actions since he/she would be persuaded 
to follow the new emergent norm of the collective behaviour. The resource 
mobilization theory critiqued this idea by arguing that individuals in a social movement 
act as rational and calculative actors who have the capacity to mobilize different forms 
of resources around them (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). The school defines social 
movements as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which presents preferences 
for changing sorne elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a 
society" (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1217). It looks at how social movements can be 
organized and structured through different forms of Resource Mobilization. In this 
sense, Resource Mobilization looks at the examination of "the variety ofresources that 
must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence 
of movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to 
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control or incorporate movements" (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1213 ). Moreover, for 
this school of thought, social and political actions are organized and structured 
processes since "ail political action is socially structured and that the resources 
available to activists are patterned accordingly" (Rootes, 1990, p. 7). Hence, Resource 
Mobilization looks at social movements in terms of the different resources available 
(economie, political, social, etc.) and aims at finding a pragmatic solution for the 
success of a social movement by examining how the mobilization of different available 
resources will lead to concrete successful outcomes in the social movement. The 
Resource Mobilization theory has a very economie and pragmatic point of view on 
social movements in the sense that it "makes the assumption that movement activists 
are at !east as calculatively rational as are more conventional political actors and that 
they will, accordingly, devise strategies of action which makes best use of the resources 
they have and which minimize the requirement for resources they do not have" (Rootes, 
1990, p.7). 
1.1 .2 New Social Movements School 
Another school of thought that came about around the same time as the Resource 
Mobilization School was that of the New Social Movements (NSM). Thinkers who 
have great! y influenced this school are Alain Touraine (1971 ), Alberto Melucci (1996), 
and Manuel Castells (20 11), to name a few. Born in Europe, the schoollooks at social 
movements in relation to the collective identity that a social movement creates. The 
approach was created because of the inadequacies ofMarxism in responding to modern 
social movements (Buechler, 1995). The movement critiqued the classical Marxist 
approach on two fronts. First, it critiqued the Marxist theories in presuming that "ail 
politically significant social action will derive from the fundamental economie logic of 
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capitalist production and that ail other social logics are secondary at best in shaping 
such action" (Buechler, 1995, p. 441). The second critique was ofthe notion "that the 
most significant social actors will be defined by class relationships rooted in the process 
of production and that ail other social identities are secondary at best in constituting 
collective actors"(Buechler, 1995, p. 442). Following the "protests around peace, 
nuclear energy, local autonomy, homosexuality, and feminism that seemed to be 
displacing the class-based political mobilization in Western Europe in the 1970's and 
1980's" (Polletta & Jasper, 2001 , p. 286), the new social movement school put forward 
two basic observations. First, they directed their attention to the fact that the 
participants of these movements cou1d no longer be categorized by the class structure 
to which they belonged since these movements were not class-based (Polletta & Jasper, 
2001 ). Second, they saw that the participants were not seeking "to gain poli ti cal and 
economie concessions from institutional actors, to further their 'interest' in 
conventional terms" (Polletta & Jasper, 2001 , p. 286). For NSM, bence, the newness 
of the modern social movements was directly related to the identity of the actors who 
participated in them. The schoollooks at how modern social movements "fight against 
not only the re-appropriation of the material structure of the production, but also the 
collective control on its development, which translates to the re-appropriation of ti me, 
of space, and of relations in the existence of the everyday individual" (Melucci, 1978, 
p. 48). This means that today's social movements look at reappropriating what is around 
them in relation to the identity of the participants in the movement. Another important 
idea introduced in this school is that the structure of new social movements is more 
decentralized and has a strong expressive dimension (Neveu, 2011). In other words, 
the new social movements look to "other logics of action based in politics, ideology, 
and culture as the root ofmuch collective action, and they have looked to other sources 
of identity such as ethnicity, gender and sexuality as the definers of collective 
identity"(Buechler, 1995, p. 442). As one can see, the New Social Movements School, 
at its core, is very identity-based. 
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There are, therefore, two major perspectives in studying social movements. While one 
focuses on the resources and capacity of a movement in a pragmatic and economical 
way, the other gives more of its attention on the importance of identity as a key 
characteristic of modern social movements. There have been attempts in integrating 
these two theories in recent years (Farro, 2000; Moghadam, 2012). However, the two 
schools have kept a certain distance from one another due to disagreements in the 
understanding of social movements and the method of analyzing them. 
1.1.3 Reflection on social movement theories 
Both of the theories introduced in prevwus sections have their strengths and 
weaknesses as theoretical frameworks for understanding social movements. The New 
Social Movements (NSM) has been instrumental in painting out the importance of 
identity in modern social movements. Through historical analysis and reflection on 
modem social movements, they have pointed out that pluralistic collectives from 
different class backgrounds can participate in a movement because they identify with 
the cause of the movement. This means that social movements are no longer solely 
class-based movements. For instance, an upper-middle-class persan would participate 
in environmental or feminist movement because of the values ofthese movements and 
how s/he identifies with these movements instead of the economie class that s/he is 
associated with. One of the limitations to the NSM theories is the lack of an explanation 
as to wh y a social movement starts. As Canel ( 1997) argues, "NSM theory offers an 
incomplete account of the origins of social movements and neglects to identify ail the 
processes that intervene in the passage from 'condition' to 'action'" (p. 35). This critique 
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has been addressed in later years by authors such as Manuel Castells (2013). In 
Networks of Outrage and Hope, for example, he takes a particular interest in the 
relation between how outrage ignites a movement and how, in the process of 
communication through networks, this outrage tums into connectivity and hope. 
However, even this explanation is not as articulate as the position of Resource 
Mobilization (RM) theory and their emphasis on political opportunity as the source that 
commences a social movement (Cane!, 1997). RM sees opportunities as instances that 
come and go. This means that collective actors play the role of seizing the opportunity 
and using it as a way to commence a movement. However, the articulation of how this 
works is problematic since RM theorists see the collective actors as rational subjects 
that identify these opportunities through "a cost-benefit assessment of likelihood of 
success, given a movement's evaluation of the possible outcomes of its action and the 
responses of its adversaries and allies" (Cane!, 1997, p.41 ). This eliminates the element 
of risk taking and altruism that exists in social movements by associating social actors 
with rational and calculative individuals who are constantly calculating the cost-benefit 
oftheir actions. To this extent, the RM theories propose a limited explanation asto how 
a social movement is ignited. 
Another central aspect in understanding the perspectives ofthese theories is the idea of 
continuity. For RM theorists, there was never a new chapter in social movements since 
social movements are understood from an organizational perspective and the 
importance of understanding social movements is in understanding the way they 
mobilize resources and organize against a force. This force is often the State. This 
means that RM theorists believe in continuity within social movements. For Tilly, for 
instance, contemporary social action repertoires nowadays are no different from those 
in the early nineteenth-century in that the forms of actions have stayed unchanged 
(Cane!, 1997, p.43). Actions su ch as rallies, demonstrations, and strikes are well al ive 
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in this day and age as forms ofwhat Tilly calls contentious politics. This is in contrast 
to NSM theories that show the discontinuity of social movements and the newness of 
social movements today by looking at the shift in social movements from movements 
that were centred on class struggles to movements that are centred on identities of the 
actors who participate in them. The fact of the matter is that both perspectives have 
valuable propositions to put forward. The challenge in looking at the question of 
continuity vs. discontinuity in a country like Iran is that the roots of social movements 
in the country were neither completely class-based, nor completely identity-based. 
They were, however, always coalition-based, or, as I would like to see it, network-
based. During the constitutional revolution, for instance, a loosely connected network 
of merchants, guilds eiders, ulama (religious leaders), Tulab (religious students), and 
intelligentsia (mostly secular western educated middle class) came together to 
articulate a discontent against the absolutist power of the king and proposed the 
adoption of a constitution for the first time in the country (Abrahamian, 1979). The 
techniques that these groups used were not very western centric. Acts such as sit-ins in 
masques and bazars or wearing white clothes as a sign of the will to die (Abrahamian, 
1979) are examples of how the so called 'social action repertoire' that Tilly speaks of is 
limited to a western-centric collection of social actions. 
So how, then, one must reflect on the Green Movement in Iran as a social movement? 
The challenge with social movement theories is simply the fact that they were 
developed to analyze westem-centric movements. Even though they can be used to 
understand social movements in other places in the world, they are limited in 
understanding aspects such as the role of religion in a social movement. Hence, neither 
NSM nor RM is able to solely answer many of the complexities that rise in a social 
movement such as that of the Green Movement in Iran. What needs to be addressed in 
the theoretical framework, hence, is an approach that partially borrows from each of 
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these schools while adding elements that can explain such complexities as the role that 
religion played in formulating of the identity of the Green Movement as a social justice 
movement. What needs not to be forgotten , however, is the fact that the Green 
Movement was a social movement with particular demands and a specifie identity and 
it was formed , just like the constitutional revolution and the Islamic Revolution, 
through a loosely linked network of alliances. The next section of the problematic looks 
at the literature on crowds. It looks at two perspectives on crowd. In doing so, it sets 
the task of thinking about crowds, and precisely protesting crowds, within the context 
of social movements. 
1.2 Crowds 
As cities grew bigger and more populated during the Industrial Revolution, new forms 
of social structures were starting to be established that were unfamiliar to academies in 
fields such as sociology and criminology. One of the less understood concepts during 
this time was the notion of crowds. As an academie subject, this concept was brought 
into academia during the 19th century, mostly in France and Ital y (Rubio, 201 0). In 
France, Hyppolyte Taine (1876) published Les origines de la France contemporaine, 
in which he looked at the influence of gatherings of groups in shaping crowds at cri ti cal 
moments of the French Revolution (Ru bio, 201 0). For Taine, crowds were dangerous 
entities because they were irrational and unpredictable. In Italy, criminologist Scopio 
Sighele looked at the problem of crimes committed by groups of people instead of one 
person. The challenge, at the ti me, was to know who was to blame if a group committed 
a crime. Sighele (1892) proceeded to take on the task of theorizing this concept from a 
criminologist's perspective. In La foule criminelle , he argued that the attitudes of 
individuals change as they join groups and crowds. For Sighele, hurnans, just like 
14 
animais, have tendencies to adapt their behaviors to that of a group (van Ginneken, 
1992, p. 78). Moreover, "the larger the number of people ex pressing a certain emotion, 
the more intense the feeling would become" (van Ginneken, 1992, p. 79). Sighele 
suggested that members of a crowd create an emotional bond together to the point 
where they create a "kind of collective crowd" (van Ginneken, 1992, p. 79). Therefore, 
when joining a group, individuals in the group can be persuaded through the power of 
suggestion and be easily manipulated into doing things that they would not normally 
do in their daily lives (Stewart-Steinberg, 2005). Wrule Sighele vaguely touched upon 
the concepts of crowds as irrational entities, it was Gustave Le Bon and Gabriel Tarde 
who were able to articulate the framework for what came to be known as 'crowd 
psychology'. The next section looks at the literature of crowd theories. In doing so, it 
divides the current understanding of crowds into two categories: crowd theories that 
look at crowds as irrational entities and those that look at them as rational entities. 
1.2.1 Crowds as an Irrational Construct 
The three major thinkers that introduced the notion of crowds as irrational entities are 
Gustave Le Bon and Gabriel Tarde, and Sigmund Freud. Le Bon and Tarde were 
greatly influenced by Taine and Sighele, while Freud took the synthesis of both Tarde 
and Le Bon and mixed it with psychoanalysis to put forward his theory on crowds. 
Known as the father of crowd psychology, Gustav Le Bonis one of the most influential 
figures in the study of crowds. In his book, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, 
published first in 1908, he states that he live in the 'Era of Crowds' (Le Bon, 2001 , p.8). 
However, for him, the problem with this idea was that "Civilizations as yet have only 
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been created and directed by a small intellectual aristocracy, never by crowds. Crowds 
are only powerful for destruction" (Le Bon, 2001 , p. 10). Le Bon's notion of the origin 
of a crowd is very problematic since he argues that they are "a self-generated being" 
(Rubio, 2010, p. 5) consisting of "the fusion of individuals in one common sentiment 
and spirit" (Moscovici , 1985, p. 109). In this way, Le Bonis very close to Sighele in 
arguing that what "separates crowds from the everyday population is the fact that they 
come to have a collective mind as soon as they come together as a crowd" (LeBon, 
1908, p. 20). This "makes them feel , think, and act in a manner quite different from 
that in which each individual would fee! , think" (Le Bon, 2001 , p. 15). As such, for Le 
Bon, individuals within a crowd reduced their intelligence capacity to that of a crowd 
since "the mental quality of the individuals composing a crowd must not be brought 
into consideration. This quality is without importance. From the moment that they form 
part of a crowd the learned men and the ignoramus are equally incapable of 
observation" (Le Bon, 2001 , p. 24). Therefore, for Le Bon, the crowd follows a herd 
mentality since, as an entity, it can easily be manipulated. Under four principal 
characteristics of hypnosis, contagion, suggestion, and leadership, Le Bon presents the 
pessimistic notion that due to the reduction in their intelligence, individuals in a crowd 
are hypnotized by the presence of a crowd and their acts can be transferred to one 
another through acts of contagion and suggestion. Le Bon concludes by arguing that 
crowds are easily manipulated by a leader since they are in a state where they are 
vulnerable to any form of manipulation. 
Gabriel Tarde was another influential thinker in the field of crowd psychology. Tarde 
tried to adopt a different perspective from Le Bon in describing the behaviour of 
crowds. For him, the understanding of human interaction depends heavily on 
understanding the laws of imitation. This idea was key in Tarde's formulation of his 
theory of crowds since he argued that crowds formas a result of individuals imitating 
16 
the acts of those around them. There is a subtle difference in Tarde's language in 
contrast with that of Le Bon. For Le Bon, individuals are susceptible to suggestion 
when they are already in a crowd (Le Bon, 2001 ). However, for Tarde, individuals are 
always susceptible to manipulation because they actively imitate those around them. 
Similar to Le Bon, Tarde believed that crowds could be easily manipulated. On the 
contrary, for him, there was a difference between artificial and natural crowds. Natural 
crowds, for Tarde, form organically with the purpose of growing larger because their 
fundamental goal is to occupy more space (Brighenti , 2010, p.303). A good example 
of a natural crowd is that of a sports riot. In a sports riot, the crowds are emotionally 
driven to imitate the acts of those around them and commit acts that they normally 
would not attempt. The hockey riots in Vancouver, B.C., in 2011 (Lindsay, 2011) are 
a great example of this type of crowd. The riot started right after the Vancouver 
Canucks, official hockey team of Vancouver, ]ost their chance of winning the Stanley 
Cup by losing the 7th game of the season to the Boston Bruins. What followed, just 
after the game ended, was a night of may hem where the crowd looted stores and bumed 
vehicles, continuing untillate into the night. What was significant in this example was 
that the crowd gathered for the purpose of expanding within downtown Vancouver 
and occupying more space while buming cars and stealing from businesses in different 
areas of the town. Artificial Crowds, on the other hand, are those that "have absorbed 
sorne organizational features in arder to last. They have traded space for time" 
(Brighenti , 2010, p. 303). A good example of this type of crowd is the Military. 
Artificial crowds are structured, organized, and have a hierarchical formation. Tarde 
uses this example to argue that the best way to control a crowd is by creating artificial 
on es in place of natural ones. 
The difference between the two types of crowd is rooted in the psychological autonomy 
of each type of crowd. Natural crowds claim to have a psychological autonomy as a 
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group while artificial crowds follow a predetermined false consciousness that is pre-
ordered for them by sorne form of structure (Neculau, 201 0). Neculau (20 1 0) clarifies 
this idea in three different distinctions. Natural crowds, as Tarde sees them, are 
spontaneous and they capture "the empirical reality of a particular kind of large-scale 
group dynarnic with a legitimate claim to psychological autonomy" (Neculau, 2010, 
p.l 00). This means that they are not pre-structured and tend to happen unplanned. 
Because of this, they have a certain psychological autonomy. This is in opposition to 
artificial crowds that are "reducible to socio-economic conditions and thereby 
explainable in terms of a system-induced production of false consciousness that 
normatively underwrites the collective attitudes of the massified individuals" (Neculau, 
2010, p.l 00). There is a problem in understanding the natural vs. artificial crowds 
because the tine that distinguishes these two types of crowds can never be clearly 
drawn. While one needs to know this as a general knowledge on theories of crowd, the 
framework is not very useful in analyzing crowds. What we propose, instead, is to look 
at types of crowds and their particular practices instead of dividing the notion of crowd 
into two arnbiguous categories. This is the reason why we focus on the concept of 
Networked Protesting Crowds. 
The final member of the crowd psychology trio is Sigmund Freud. Freud borrowed 
greatly from Le Bon and Tarde in establishing his theory on crowds. His perspective, 
however, uses psychoanalysis to come to conclusions similar to those of Le Bon and 
Tarde. For Freud, a crowd bas within it a collective ego that is separate from each 
individual that participates in it. Hence, as individuals jo in a crowd, they give their ego 
to the crowd in order to become part of the collective ego. However, in doing so, 
individuals reduce their individuality as they no longer possess their ego. What Freud 
argues is that crowds are easily manipulated because if someone who plays the role of 
the leader, or father-figure, replaces the ego-ideal of the crowd, he is able to easily 
-------------------------------
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manipulate the whole crowd (Freud, 1922, p. xi). Hence, for Freud, just as for Le Bon 
and Tarde, crowds are irrational entities that are susceptible to manipulation by a 
leader. In a way, behind the 19th and 20th century crowd theories there was a fear of 
crowds as somewhat of an unknown abstraction (Rokni , 2014) and this fear was dealt 
with by dismissing crowds as irrational entities. 
1.2.2 Crowds as a Rational Construct 
After Freud, the interest in crowd psychology morphed into discussions on theories of 
collective behaviour (Granovetter, 1978; Leach, 1986; Turner & Killian, 1957). 
Meanwhile, there was a revival of crowd theory with Serge Moscovici ' s (1985) 
analysis of the fascist movements in Europe using the theories of Le Bon, Tarde, and 
Freud in his book L'âge des foules . In recent years, a new discourse has emerged, 
particularly in North America that looks at crowds in a completely different way. In 
this discourse, the crowd is no longer an irrational entity but a rational one consisting 
of individuals that make rational choices and who are connected through networked 
technologies. This discourse circles around two major poles. The first looks at the 
impact of technology on the mobilization of crowds while the second looks at crowds 
from an economie perspective. The former is proposed by Howard Rheingold (2005) 
while the latter is argued by James Surowiecki (2005). 
Rheingold, in his book Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution argues that the greatest 
success of the Information Communication Technology industry has been the new 
social practices that it has made possible (Rheingold, 2005). This has been through the 
new infrastructure that this industry has introduced, which in turn has allowed people 
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to act together without really knowing one another. Rheingold argues that the next big 
change in social movements is the appearance of the ' smart mobs '. He defines this 
concept as a form of mob that "consists of individuals that are capable of acting 
together without knowing each other" (Rheingold, 2005 p.16). What makes these mobs 
interesting is their use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) to 
achieve their goals. Rheingold argues that "Smart mobs emerge when communication 
and computing technologies amplify human talents for cooperation" (Rheingold, n.d.). 
Using mostly anecdotes, Rheingold talks about how technology and its capacity to 
intensify and speed up the process of communication have made mob smartness 
possible. For him, smart mobs can be formed for different reasons. However, what is 
common in ail of them is the use of ICTs as a way to exchange information and form 
mobs. One can see how this idea is very technology-centred in the sense that most of 
the credit for this mob formation is given to the structures that the ICTs have been able 
to provide to the masses, therein reducing the cost of production and information 
distribution. 
Another discourse on crowds cornes from an economie perspective. James Surowiecki 
(2005) is one of the thinkers who pushes forward the idea of thinking of crowds from 
an economie perspective. He sees an intelligence or wisdom amongst crowds whose 
members are not aware of the actions of other members and who are guided by self-
interest. Surowiecki uses the observation of Francis Galton in 1907 who "pointed out 
that the average of ali the entries in a ' guess the weight of the ox ' competition at a 
country fair was amazingly accurate - beating not only most of the individual guesses 
but also those of alleged cattle experts" (Bail , 2014). Hence, crowds produce an 
unconscious wisdom that can be above the intelligent capacity of an individual. For 
this to happen, four elements must be present. First, there must be a diversity of 
opinion. This "refers to information and not to socio-demographics (Surowiecki 2004). 
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It is important that members of a group have different pieces of information so that 
combining their responses enriches the prediction" (Murr, 2011). The second element 
is independence. Following the footsteps of Solomon Asch (1955), Surowiecki argues 
that group-thinking may cloud the judgment of each individual in a crowd (Murr, 
2011 ). So, for a crowd to be wise, the opinions of the individuals should not be 
influenced by those around them. The third element is decentralization, which refers 
to the decentralized knowledge of each individual in the crowd (Murr, 2011). The 
fourth element is aggregation. Aggregation is the idea that through the gathering of ail 
these three elements, the crowd acquires a unique wisdom that surpasses that of an 
individual. Surowiecki's idea is very economic-centred in that it looks at crowds as an 
aggregation of egoistic actors that create a transcendent wisdom by the mere fact of 
putting their individual input in a collective setting. For Surowiecki, collectivity is not 
very productive. Aggregation of actors that follow the ir own self-interest is what makes 
crowds more intelligent than their individual parts. 
There are, thus, two major ways of approaching the idea of crowds. The first cornes 
from crowd psychology and sees crowds as irrational entities. For Crowd psychologists 
like Le Bon and Freud, the individual changes his/her behaviour and becomes part of 
the psyche or sou! of the crowd when he/she participates in it. This is a fairly 
pessimistic way of looking at crowds because it presumes that the individual has no 
agency and control over him/herself once he/she is part of the entity. This is also 
problematic because crowd psychologists never really clarify what type of crowd they 
address. As we saw earlier, even Tarde's notion of artificial versus natural crowds 
started to become problematic when this division was seen as unclear. The second way 
of thinking about crowds looks at it as rational entities. This way of thinking about 
crowds focuses on the technological or economie arguments. For one side, the 
accumulation and aggregation of people through the usage of technology create new 
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kinds of crowds that are smart. This is a very techno-deterministic argument in that it 
sees technology as a neutra! tool that is at the heart of the success of future forms of 
gatherings and protestations. In other words, the fact that people can act together 
without knowing one another through the usage of technology creates a new way of 
being together without really being together. The idea of smart mobs, hence, rises from 
the notion of technology-based participation. The smartness of the rn ob is in the way 
they can achieve collective results only through the usage of ICTs. The other side of 
the rational way of thinking about crowds is argued through economie theory. Here, 
we see the argument of Surowiecki (2005) who sees crowds as entities that can become 
intelligent if and only if each individual in the collective follow their own self-interest 
without knowing about the opinion and decisions of others around them. It puts forward 
the notion of cooperation through individualism. 
1.2.3 Reflection on crowd theories 
The first problem in the literature on crowds is the focus on rationality or irrationality 
of crowds. What I would like to propose, therefore, is to exit this dilemrna by accepting 
that crowds can be rational or irrational depending on the context and there is no way 
we can be certain of wh ether they are completely rational or irrational when we think 
of them. I would like to also bring forward the idea that depending on the type of crowd 
that we want to study, the compartmental attitudes of each type is different from 
another. This is because their collective practices and the way they come together and 
act together is different. Hence, I wish to point to the problem with both irrational and 
rational schools of thought on crowds by arguing that "crowds" must be understood as 
a field of study and not an object of study. Hence, in the field of crowd studies, the 
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dichotomy of rational vs. irrational is not enough to exp lain all crowds. 
The challenge with crowd theory, from the beginning, is that it is a very generalized 
theory that includes ali forms of crowds under one umbrella. The problem that with 
this is a very bizarre generalization that looks to explain how all types of crowds would 
react the same way at all times. For crowd psychologists such as Le Bon, the crowd is 
an entity that has its own collective consciousness and hence any individual who enters 
the crowd would reduce their leve] of consciousness to that of the crowd. It was Tarde 
who spoke of the distinction between crowd and public for the first time by seeing 
public as a positive collective entity and crowds as a negative one (McPhail, 1991). 
Later, Robert Park made a clear distinction between crowds and public by arguing that 
the difference between that two is that "in the public, interaction takes the form of 
discussion [ ... ] the crowd does not discuss and hence it does not reflect" (McPhail , 
1991 , p. 8). Park, and later Blumer, were able to separate a discursive articulation from 
the crowd by distinguishing crowds from the public. However, they did not to 
distinguish between different types of crowds. To this extent, they followed the same 
path as Le Bon and Tarde in generalizing ali crowds under one general category. The 
same goes for thinkers like Serge Tchakhotine (1939) who tried to show how political 
propaganda during the Nazi regime has been able to condition the masses to commit 
atrocious acts by using the theory of social conditioning of Pavlov as a theoretical 
framework. Serge Moscovici (1985) has done the same type of analysis by looking at 
the theories of Le Bon, Tarde, and Freud to conclude how fascist regimes in Italy and 
German y used these theories as the backbone of their strategy to control the masses. 
Both Moscovici and Tchakhotine assume that crowds Jack agency and are easily 
manipulated by propaganda systems. Hence, crowds can not shape and articulate 
discourses or identities because they are irrational and prone to manipulation. This is 
the reason why theories that look at crowds as irrational entities that can be easily 
23 
manipulated are not helpful in understanding protesting crowds since they never see 
protesting crowds as entities with political agency and power. 
The same problem is seen with the theoretical framework of Rheinglod (2005) and 
Surowiecki (2005). They also use the term crowds to address a vague entity that not 
only includes physical crowds but also looks at crowds and their behaviour online. 
While in complete opposite spectrum in their analysis, these authors also have a limited 
perspective on crowds since they look at them as individual entities whose rational 
behaviour creates an intelligence beyond that of individuals that from them. This sort 
of rational (in case of Surowiecki) and techno-centric (in case of Rheingold) vision of 
crowds is problematic since crowds are not really understood as collectives but as an 
aggregation of selfish individuals that magically contribute to a collectivity that is 
beyond them. In this spirit, crowds are thought from a very narrow libertarian 
perspective. 
In both rational and irrational ways ofthinking about crowds, two important reflections 
are missing. First of ali , it seems that a reflection on identity is missing within the 
lecture on existing crowd theories . The only reflection on identity goes back to 
Moscovici and Tchakhotine and the idea that crowds are manipulated and hence their 
identity is conditioned by something that is beyond their grasp, propaganda machine. 
This indeed is a weak argument since we see first hand in protests around the world 
how crowds of protesters from a unique identity that reflects upon their goals and 
aspirations. Hence, crowds form identities and, more importantly, do so through 
different collective practices as weil as collective articulation of discourses relevant to 
the situation they are facing. The second reflection is on agency. In both rational and 
irrational theories on crowds, the reflectio'n on crowds as entities with agency is 
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missing. One reason why such reflection is not clear in both types of crowd theories is 
the fact that these theories tend to generalize ali forms of crowds into one category. 
Hence, there may be no difference between a sports riot and a protest against austerity 
in the eye of these crowd theories . 
The importance of thinking about protesting crowds is as followed : protes ting crowds 
are a form of collective action that articulate particular discourses, produce a collective 
identity and have a particular political agency. For this thesis, hence, I attempt to exit 
the dichotomy of rational vs. irrational crowd theories because they cannot ex plain the 
particularity of a protesting crowd and its importance. I first establish the concept of 
the protesting crowd. In doing so, I explore the two problems that are not addressed in 
any of the literature on crowds. The first is the idea that protesting crowds forma certain 
identity through their collective practices while the second idea is that protesting 
crowds must be seen as a collective with particular political agency that question a 
dominant power. In other words, protesting crowds are important political actors in the 
process of the development and establishment of social movements. 
1.3 The Thesis question 
The concept of protesting crowds, hence, is the centerpiece of this thesis . In this thesis, 
we look at a type of crowd in a specifie context, the Networked Protesting Crowds of 
the Green Movement in Iran in 2009. Hence, we seek to understand the way the Green 
Movement emerged as Networked Protesting Crowds (NPC). This brings us to the 
central question of the thesis as weil as its central hypothesis . The challenge, is to first 
25 
and foremost define what a protesting crowd is and show its importance as a collective 
with political agency within a social movement. 1 would like to look at three theoretical 
frameworks in order to do so. First of ali , 1 would like to argue that the protesting 
crowds of the Green Movement were a collective action that sparked the Green 
Movement as a social movement. In doing so, 1 would like to establish the idea that 
this collective action was able to gain political agency through articulating discourses. 
For this, 1 establish a theoretical frarnework based on the literature proposed by Chantal 
Mouffe and her idea of pluralistic antagonistic democratie practices. 1 then use the 
concept of the "care of the self' by Michel Foucault and argue that one can look at a 
protesting crowd as a collective entity that constructs its identity through collective 
articulations and collective practices. Hence, 1 propose the concept of the "care of the 
collective" in explaining that protesting crowds and their construction of identity is 
rooted in the collective practices of this type of crowd and their way of articulating 
their discourses. In the second volume of Dit et écrit, Michel Foucault talks about how 
one shall use his works as tools in an analytical toolbox in order to see how these tools 
can be used for other reasons. Foucault states the following: 
"1 would like my books to be a kind oftool-box which others can rurnmage through to 
fi nd a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area [ ... ] 1 would like 
[my work] to be useful to an educator, a warden, a magistrate, a conscientious objector. 
1 don't write for an audience, 1 write for users, not readers" (Foucault in Baker, 2007, 
p.83) 
The notion of the "care of the collective" is indeed using the notion ofthe "care of the 
self' as a theoretical tool to look at collective practices in the same way that Foucault 
saw practices of the self as an analytical tool to understand the self and the subject. 
Hence, the notion of the "care of the collective" is a result of my re-appropriation of 
Foucault's toolbox for understanding a notion that he did not attend to during his !ife. 
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Finally, 1 look at the concept of Kairos, or the opportune moment, by arguing that 
protesting crowds produce themselves in opportune moments as a form of rhetorical 
strate gy. 1 use the concept of Kairos in order to distance myself from the idea of 
political opportunity that was proposed in the literature by RM theorists. This is 
because I find the economic-centric approach of RM theorists to be limiting in the 
understanding of the usage of opportune moments . In this thesis I hope to answer this 
central question through one central hypothesis. 
The central question of this thesis is the following: 
How did the Green Movement in Iran in 2009 emerged? 
This question brings us to our central hypothesis: 
The Green Movement in Iran in 2009 emerged as a Networked Protesting Crowd. 
What I attempt to find out is how the Networked Protesting Crowds (NPC) in Iran 
allowed the emergence of Green Movement in the country. In order to do so, 1 aim to 
lay out a conceptual framework that first conceptualizes what a NPC is and then look 
at how one can use this conceptual framework to methodologically analyze the case of 
this particular crowd. The next chapter, thus, establishes the conceptual framework of 
this thesis. 
CHAPTERII 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Metatheory 
Methatheory means the theory of theory and is divided between two theoretical 
perspective of epistemology, and ontology (Miller, 2005, p. 26). Each of these 
theoretical pillars is important in making a theoretical position within this thesis. This 
indeed constructs the research paradigm for this thesis. These theoretical paradigms are 
introduced andjustified in this section before introducing the theoretical framework for 
this thesis. 
2.1.1 Ontology 
Ontology deals with the question ofbeing. It is a philosophical conception that explores 
the "science of what is, of the kinds and structures of abjects, properties, events, 
processes and relations in every area of reality" (Guarino & Smith, n.d., p. 155). 
Robe11o Polio argues that "ontology deals with what can be rationally understood, at 
!east parti ally" (Polio, 2010, p. 1 ). The reason wh y ontology is important is that the 
central question of this thesis is an ontological one since it is looking for the conditions 
that make possible a crowd. In this matter, this thesis takes the ontological position of 
Alain Badiou in looking at the concept of being by looking at the concept of Being 
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alongside Event. In this interpretation, the condition of possibility of a protesting crowd 
depends not only on what is, but also what disturbs and interrupts what is, the Event. 
In understanding Badiou' s notion of Event (l ' évènement), one needs to understand his 
notion ofBeing (l ' être) . For Badiou, the theory ofBeing contains three theories within 
it: a theory of multiplicity, a theory of infinity, and a theory of void (Badiou, 2008). 
Badiou, hence, sees being, or to be, as multiplicity (Meillassoux, 2011 ). Referring to 
Cantor and Plato, Badiou makes the argument that ontology is nothing but mathematics 
since they both share the same three sub-theories of multiplicity, infinity, and void (or 
zero) (Badiou, 2005 , p. 3; Badiou, 2008). He further goes to show that while Being 
con tains multiplicities within itself, it is never the origin of new multiplicities. This is 
because the basic elements that create the framework of Being, the three theories of 
multiplicity, infinity, and void, cannot originate new multiplicities. What Badiou 
means by this is that new multiplicities enter the realm of Being through an Event. 
Badiou situates Event as something that is supplementary to Being or something that 
is in the state of Trans Being (trans-être) since it is a form whereby its appearance and 
disappearance are not separable (Badiou, 2008). Hence, an Event has no objective 
existence in and of itself since it "emerges along with the subject who recognizes it, or 
who nominates it as an event" (Dews, 2008). Indeed, Badiou argues that "the situation 
to-come [the Event] presents everything that the current situation presents, but in 
addition, it presents a truth. By consequence, it presents innumerable new multiples" 
(Badiou, 2005 , p. 408). Hence, an Event is the source of new ideas and multiplicities 
in the field of Being. 
The position of this thesis is that the understanding of being in and of itself is not 
enough in understanding the conditions of possibility of the Green Movement in 2009. 
Instead, these conditions need to be understood through how they entered or re-entered 
Being through an Event and created new multiplicities in the realm of Being. 
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2.1.2 Epistemology 
Epistemology is the study of what knowledge is. The difference between ontology and 
epistemology can be understood through the understanding of the concepts that they 
treat since "ontological concepts are: abject, process, event, whole, part, determination, 
dependency, composition, etc. [while] epistemological concepts are: belief, truth, 
probability, confirmation, knowledge and ail its subsequent modulations (uncertain 
knowledge, wrong knowledge, etc.)" (Polio, 2010, p.4). Hence, epistemology is the 
theory of different kinds ofknowledge and how they are understood (Polio, 201 0). This 
thesis takes the social constructionist approach with a particular focus on discourse 
analysis as method as its epistemological approach and methodology respectively. As 
Vivian Burr (2003) argues, there is no single description of social constructionism. 
However, there are four key assumptions in the social constructionist approach. The 
first is that social constructionists take "a critical stance towards taken-for-granted 
knowledge" (Burr, 2003 , p.2). This approach invites one to "be critical of the idea that 
our observations of the world unproblematically yield its nature to us" (Burr, 2003 , 
p.3). This is indeed in opposition to positivism that assumes that the nature of the world 
can be understood through objective observation (Burr, 2003). The second assumption 
is that our understanding of the world and the way we look at the world "are historically 
and culturally specifie" and relative (Burr, 2003 , p.3). The third assumption sees 
knowledge as something that is sustained by social process. This means that knowledge 
is constructed through social processes and interactions between people and abjects. 
As Burr argues, "it is through the daily interactions between people in the course of 
sociallife that our versions ofknowledge become fabricated" (Burr, 2003 , p.4) . Lastly, 
constructionists argue that "knowledge and social action go together" since 
constructions of the world "are bound up with power relations because they have 
implications for what it is permissible for different people to do, and for how they may 
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treat others" (Burr, 2003 , p.5) . This means that there is a relation between power and 
knowledge whereby "constructions of the world sustain some pattern of social action 
and exclude others" (Burr, 2003 , p.S). Hence, the epistemological stance of this paper 
is one that sees knowledge as something that is socially constructed and that one can 
understand an abject of study such as the protesting crowd by looking into the 
discourses that it produces and its relation to the discourses of social movements before 
it. To this extent, it considers social and historical discourses as key to acquiring 
knowledge about a phenomenon such as the protesting crowds ofthe Green Movement 
in 2009. 
This chapter explores the conceptual framework of this thesis and extends the notion 
ofprotesting crowds to include the idea ofNetworked Protesting Crowds. It first looks 
at establishing the position of protesting crowds within the general context of social 
movements . It then looks at the practices of the collective and see protesting crowds 
as a type of collective action who produces its collective identity through collective 
practices. This protesting crowds recognize themselves and are recognized by others 
because of their particular collective practices. Following this logic, we argue that the 
usage of networks or other tools by protesting crowds is part of the innovative ways 
that they, as collectives, practice their collectivity in creative way. 
2.2 A Plight for Democracy 
The reason why thousands of people were in the streets in Iran in 2009 was because 
their last resort to voice their opinion on poli tics of the country was taken away from 
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them. The slogan "Where is my vote?" is important because it tells exactly of how 
many people in the country felt betrayed by seeing that their votes were not heard and 
were dismissed. This thesis is not about social movements. It is about protesting 
crowds. What makes protesting crowd relevant as an abject of study is their role as an 
entity with political agency that articulates discourses and demonstrates the grievances 
of a collective. What makes Iran's Green Movement complicated is that it began as a 
discursive articulation that showed the desire of a large group of people for change in 
the system of governance and decision making. However, this is not a sudden 
realisation in Iran. lt has been an historie struggle for social justice and fair 
representation since constitutional revolution of 1906. Hence, what NSM calls the 
newness in social movements of post-industrialized societies is not very relevant to the 
Green Movement since historicity and context become vital pillars of understanding 
the Green Movement and why Iran faced its biggest social uprising since the 1979 
Islamic Revolution. The argument by RM about continuity is also not very valid since 
forms of protestations and mobilization have changed through the history of Iran. This 
is because the groups that coordinated together in social movements and their forms of 
coalition have constantly changed throughout the history of the country. Also, the 
forms of protestation in Iran have changed drastically during the history of the country. 
What hasn't changed, however, is a plight for democracy. Be it the constitutional 
revolution, the oil nationalisation movement or the Iranian Revolution, the aim of 
social movements in Iran has al ways been about a pluralistic representation of a diverse 
and complex society. 
NSM's focus on identity becomes vital in understanding the Green Movement because 
there was an identity that was established by the protesting crowds. This identity was 
articulated through the symbolic usage of a story that was rooted in the Shia'a Islam 
history, the story of the battle of Imam Hossein and Yazid in Karbala, Iraq. The 
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importance of this story and the symbolism/discourse used by the protesting crowds in 
relation to this story shows how the Green Movement used a narrative that has helped 
shaping the ideological backbone of the post 1979 revolution Iran as a counter-
hegemonic narrative against the actions of the government. The Green Movement is a 
social movement because it is part of a historie struggle for democracy and social 
justice. What this means, hence, is that what we need as a theoretical framework is not 
a framework on social movements but a framework on understanding democracy. I 
would like to hence use the theoretical framework of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto 
Laclau (1985) to argue that the Green Movement succeeded in articulating clear 
discourses to move toward a pluralistic democracy. In this spirit, the protesting crowds 
of the Green Movement acted as political agents that were concerned with the poli tics 
of the country and the way it approached the fundamental democratie right of the 
nation. 
2.2.1 From Deliberative to Agonistic Pluralistic madel of Democracy 
The challenge of understanding democracy in Iran is that it has never truly existed. 
lran's modern history has been an internai struggle between monarchy, theocracy, and 
secularism and an external struggle with the Western world (England, United States, 
France, Germany, etc.) as weil as the former Soviet Union. The one time Iran saw a 
brief moment of democracy was indeed crushed by the CIA-led coup d'état against 
president Mohammad Mosadegh who decided to fight Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
(now known as British Petroleum) and nationalize the most important natural resource 
of the country, the oil (Gasiorowski, 2013). This, however, does not have to stop us 
from thinking about the Green Movement as a social justice movement that is asking 
to have a voice in the politics of the country. It is hence necessary to reflect on 
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democratie theory of Chantal Mouffe in explaining sorne of the tendencies that came 
out of this movement. 
The reason why we can never see democracy in Iran is that there never has been a 
consensus as to how democracy can be reached in the country. With the Iranian 
revolution of 1979, a form of democracy was proposed, that of an lslamic Republic. 
However, this form of democracy also found challenges in positioning itself as a system 
of reaching consensus. Hence, in thinking democracy in Iran, one needs to have a 
different notion of democracy that is pluralistic in nature and sees conflict at the heart 
of its existence. This is the reason wh y the proposition of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto 
Laclau (1985) is a pertinent theoretical tool in understanding the Green Movement and 
its aspirations. 
2.2.2 Deliberative Democracy 
Mouffe and Laclau's notion of democracy came as a critique of the proponents of 
'deliberative democracy'. The term refers to: 
"a necessary condition for attaining legitimacy and rationality with regard to collective 
decisions making processes in a polity, that the institutions ofthis polity are so arranged 
that what is considered in the co mm on interest of ali results from processes of collective 
deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal individuals" 
(Benhabib in Mouffe, 1999 p.743). 
This means that through deliberation and rational discussion, a 'rational consensus' 
must be reached. Reaching this consensus is based on a procedure that requires 
impartiality openness, lack of coercion, and unanimity. Combining these values "will 
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guide the discussion towards generalizable interests to the agreement of all participants 
and they will produce legitimate outcomes" (Mouffe, 1999, p. 74 7). Deliberative 
democracy, hence, sees the process of public discussion in rational and inclusive 
manner as the best way to reach ideal discourses that are inclusive and achieves a 
consensus between the participants in the public discussion. In other words, "it is 
possible, thanks to the adequate procedures of deliberation, to reach forms of agreement 
that would satisfy both rationality (understood as defence of liberal rights) and 
democratie legitimacy (as represented by popular sovereignty) (Mouffe, 2009, p. 83). 
Mouffe proposes a new way of thinking about democracy by critiquing deliberative 
democracy model from two fronts. The first is the way such models aim to reach certain 
forms of consensus. Mouffe sees the concept of consensus as problematic. Using 
Jacque Derrida's work, she argues that deconstruction warns us of how "establishing 
consensus without exclusion is offundamental importance for grasping what is at stake 
in democratie politics" (Critchley & Mouffe, 1996, p. 9). Mouffe sees that thinking of 
democracy through the lens of consensus brings the dangerous risk of exclusion of 
voices that have not participated in the reaching of consensus and the undecided voices. 
Referring to Derrida's work, she argues that "when we accept that every consensus 
exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of power, and 
that it always entails sorne form of exclusion, we begin to envisage politics in a 
different way" (Critchley et al. , 1996, p.l 0) . Another critique of deliberative 
democracy attacks the idea ofuniversalism. In her critique of Habermas, Mouffe argues 
that Habermas "believes that the emergence of universalist forms of morality and law 
is the expression of an irreversible collective process of learning, and that to reject this 
implies a rejection of modemity, undermining the very foundation of democracy's 
existence" (Mouffe, 2005, p. 9). 1t is this idea of universalism that makes Mouffe 
separates herself from deliberative democracy. This is because Mouffe sees that there 
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is "no longer a role to be played in this project (project of democracy) by the 
epistemological perspective of the Enlightenment" (Mouffe, 2005 , p.lO). For this 
reason, Mouffe proposes the Pluralistic Agonistic mode! ofDemocracy. 
2.2.3 Agonistic Pluralistic Democracy 
The fundamental basis underlying the pluralistic agonistic mode! of democracy can be 
found in Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau's book, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
The book proposes to look beyond class since "class is never an a priori formation to 
the realization of hegemony; any subject position is already caught up in hegemonie 
relations" (Ballvé, 2011 ). To this extent, they follow the same critique as the NSM 
theorists in seeing the limitations of Marxist theories with their focus on class. 
However, instead of loo king at identity formations , Mouffe and Laclau look at two key 
concepts of 'hegemony' and 'antagonism' to grasp the nature of the poli ti cal. For them, 
"the concept of hegemony supposes a theoretical field dominated by the category of 
articulation" (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 93). They continue by defining articulation 
as "any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is 
modified as a result of the articulatory practices" (Laclau et al. , 1985, p.l 05). Hence 
articulation is central to the idea of hegemony because it is through articulation that a 
certain hegemonie order is created and it is also through articulation that hegemonie 
orders are questioned. Articulation, bence, results in hegemonie orders and conflicts 
that question hegemonie orders. What articulation produces, in Mouffe and Laclau's 
view, is the notion of discourse. For them, discourse refers to "the structured totality 
resulting from the articulatory practice" (Laclau et al. , 1985. p.l 05). Unlike Foucault, 
they reject the distinction between discursive vs. non-discursive practices by arguing 
the following: 
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"a) every abject is constituted as an abject of discourse, insofar as no abject is given 
outside every discursive condition of emergence; and b) that any distinction between 
what is usually called the linguistic and behavioural aspects of a social practice, is 
either an incorrect distinction or ought to find its place as a differentiation within the 
social production of meaning, which is structured under the form of discursive totality" 
(Laclau et al. , 1985, 1 07). 
Simply put, discourse includes every abject that it constitutes. The moment one gives 
meaning to something, it becomes part of a discourse. Hence, there is not distinction 
between discursive and non-discursive abjects. Moreover, discourse is a result of 
practices of articulation. This is important because understanding what is hegemonie 
and where hegemony is requires one to look at articulation and practices that articulate 
discourses. This means that articulation is the practice that creates discourses and 
discourses are central elements that form hegemonie and counter-hegemonic orders. 
This brings us to the importance of antagonism and the idea of Radical Negativity. 
Through their rejection of universalism, Laclau and Mouffe argue for the necessity to 
"acknowledge the dimension of the political as the ever-present possibility of 
antagonism and this requires [ ... ] coming to terms with the Jack of a final ground and 
the undecidability that prevades every order" (Mouffe, 2008). To this extent, every 
social order consists of hegemonie orders that have been resulted from discourse 
articulations and these orders are never fixed since they can be challenged through the 
same process of articulation of discourse. Thinking of democracy as antagonistic, 
hence, requires one to reject universalism and accept the notion that democracy can 
never be reached in consensus but in constant conflicts that arrange hegemonie order 
as well as putting them into question though discourse articulation. This reflection has 
led Mouffe to continue to work on two concepts. The first is the idea of political vs. 
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Politics and the second is the notion of pluralism as an alternative to the notion of 
universalism that has been used by the proponents of deliberative democracy. 
As it was said in the previous paragraph, the notion of Radical Negativity shows the 
constant possibility of antagonism and requires one to come to terms "with the Jack of 
final ground and the decidability that pervades every order" (Wagner, & Mouffe, 2013 
p.2). This has led us to the reflection that 1) "any order is al ways the expression of a 
particular configuration of power relations" (Mouffe et al. , 2013 , p.2); 2) hegemonie 
orders rise from articulation practices and; 3) Every order is "susceptible to being 
challenged by counter-hegemonic practices that attempt to disarticulate it in an effort 
to install another form of hegemony" (Mouffe et. al. 2013 , p.2). In The Return of the 
Political, and The Democratie Paradox, Mouffe continues on this reflection and shows 
how two notions of The Political/Politics must be seen as an ensemble in order to 
understand how hegemonie orders are put into question and new hegemonie orders are 
introduced. The political, for Mouffe, is "the antagonistic dimension which is inherent 
to ali hurnan societies" (Mouffe et. al. 2013 , p.2). The importance of the poli ti cal for 
Mouffe is that "a project of radical and plural democracy has to come to terms with the 
dimension of conflict and antagonism within the political and has to accept the 
consequences of irreducible plurality of values" (Mouffe, 2005, p. 152). Hence, 
political is a dimension of antagonism that keeps a society pluralistic. The political is 
rooted in the notion of Radical Negativity in the sense that it is there to question norms 
and orders and keep active the critical and conflictual aspect of society that must stay 
alive in order for a pluralistic mode! of democracy to thrive. The political dimension 
keeps antagonism alive and allows for challenging hegemonie orders that would 
otherwise not be challenged. Mouffe argues that political "can take many forms and 
can emerge in diverse social relations" (Mouffe et al. 2013 , p.2). She sees the political 
as being an important player in the notion of poli tics. For her, poli tics is "refers to the 
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ensemble of practices, discourse and institutions that seeks to establish a certain arder 
and to organize human coexistence in conditions which are always potentially 
conflicting, since they are affected by the dimension of 'the political'" (Mouffe et al. , 
2013 , p.2). The political , hence, is an ensemble of choices amongst conflicting 
alternatives that play a role in influencing politics and hegemonie orders. What the 
political brings to the table is the understanding of identity as relational by the premise 
that identity cornes out of difference. In another word, political identity, for instance, 
come out of identifying oneself to a set of discourses in relation to other discourses by 
acknowledging the difference of one's identity to other identities . Mouffe takes this 
notion of identity from the work of Jacques Derrida and the notion of 'differance'. She 
argues that "the affirmation of a difference is a precondition for the existence of any 
identity [ ... ] (therefore) we can understand why politics, which always deals with 
collective identities, is about the constitution of a 'we' which requires as its very 
condition of possibility the demarcation of a 'they'" (Mouffe et al. , 2013 , p.5). 
Mouffe understanding of pluralism cornes from the critique of the way this notion is 
understood in liberal democracies. She cornes to show how the liberal democracies see 
pluralism as a set of diverse perspectives that cannat ail be adopted and instead are put 
together to constitute a harmonious and non-conflictual ensemble (Mouffe et al. , 2013). 
She sees aproblem with this notion ofharmonious assemblage ofperspectives because 
of how it has to "negate the political in its antagonistic dimension in arder to thrive" 
(Mouffe et al. , 2013 , p. 3). The negation of the poli ti cal does not make it disappear 
since the antagonistic nature ofhuman societies will never disappear. This is the reason 
why Mouffe proposes the notion of Agonistic Pluralistic Democratie mode!. This is a 
mode! where the notion of conflict is accepted as the reality of human societies. The 
difference, however, cornes in the way subjects are recognized in the democratie 
conflicts. Antagonistic refers to struggle between enemies while agonistic refers to 
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struggle between adversaries. This is a very important shift in terrninology since within 
the dynamic of us/them, 'they' should not be seen as "enemies to be destroyed, but as 
adversaries whose ideas might be fought , even fiercely, but whose right to defend those 
ideas is not to be questioned" (Mouffe et al. , 2013 , p.7). Hence, pluralism accepts the 
notion of difference. However, it sees the subjects that are in the conflictual relation as 
adversaries instead of enemies. This, in turn, allows the political to function inside a 
plural society and becomes an important part of a plural society. What her proposition 
cornes down to is the notion that antagonism still exists within agonistic politics. 
However, the conflict between different adversaries is "played out under conditions 
regulated by a set of democratie procedures accepted by the adversaries" (Mouffe et 
al. , 2013 , p.9). To this extent, the agonistic mode! of democracy accepts the 
antagonistic dimension of the political and seeks to find ways to establish different 
ways of including both us/them in the process instead of overcoming their differences 
by attempting to find a consensus. 
2.2.4 Where is Pluralistic Agonistic Democracy in Iran? 
This simple answer to this question is: Nowhere. Iran is not a liberal democracy. It is a 
unique mode! of governance that was created to integrate Islamic principles of 
governance with parliamentary mode! of democracy. Moreover, the subject of this 
thesis is not really about what democracy in Iran is but how the largest protest 
movement in the country after the 1979 revolution emerged particularly at the time it 
emerged. Mouffe admitted to her shortsightedness in using the terrn 'modern 
democracy' as the manner of generalizing democratie practices around the world. She 
makes this clear in her recent book's introduction by stating that "Have 1 not myself 
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repeatedly referred to 'modern democracy' to designate the Western mode!? In truth, I 
have ceased doing it in recent writings: I now try to avoid speaking of 'modern 
democracy"' (Mouffe et al. , 2013 , pJCV). She continues to explain how her judgment 
on the idea of'modern democracy' was put into question when she saw the role oflslam 
in the Arab Spring and how "it would indeed be a fatal mistake to force those countries 
to adopt the Western mode!, refusing to recognize the central place of Islam in their 
culture" (Mouffe et al. , 2013 , p.XVI). However, she still makes the point that pluralistic 
mode! of democracy is the best way to formulate democracy around the world because 
each culture can make its own pluralistic version of such democratie mode!. So, one 
cannot put the lens of 'modern democracy' in thinking about the events that happened 
in Iran. What one can do, however, is to look at certain theoretical reflections within 
such theory to reflect upon the Green Movement in Iran and the role of protesting 
crowds in shaping this movement. 
We take two mam elements from Mouffe and Laclau's ideas. First, the Green 
Movement emerged as a social movement with a very simple question, "where is my 
vote?". This statement is a discourse that emerged through many forrns of articulatory 
practices. As a theoretical framework, hence, we use discourse to not only talk about 
this slogan, but also other articulatory practices that emerged from the Green 
Movement as different forms of collective practices. This would include the goals and 
aspirations of the movement as weil as their collective practices. What I am looking 
for is two things . The first is to see the discourse of the Green Movement as a historical 
continuation of a plight for an inclusive societal system. The second goes to the mere 
definition of articulation which includes any practice that modifies an already 
established identity as a result of articulatory practices. I seek to see for how 
articulation was made possible and what sort of identity was modified in order to 
articulate the discourses that were articulated during the Green Movement. In doing so, 
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I search for how the Green Movement developed its identity through its collective 
practices. The second element that I use from Mouffe's framework is the idea of 
political vs. Poli tics. An important contribution of Mouffe is the role of the political, 
the antagonistic dimension in human societies that keeps questioning the hegemonie 
order, in influencing politics. For Mouffe, the political can take many forms. The 
importance of the political for this thesis is that we position the protesting crowds as a 
collective action that articulates counter-hegemonic discourses. ln the case of Iran, this 
collective action questioned the legitimacy of an election in ever-present force and with 
it asked how they are truly represented in the society. Hence, the Protesting Crowd of 
the Green Movement in Iran, as a collective action, were a form of what Mouffe coins 
'the political' who questioned many aspects of the politics in the country during the 
Green Movement. Studying the protesting crowd as a collective action is pertinent in 
the case of the Green Movement because it tells the importance of how such form of 
crowd can be seen as collectives with the capacity to articulate political discourses and 
affirm the importance of radical negativity when looking at a movement such as the 
Green Movement. 
What is missing from Mouffe's theory is a way to understand how collective identity 
is formed. In fact, Mouffe has a proposition for understanding political identity. She 
sees it as something that is "inscribed within an anti-essentialist theoretical framework 
according to which the social agent is constituted by an ensemble of subject positions 
that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of difference" (Mouffe, 1992, p.28). 
Identity of a social agent, for Mouffe, is in a plurality of diverse discourses "among 
which there is no necessary relation but a constant movement of over-determination 
and displacement" (Mouffe, 1992, p.28). The reflection of Mouffe on identity is about 
the way one can think of how a radical democratie "citizens" can be envisaged within 
the framework of a radical plural democratie society. This does not really help us in 
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understanding how the protesting crowds of the Green Movement were able to produce 
a collective identity as a political collective during the post-electoral uprising in 2009. 
In what follows, I pro vide a definition of protesting crowds by arguing that it is a form 
of collective action that emerges in an opportune moment to articulate particular 
discourses that shape what Mouffe calls 'the political'. Hence, at its core, a protesting 
crowd is a political subject. I continue this reflection by showing how the notion of 
networks can be used to look at Networked Protes ting Crowds as a type of protesting 
crowds that uses networks and networked technologies for expanding the reach of its 
discourse to a global scale. 
2.3 Protesting Crowds 
What is a protesting crowd? From the literature that was presented on the two major 
theories on social movements, I would like to first argue that the these schools are not 
sufficient independently in explaining the complexities of social movements in today's 
world, especially with the ad vent of globalization and the advancement ofiCTs. When 
considering social movements, one must not on! y consider the ways in which resources 
are used, but also the identity (or identities) that are formed as a result of a social 
movement. Mobilization is indeed an important element in understanding the structure 
of a social movement. However, as Polletta and Jasper (2011) point out, the RM's 
"emphasis on the how of mobilization over the why of it, their focus on the state as 
target of action, and their dependence on rationalistic images of individual action left 
important issues unexamined" (P. 238). This is indeed challenging because the RM 
school puts aside a great array of characteristics that shape a social movement and its 
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identity formation and focuses its attention on the actions of the individuals 
participating in the movement. On the other hand, the NSM School has a greater focus 
on the construction of identity and social perspective on social movements. For this 
school, social movements do not always have to be political since they revolve around 
the established identity of a movement. Moreover, these movements are new because 
their concerns are no longer solely material but also culturally and socially grounded. 
The critiques of this school point out that much reasoning behind the "newness" of 
today's social movements is debatable. As Pichardo (1997) points out, many claims of 
the newness of social movements prove to be false because such things as movements 
on the basis of identity has existed before. Moreover, he argues that the new social 
movements have a biased focus on leftist movements without consideration of right-
wing and conservative social movements. Moreover, the discourse of new social 
movement theories Jacks conversation surrounding the organization and mobilization 
of social movements by putting too much emphasis on identities and identity 
movements. Lastly, both schools ofthought seem to focus on social movernents in the 
western world with little attention to nuances of social movements in other countries 
that have experienced different social , political , and historical experiences. 
The literature sunounding crowds is fairly limited in explaining protesting crowds as 
a category of study. Crowd theories usually throw ali types of crowds into one general 
category and propose an either/or dichotomy in explaining them. This causes a very 
fundamental problem since it limits the reader' s ability to geta grasp on what exactly 
these theories are talking about. Moreover, crowd theories seem to downplay the 
importance of crowds as a form of collective action within social movements. Crowd 
theories seem to miss the altruistic aspect of crowds by arguing that they are either 
irrational entities susceptible to manipulation or an aggregation of rational individuals 
who, by following their self-interest, create a transcendental-like intelligence. To tackle 
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this problem, I would like to argue that one can look at protesting crowds as a form of 
collective action, consisting of a collection of collective practices that distinguish them 
from other forms of crowds. Protesting crowds are particular in that they are collective 
actions that articulate the political within the sphere of the social. 
In this section, I first argue that protesting crowds produce themselves in a Kairos (an 
opportune moment). Therefore, as a collective, protesting crowds use opportune 
moments to produce themselves and their discourses. I further argue that protesting 
crowds are political subjects that articulate what Chantal Mouffe terms 'the political' in 
the sphere of politics. At this point, I move away from Mouffe's notion of 
understanding identity through difference and argue that identity is formed by 
protesting crowds through their collective practices. Using Michel Foucault's notion of 
souci de soi ( care of the self), I argue that collectives su ch as protesting crowds develop 
notions of collective identity through their collective practices and formulate a 
collective ethos through such practices. In the same way, protesting crowds recognize 
themselves as such entities through their collective practices. I finally look at 
globalization and the idea of networked social movements to introduce the notion of 
Networked Protesting Crowds (NPC) and how such notion is part of the opportunistic 
usage of tools practices of protesting crowds to articulate the ir discourses and connect 
with other networks through the usage of Information Communication Technologies. 
2.3.1 Collective Action 
Alberto Melucci defines collective action as "a set of social practices (i) involving 
simultaneously a number of individuals or groups, (ii) exhibiting similar morphological 
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characteristics in contiguity of time and space, (iii) implying a social field of 
relationships and (iv) the capacity of people involved ofmaking sense ofwhat they are 
doing" (Melucci, 1996, p.20). For Melucci, crowd is a form of collective action since 
it has all the four characteristics that were mentioned in the definition above. Moreover, 
it "offers individuals (in the crowd) the chance to take part in a collective that remains 
undefined, that leaves the options open ... the crowd off ers an open field in which the 
individual may project her or his expectations, desires, drearns" (Melucci , 1996, p. 
372). For Melucci , then, the crowd is a place where identities form since the crowd, as 
an entity, leaves options open for different interpretations and identity formation. 
Lastly, Melucci argues that "crowds can be seen as the most elementary exarnple of a 
potential collective, and therefore, one in which individuals already interact in the 
production of meanings and orientation"(Melucci, 1996, p.3 72). This is an important 
element to point out. While Melucci, just like many, falls short of specifically 
addressing protesting crowds, he sees crowds as very rudimentary entities within social 
movements and as very important forms of collective action. In this thesis, following 
Melucci, 1 would like to argue that a protesting crowd is a form of collective action. 
This leaves two questions unanswered: How do protesting crowds produce themselves? 
And, how do they form their identity? The next two sections tackle these two questions . 
2.3.2 Crowds and Kairos 
In Greek mythology, Caerus is the name of the youngest son of Zeus, who represents 
the spirit of opportunity (theoi Greek Mythology, n.d.). Kairos is comrnonly used in 
the tradition of rhetoric as a technique of seizing the moment. One can understand it in 
relation to Chronos which refers to the chronological way oftime. These two concepts 
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are not really opposed so much as complementary to one another. According to Miller 
(1994), "Kairos refers not to the specifie responsiveness of discourse to situation but 
to the dynamic relationship between discourse and situation" (Miller, 1994, p. 83). This 
dynamic relationship is one that cornes to !ife at a precise moment and it is the 
recognition of the moment and its usage that becomes particularly important as a 
rhetorical technique. Kairos, hence, "tells us to look for the particular opportunity in a 
given moment, to find-or construct-an opening in the here and now, in order to 
achieve something there and then" (Miller, 1994, p. 83). One ofthe challenges in crowd 
theory has been the Jack of a definition on where crowds come from and how they are 
formed. This is partially because the analysis of crowds begins once they are already 
established. In theories that focus on the irrationality of crowds, they are entities that 
are self-generated (Rubio, 2010, p. 5). Within the theories that see crowds as rational, 
crowds are produced as inputs of individuals that follow their individualistic interest 
(Surowiecki, 2005). 
What I would like to argue is that protesting crowds produce themselves in an 
opportune moment. This opportune moment acts as a situation which can be used as a 
rhetorical argumentation technjque against a dominant discourse. There are three 
advantages to using Kairos as a theoretical framework in explaining how protesting 
crowds form themselves . First, Kairos is a strategie method in rhetoric. In this sense, 
usage of the opportune moment by protes ting crowds is a strategie rn ove on their part 
in challenging the dominant discourse. Another important advantage ofthinking about 
Kairos as the way protesting crowds are formed is that it shows the reason behind the 
creative nature of protesting crowds. As a rhetorical strategy, Kairos brings about the 
dynamic between situation and discourse. As a situation emerges, creative ways of 
formulating counter discourses through the use of available materials also emerge. 
Subsequently, one can imagine new ways ofusing the different tools protesting crowds 
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utilize to make their voices beard and reinforce their message. Finally, Kairos responds 
to the problem of wh y protesting crowds on the Internet, for instance on social media, 
can still be considered crowds. Kairos removes the ambiguity that a crowd can only 
exist in one physical space at a time. Protesting crowds produced in the modem world 
no longer solely follow time chronologically since their existence as networks have 
reconfigured them to reproduce themselves in different ways that are not limited to the 
constraint of time and space. Kairos can be used to ex plain wh y crowds in a network 
can still be considered as crowds. lt directs our attention to the opportunistic and 
creative function of protesting crowds instead of focusing on a definition that is based 
in space and time. 
2.3.3 Care ofthe Self/Care of the collective 
Foucault (1984) introduces the notion of "care of the self' ' in order to talk about the 
Ethics of the Subject. In fact, the subject bas played a very central role in the 
development ofFoucault's thought. In one of his conferences in the 80s, Foucault states 
that the goal of his academie career is to understand the creation of the subject. " [My 
goal] has not been to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations 
of such an analysis. My objective, instead, bas been to create a history of the different 
modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects" (Foucault, 1982, p. 
777). For Foucault, to understand the subject, one bas no choice but to tackle the 
question of power and how the relations of power create certain subjects. For instance, 
the use of slogans by a crowd is an act that seeks recognition of its collective discourse 
as a practice of its collective self. What is central in a protesting crowd is the set of 
collective practices that separates it from other types of crowds, such as sports crowds 
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or crowds in a marketplace or bar (Rokni, 2014). One can take the concept of the Ethics 
ofthe Subject by Foucault and use it to examine the Ethics of the Collective by looking 
at how the practices of a collective make it recognizable as a collective. In other words, 
what one understands as identity formation within a collective cornes from the practices 
of a collective. As a result, a protesting crowd cornes to recognize itself as such through 
practices that are particular to this type of crowd. As Mellucci argues, a crowd is a 
space where individuals interact to produce meaning. One can argue that these 
interactions are indeed the collective practices within a crowd and that what they 
produce is the collective identity of a protesting crowd. 
2.4 Globalization and Networked Protesting Crowds 
We have established the idea ofprotesting crowds. In this section, we look at how we 
can theoretically approach the usage of ICT by protesting crowds and how such 
technologies impact the collective practices of the protes ting crowds. 
2.4.1 Globalization and the Networked Social Movements 
A great number of theorists have tried to explore the changes that have led to 
globalization and one ofthese thinkers is Manuel Castells. He has proposed the concept 
of Networked Societies and argues that "around the end of the second millennium of 
the common era a number of major social, technological , economie, and cultural 
transformations came together to give rise to a new form of society, the network 
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s o c i e t y "  ( C a s t e  I l s ,  2 0 1 1 ,  p .  x i i ) .  F o r  h i m ,  t h e  s o c i e t y  t h a t  w e  l i v e  i n  n o w  i s  m o v i n g  
t o w a r d s  n e t w o r k e d  s o c i e t i e s  a n d  i t  i s  m a d e  u p  o f  " i n d i v i d u a l s ,  b u s i n e s s e s  a n d  s t a t e  
o p e r a t i n g  f r o m  t h e  l o c a l ,  n a t i o n a l  a n d  i n t o  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a r e n a " ( C a s t e l l s  &  C a r d o s o ,  
2 0 0 5 ,  p .  x i x ) .  T h e s e  s o c i e t i e s  a r e  a  r e s u l t  o f  " t h e  e m e r g e n c e  o f  a  n e w  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
p a r a d i g m ,  b a s e d  i n  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  t e c h n o l o g i e s ,  t h a t  t o o k  s h a p e  i n  
t h e 1 9 7 0 s  a n d  d i f f u s e d  u n e v e n l y  a r o u n d  t h e  w o r l d "  ( C a s t e l l s ,  2 0 0 5 ,  p .  3 ) .  I n  o t h e r  
w o r d s ,  t h e  n e t w o r k  s o c i e t y  e m e r g e d  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  a  s h i f t  t o w a r d  n e w  f o r r n s  o f  
I n f o r m a t i o n  C o m m u n i c a t i o n  T e c h n o l o g i e s  ( I C T s )  s u c h  a s  t h e  c e l l  p h o n e ,  t h e  p e r s o n a !  
c o m p u t e r ,  a n d  t h e  I n t e r n e t .  A s  C a s t e l l s  e x p l a i n s ,  n e t w o r k  s o c i e t y  i s  " a  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  
b a s e d  o n  n e t w o r k s  o p e r a t e d  b y  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  t e c h n o l o g i e s  b a s e d  i n  
m i c r o e l e c t r o n i c s  a n d  d i g i t a l  c o m p u t e r  n e t w o r k s  t h a t  g e n e r a t e ,  p r o c e s s ,  a n d  d i s t r i b u t e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  k n o w l e d g e  a c c u m u l a t e d  i n  t h e  n a d e s  o f  t h e  n e t w o r k s  
( C a s t e l l s ,  2 0 1 1 ,  p .  7 ) .  F o r  t h i s  r e a s o n ,  n e t w o r k  s o c i e t i e s  a r e  " k n o w l e d g e - b a s e d "  
s o c i e t i e s .  O n e  o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  n e t w o r k e d  s o c i e t y  i s  i t s  " s h i f t  f r o m  
g r o u p s  a n d  h i e r a r c h i e s  t o  n e t w o r k s  a s  s o c i a l  a n d  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  m o d e l s - l o o s e r ,  
f l e x i b l e  a r r a n g e m e n t s  o f h u m a n  a f f a i r s "  ( B e n k l e r ,  2 0 0 6 ,  p .  1 8 ) .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  a  f e a t u r e  
o f  a  n e t w o r k  s o c i e t y  i s  i t s  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  w i t h  l o o s e l y  a f f i l i a t e d  c o n n e c t i o n s  
b e t w e e n  i n d i v i d u a l s  a n d  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  w i t h i n  a  n e t w o r k .  C e n t r a l  t o  a l l  o f  t h i s  i s  t h e  
i d e a  t h a t  t e c h n o l o g y  i s  d e t e r r n i n e d  b y  s o c i e t y  i n  t h a t  i t  i s  s o c i e t y  t h a t  " s h a p e s  
t e c h n o l o g y  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  n e e d s ,  v a l u e s ,  a n d  i n t e r e s t s  o f  p e o p l e  w h o  u s e  t h e  
t e c h n o l o g y "  ( C a s t e l l s ,  2 0 0 5 ) .  
I n  h i s  l a t e r  b o o k ,  N e t w o r k s  o f  O u t r a g e  a n d  H o p e :  S o c i a l  M o v e m e n t s  i n  t h e  I n t e r n e t  
A g e ,  C a s t e l l s  l o o k s  a t  t h e  " n a t u r e  a n d  p e r s p e c t i v e s  o f  n e t w o r k e d  s o c i a l  m o v e m e n t s "  
( C a s t e l l s ,  2 0 1 3 ,  p .  4 ) .  N e t w o r k ,  i n  h i s  b o o k ,  h a s  a  d o u b l e  m e a n i n g :  " a )  t h e  s o c i a l  
n e t w o r k s  o f  a c t i v i s t s  a n d  b )  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  I n t e r n e t  a s  g l o b a l  n e t w o r k  o f  c o m p u t e r  
n e t w o r k s  i n  s o c i a l  m o v e m e n t s "  ( F u c h s ,  2 0 1 2 ,  p .  7 7 6 ) .  T h e  b o o k  i s  i n d e e d  a n  
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exploration of his previous works on social movements (Fuchs, 2012). In the book, 
Castells argues that because we live in a networked society, our social movements are 
also spread through "a world wired by the Internet" (Castells, 2013, p.2). To him, social 
movements can "only form if there are the emotions of hope and outrage and these 
emotions are communicated to others on a large-scale" (Fuchs, 2012, p. 779). 
Therefore, for a social movement to occur, the two elements of hope and outrage must 
be communicated by any means available. In an age of the Internet and social media, 
these principal tools are used to communicate this message due to their wide 
accessibility and low cost. Castells puts great emphasis on how technology plays a very 
central role in the mobilization of recent social movements to the extent that "Internet 
communication created street protests, which means that without the Internet there 
would have been no street protests" (Fuchs, 2012, p. 780). He goes through different 
cases such as the Arab Spring, the M-1 5 movement in Spain, and Occupy Wall Street 
and looks at how these movements were largely organized and diffused online and how 
the physical protests resulted from these online activities. 
2.4.2 Networked Protesting Crowd 
I would like to base my idea of Networked Protesting Crowds (NPC) partially on 
Castells' thesis in his latest book while keeping distance from sorne claims that he has 
put forward. I would like to first argue that Network, in the term Networked Protesting 
Crowds, has a similar double meaning to what Castells proposed in his conception of 
network societies. The first meaning is social. This means that NPC consist of networks 
of different social groups that come together around a common discourse. This also 
includes the phenomenon of transnational crowds wherein networks of solidarity are 
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built physically and online in different places in the world. For instance, during the 
2009 Green Movement, there were protesting crowds which gathered in many of the 
major cities in the world to show solidarity with those who went to the streets of Iran 
to protest the election results (Burns & Eltham, 2009; Papic & Noonan, 2011). 
Moreover, these protesting crowds consisted of many individuals, organizations and 
groups who did not necessarily follow the same discourse. As Valentine Moghadam 
bas argued, "the economie, political, and cultural dimensions of globalization [ ... ] 
create opportunities and engender grievances that have resulted in a range of forms of 
collective action on a transnational scale" (Moghadam, 2012, p. 204). Hence, NPC are 
in nature transnational due to the nature of globalization as a phenomenon that bas 
changed the economie, poli ti cal and cultural dimensions of the world we live in and 
they include a multiplicity of interests that come together around a common discourse. 
The second meaning of network cornes from the role of the Internet in creating online 
networks. Here my views differ with Castells ' in that I argue that the NPC use tools 
available to them in order to produce themselves as a global phenomenon. This is 
intrinsic to the nature of humans as individual or collective beings with the creative 
capacity to see potential in tools around them. This does not mean, however, that the 
nature of protesting crowds has shifted to the extent that their existence depends on 
networks. On the contrary, I believe that NPC's usage of networked technologies is 
within the strategie nature of this type of crowds since the different uses of ICTs add 
to the repertoire of collective practices that already exists amongst protesting crowds. 
In other words, the use of networked technologies as tools for creating loosely tied 
networks is what makes protesting crowds to become Networked Protesting Crowds. 
Benjamin Shepard (2011), in his book Play, Creativity, and Social Movements , turns 
our attention to the role of creativity and play in social movements by taking a historical 
look at surrealist and situationist movements and linking them to recent forms of social 
movement that involves play. While this paper bas no intention oftackling the subject, 
1 would still like to argue that usage of available tools by NPC is a form of creativity 
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that cornes from making connections between practices of using a technology and 
finding other ways ofusing it as a tool for protesting. As such, 1 would like to maintain 
that NPC keep many of the collective practices of a protesting crowd and use 
teclmology creatively as a tool to articulate their discourse. Subsequently, 1 would like 
to add two dimensions to the characteristics of NPC that distinguishes them from 
protesting crowds. First, NPC transcend space in the sense that they are no longer 
limited by a national boundary. This is because they can appear in multiple physical 
places as weil as online. Second, they transcend time in the sense that they no longer 
have to appear together at once. They can appear at different times around the world or 
they can appear as aggregates of information online. 
2.4.3 Networks as opportunities 
Protesting crowds are a form of collective action that articulate their discourses within 
the political dimension of a society. This type of crowd forms itselfthrough Kairos and 
uses opportune moments along the way to produce counter discourses in creative ways. 
The dichotomy between whether crowds are rational or irrational is irrelevant when it 
cornes to explaining protesting crowds because these ideas do not really look deep 
enough into seeing these crowds as forms of collective actions with particular collective 
practices. Thus, 1 propose to fundamentally exit this dichotomy by looking at how 
protes ting crowds recognize them sel v es as su ch through the pro cess of the care of the 
collective and how they help in shaping the identity of a social movement through 
different practices of the collective. 
Using this reflection, one can see that networked technologies have provided new ways 
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for social movements to organize and recognize themselves as collectives. They have 
been proven to be great tools for the diffusion and engagement, on a globalized level, 
of protesting crowds. In analyzing NPC, one needs to look at how their collective 
practices have been able to shape the identity of a social movement in today's world . 
One needs to also take a look at the way opportune moments were used by this type of 
crowd in relation to confronting dominant discourse through different creative forms. 
The mere usage of tools such as the Internet shows how NPC invent creative ways of 
mobilizing and using the surrounding resources to create counter-discourses. Hence, 
the usage of Kairos is something that is embedded in the nature of NPC as a form of 
collective action. Lastly, there should always be a reflection on how discourses are 
articulated and how they play a role in the relation between the political vs . politics as 
the NPC articulates these discourses 
CHAPTERIII 
METHODOLOGY 
Methodology is the way one tries to answer a research question. For the purpose of this 
thesis, qualitative research is used in order to gather and analyze data necessary to 
answer the central question of the thesis. The thesis looks at how three social 
movements of feminist movement, the student movement, and the reform movement 
were able to come together to form the protesting crowds of the Green Movement in 
Iran. lt looks at how these three movements were able come together by looking at their 
discourses and their relation to the discourse of the Green Movement. To achieve its 
goals, the thesis combines two approaches to answer the central question of the thesis . 
The first approach is historical research while the second approach is discourse 
analysis. The historical analysis is used to provide the context for the discourse analysis 
by tracing the roots of the discourses of the protesting crowds of the Green Movement. 
3.1 Research Approach 
Qualitative research is an approach to research that investigates "complex or sensitive 
issues that cannot be reduced to a simple, objective, quantitative study" (Creswell in 
Davis, Powell, & Lachlan, 2013). A qualitative researcher looks at "patterns, symbols, 
norms, rules, and assumptions in a culture to understand how people create meaning 
and how these meanings influence what people do and why they do it" (Davis et al. , 
20 13). The reason wh y this research is considering this approach is because it is 
answering a complex and open question that cannot be quantified in any sense. It is the 
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interpretive aspect of the research that is important for this research since the answer 
to the central question of the thesis requires one to look deeply into the discourse of 
social movements in Iran and its history. As Bonneville argues, qualitative research 
allows one to "study [a subjet] in all its complexity and depth" (Bonneville, Grosjean, 
& Lagacé, 2007, p. 156). This is indeed necessary for this research because the only 
way to understand the conditions of possibility of a protesting crowd is to have an in-
depth look at the socio-political situation in the country and the discourses that lead the 
Iranian people to go to the streets and protest. This research uses discourse analysis as 
a qualitative research method in order to analyze the data that is gathered. 
3.1.1 Historical research 
Historical research, as it is implied in the name, is a research method that searches 
different historie events in arder to find and understand the events of the past or relate 
them to current events. History is "the written or spoke record, or physical artifact, or 
interpretation, or study of all that has happened up to the present" (Les lie, 2010, p. 95). 
Historical approach is objective, subjective, and more importantly constructive. It is 
objective in that it looks at events in the past and looks through documents that already 
exist in arder to recount what has happened in the past. Historians "tell us what 
happened in the past and how things changed over time" (Berger, 2014, p. 183). 
However, this is not completely true because historians look through evidence of the 
past by looking at factual evidence and interpret them methodologically. In other 
words, "there is an element of interpretation involved in history based on the selection 
process" (Berger, 2014, p.183). Hence, the interpretation of a historie event can vary 
from a historian to another based on the material that they have chosen and the way 
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they have approached the material in their interpretation. 
There are two main challenges in using historical research methods. The first is the 
reliability of sources that are used while the second is how the historical data that is 
gathered is interpreted. In other words, what is said and what is not said. This thesis 
uses historical research in order to understand the historical context of the Green 
Movement in Iran. In doing so, it first addresses the two challenges of doing historical 
research. It then proposes how this research is effectuated for this thesis . 
The challenge that must first be addressed in historical research is the verification of 
data in terrns of where the source is coming from and how reliable it can be (Berger, 
2014). There are degrees or levels of importance in the quality of information one 
receives from his/her source (Les lie, 201 0). The first type is the primary sources. These 
include original documents and artifacts that are related to the event that is studied. The 
secondary sources include scanned or copies of original docwnents as well as books 
and articles written by historians or other historical researchers (Leslie, 201 0) . This 
thesis uses secondary sources to gather historical data on social movements in Iran 
including the constitutional revolution as well as the Islamic revolution. These data are 
gathered from prominent historians in the field. The data that is gathered is verified by 
comparing the historical data between different authors in order to assure the reliability 
of the sources as weil as historical facts that are presented in each of the cases. Since 
the reliability of books and articles can be questioned, the practice of comparing severa! 
accounts of the same event gives better assurance of the historical reliability of the 
sources that are being used. Through verification of the same historical accounts 
amongst different books and articles we verify the veracity of tho se claims. 
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The second challenge that must be addressed is that of interpretation and meaning. 
Historical research requires sorne form of construction of the data that is collected in 
arder to construct a pattern within the data that is collected (Berger, 2014). As such, 
one can say that there is a logic behind the construction of a historical work based on 
the interpretation of the author of the data that he/she has collected. In other words, 
"facts don't speak for themselves. Someone has to interpret the facts and put them into 
perspective" (Berger, 2014, p.187). This indeed brings us back to the notion of 
discourse by Foucault and how one must understand discourse by looking at the 
relation between knowledge and power. In other words, as authorities in the field of 
history, historians produce knowledge through constructing the discourse ofhistory. In 
the same way, our historical research on the roots ofthe discourses of Green Movement 
in Iran use previous knowledge in arder to construct a new knowledge about the 
subject. What this means is that the historical analysis that is established in the thesis 
will not be "the tru th" but "a truth" that is interpreted by myself as the author of this 
paper. Going back to the epistemological position of the paper, this also affirms our 
position ofknowledge as something that is constructed socially and interpreted through 
different research methods. 
3 .1.1 .1 Data Gathering 
The data that is gathered for this analysis cornes from articles and books written by 
historians specialized in the history of modern Iran. While there is a difference in the 
framing of the history, the historical events that are analyzed by these authors are the 
same. Hence, to assure reliability of information, the same historical events are 
compared amongst severa! authors . This is to assure the credibility as well as the 
reliability of the data. In terms of interpretation of the data, this thesis looks at the 
58 
interpretation of other historians on the subject. The thesis presents its own 
interpretation of the historical events based on these interpretations for the precise case 
of the Green Movement in Iran. There are two sets of data gathered in the historical 
research section. The first set looks at the discourses that were produced during the 
constitutional revolutions in the country that took place between 1906-1909. This 
allows us to see how the discourses of the _ Green Movement are part of a historical 
context of social movements in Iran. The second focuses on the roots of the three major 
movements that came together during the Green Movement: the feminist, student and 
the reformist movement. 
In the first part of the historical research, we look at historical data from four major 
Iranian historians on the constitutional revolution. These include Janet Afary (1994, 
1996, 2005, 2009), Ervand Abrahamian (2008, 2009, 1979), Homa Katouzian (1998, 
2003 , 2008), and Mohammad Taraghi-Tavakoli (Tavakoli-Targhi, 1990). Each ofthese 
scholars brings a unique perspective on the history oflran. Janet Afary focuses greatly 
on the his tory of feminist movements in Iran. Her framework is useful in understanding 
the roots of feminism in the country. Ervand Abrahamian and Homa Katouzian are 
both historians with a focus on the socio-political history of Iran. However, their 
approaches to this history is fairly different in that Abrahamian still holds a very strong 
Marxist tradition while Katouzian has a more philosophical approach to the socio-
political history oflran. Mohammad Tavakoli Taraghi has done a great analysis on the 
evolution of language and imagery during the constitutional revolution and the birth of 
severa] discourses during this era. He has also put forward sorne of the strategies that 
were involved in introducing and using these discourses during the constitutional 
revolution. The body of work between these four historians gives me a global 
perspective of the type of discourses that were produced historically during the 
constitutional revolution. In addition to these four authors, I refer to Abdul-Hadi Hariri 
59 
(1976) and Cyrus Schaghayegh (200 1) on the role of ulama and the ir relationship to 
modemity during the constitutional revolution. Central to my analysis is the reflection 
on the constant tension between traditionalism and modemism during this revolution. 
My analysis from this section focuses on how the discourses that were produced during 
this period are still alive and embedded in the discourse of the protesting crowds of the 
Green Movement. To this extent, I would like to see how the tension between 
traditionalism and modemity has continued in Iran to this day since this period. 
The second part of the historical research takes a look at the history of Iranian 
Revolution and what followed in the period after the revolution. In looking at this 
history, we examine the development ofthree major social movements in Iran after the 
revolution: the feminist, the student, and the reform movement. For the historical data 
on feminist movement in Iran, we rely on the works of Janet Afary (2009) on the history 
of sexual politics in modem Iran as well as Nikki Keddie's (1983) work on the place of 
women in Iran after the 1979 revolution. As a specifie case, we look at Zanan magazine 
and discourse of Islamic Feminism that it introduced. For the historical data on the 
student movement in Iran, we consult Saeed Paivandi (1998, 2005) and his work on 
the Islamization of educational system and the creation of Supreme Council of Cultural 
Revolution in the country and Ali Akbar Mahdi's (1999) study on the history ofstudent 
movement in Iran after the Islamic Revolution. The two perspectives are 
complementary to one another since the history of post-revolutionary student 
movement in Iran commences during the Cultural Revolution where the Iranian 
government closed all Universities in the country and created the Supreme Council of 
Cultmal Revolution in order to assme the accordance of the University curriculums 
with the Shi'a Islam values . Again, this takes us back to the tension between tradition 
and modemity and the way these two concepts interact with one another through 
history. The case that we consult for this historical analysis is the Student Protest of 
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July 1999 that was sparked after the closure of Salam, a prominent reformist daily 
newspaper, by the hardliners in Iran. We lastly look at the history of the reform 
movement in Iran. For this, we look the tension between two philosophical propositions 
and how the reformist movement evolved from them. The first is that of Dr. Ali Shariati 
in continuation of the work of Jalal Al-i Ahmad on the concept of Westoxification. 
Shariati was considered as the ideologue of the Iranian revolution and his ideas on 
relying on Islam and the Islamic rule as the ideology of the society great! y influenced 
the revolutionary discourse during the Islamic Revolution (Arjomand, 2002). The 
second philosopher is Abdolkarim Soroush and he is coined as the ideologue of the 
reform movement in Iran. l refer to original texts by bath authors that are translated in 
either French or English and use supporting articles from Said Amir Arjomand (2002), 
Behrouz Ghamari-Tabrizi (2004) and Valla Vakili (1996). As a case, I look at the 
election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997 and show how this election created a reformist 
force with a particular discourse in the political sphere of the country. Again, the 
tension between tradition and modernity is one of the key aspects of this analysis. 
CHAPTERIV 
HISTORICAL ANAL YSIS 
4.1 Social Movements in Modern Iran 
The history of social movements in modern Iran is of great complexity. Since late 19th 
century, Iran has faced two major revolutions. The first, the constitutional revolution, 
occurred in earl y 1900 and led to the formation of a parliament and a constitution while 
the second occurred in 1979 and resulted in the change in the governrnental system of 
Iran from monarchy to Islamic Republic. The aim of this thesis is to understand the 
protesting crowds of the Iranian Green Movement in 2009 and see the conditions of 
possibility of this protesting crowd as a form of collective action. The way by which 
this thesis answers this question is through discourse analysis. In order to do so, 
however, one must look at the history of social movements in Iran in order to 
understand where the discourse of the protesting crowds in Iran in 2009 came from. 
This puts the Iranian modern history as a continuation of struggle that was really born 
of a quest for modernity in the late 1800 in Iran. The aim of the first chapter, hence, is 
to give a context to the Iranian Green Movement by looking at the history of the 
constitutional revolution and the discourses that were born out of this movement such 
as Ghanoon (Law), Millat (people), Azadi (freedom), Barabari (equality) (Tavakoli-
Targhi, 1990). In doing so, the chapter looks at the relation between Mashrutah 
( constitutionalism) and Mashru'ah (religious law) and traces the fundamental 
challenges of modern Iranian society that influenced the discourse of the protesting 
crowds ofthe Green Movement in 2009. 
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4.1.1 The constitutional revolution of Iran 
The constitutional revolution of Iran is one of the most important events in the history 
of the country. As Janet Afary puts it, it was "made possible through an initial hybrid 
coalition of forces which included liberal reformers, members of the ulama, merchants, 
shopkeepers, students, trade guilds people, workers, and radical members of secret 
societies who promoted the formation of an assembly of delegates and a constitution" 
(Afary, 1994 ). Resulting in the establishment of a parliament and a constitution in the 
country for the first time in 1906, the constitutional revolution was rooted in the public 
arena that was created due to the contact with Europe and modernity. The principle 
goal ofthe revolution was to establish Ghanoun (law) in the country (Katouzian, 2011). 
This, however, led to questioning the fundamental structures of power in the country 
and brought about a new form of power to the Iranian power structures which saw the 
majlis (parliament) as the representative body of Iranians (Katouzian, 2011 ). 
At its heart, the constitutional revolution was reacting to the traditional understanding 
of the king as the arbitrary ruler. This reaction was due to many reasons including social 
injustice, devastating economie situation, a great domination of western world on 
Iranian affairs, and mistrust in the capability of the Qajar kings to manage the country. 
Traditionally, the king or the ruler in Iran "was thought to be vicegerent on earth" 
(Katouzian, 2003 , p.234). The idea behind this was that the king or the ruler "was not 
bound by any written or unwritten rule or tradition and could take decisions up to the 
utmost of his physical power" (Katouzian, 2003 , p.234). This meant that the only factor 
that really influenced the decision making of a ruler was the fear of rebellion and "the 
expediencies which were necessary to maintain them in power and authority" 
(Katouzian, 2002, 234). This also meant that Iran's ruler ruled over the country 
arbitrarily and could order anything that he felt necessary. This is clear in the writing 
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of Sir Percy Sykes who observed that the Iranian king had the authority over "the 
threefold functions of government, legislative, executive, and judicial. He was the pivot 
upon which turned the en tire machinery of public life" (Afary, 1996, p.342). The logic 
behind this form of legitimacy cornes from a concept imbedded in the tradition of 
kingdom since the Achaemenide empire called farah-ye izadi (God's Grace). 
According to this idea, the king or the ruler, by becoming a ruler, possesses the God's 
Grace and such possession makes them legitimate and just (Katouzian, 2003 , p.236). 
Simply put, the arbitrary rule was justified by the concept of God's Grace since the 
ruler "was believed to have received his right to rule as a gift from God" (Katouzian, 
2003 , p.243). This Grace would have been taken away from the ruler if he "openly 
claimed divinity, or was systematically unjust towards the people" (Katouzian, 2003 , 
p.243). This would indeed make rebellion and the successful rebel leader would 
become legitimized as the future king due to the fact that the Grace was bestowed upon 
him (Katouzian, 2003). As Katouzian argues, the idea of Grace of God was a pre-
Islamic myth that was later justified by Muslim theoreticians through the well-known 
command '0 ye Faithful, obey God, the Prophet and those in authority among you' 
(Katouzian, 2011 , p.758). While for the Shi'a ulama, the authority meant the holy 
Imams only, " in practice they normally tolerated the existing reality, namely the 
arbitrary state" (Katouzian, 2011 , p.758). 
During the Qajar dynasty, the justice system was divided between two sets of law that 
were practiced by several representatives who "checked the patrimonial powers of the 
king in sorne arenas" (Afary, 2005, p.342). The first sets of laws were the urf laws or 
customary laws (Afary, 2005). The second sets were the Sharia laws that were laws 
based on the Quranic laws. While the boundaries between the two were ambiguous, in 
general, the clerics "handled religious and civil matters, and the state handled cases of 
murder, robbery, and other forms of violence. In commercial disputes, two arbitrators, 
one for each plaintiff, often resolved conflicts through mediation and negotiation" 
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(Afary, 2005, p.342). The traditional justice system had four major characteristics. First 
of ali , the meaning of justice was related to maintaining the hierarchy of the four social 
classes: men of the pen, men of the sword, merchants, and farmers . This meant that the 
king "had enormous control over the lives ofmembers of the royal court, his ministers, 
and ali public officiais" (Afary, 2005, p.343) since he stood at the highest rank of the 
social hierarchy. The second characteristic of traditional justice was its Jack of 
unanimity. This meant that the interpretation of Sharia law (the religious law) differed 
from one religious scholar to another (Afary, 2005). There was also a difference 
between the urf law and the sharia law. The use of severe physical punishment was 
another characteristic of the traditional justice system. "Until the late nineteenth 
century, if the state found someone guilty of carrying out an insurrection against Islam 
or the shah, the punishment was brutal and could involve the mass execution of entire 
communities" (Afary, 2005, 343). This was the case with the Babi movement, for 
instance. The fourth characteristic was the unequal treatment of minorities and women 
before the law (Afary, 2005). Hence, there were no unified version oftreating a crime 
and the punishment would depend on the hierarchical status of the accused as weil as 
its gender and race. 
In the early 19th century, Iran faced a senes of military defeats that lead to the 
weakening ofits economy (Abrahamian, 1979). The two Russo-Iranian wars as weil as 
three Anglo-lranian wars lead the country to sign two major treaties ofTurkamanchai 
(1827) and Paris (1857) with Russia and England respectively (Abrahamian, 1979). 
These in tum opened the way for Russia and England to not only take away large parts 
of lands from Iran, but also to create new trade deals that benefited them significantly 
by being exempt from paying taxes, tariffs, and road tolls as weil as bypassing local 
laws (Abrahamian, 1979). What this lead to was an exponential growth in trade which 
changed the Iranian economy through the construction of modem communication 
syster:ns in the country, industrialization of agriculture, while negatively impacting the 
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handcraft industry. These, hence, transformed the Iranian economy from a "pre-
capitalist economy, with its production for use-value, into a market economy, with its 
production for sale value" (Abrahamian, 1979, p. 391). These defeats and changes in 
the economie structure of the country throught the years convinced the king and his 
concerned ministers to "call for the acquisition of European scientific and technological 
know-how in order to develop national trade and industries on a competitive basis with 
Europe" (Bayat, 1991 ,p.35). The crown prince of the Quajar dynasty at the time, Abbas 
Mirza, hence, sent severa! students to England to study modern sciences in 1811 and 
1815 respectively (Tavakoli, n.d.). These and other students who were later sent to 
France were influential in introducing a new language to governmentality in the 
political discourse of the country. One such students were Mirza Salih-i Shirazi, for 
instance, whose memoir of his trip to England spoke of the French Revolution and 
constructed the equivalent terrns in Farsi to Parliament (Mashviratkhaneh), House of 
Commons (Khan ah-'i fail-i ra'aya), Elections (intikhabat) and social revolution 
(ba/va-yi 'ammi) to name a few (Tavakoli , n.d .). By the time ofNaser al-Din Shah in 
1848, Iran saw an increasingly vocal circle of reform-minded officiais who saw 
emulation of Europe in development of trade and industry, especially mining and 
construction of railroads, as a way to regain the former position of the country among 
the most advanced nations in the world (Bayat, 1991 , p. 36). As Katouzian argues, the 
project ofmodernization during this time was " about the possession[ ... ] oftechniques 
and institutions which had never been known before, and which gave them such 
superiority over the Iranians that it looked as if no amount of traditional power and 
technology might be equal" (Katouzian, 2001 , p. 756). 
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4.1.1.1 The Intelligentsia 
On December 28, 1851 , Iran's first European-style institution of higher learning, Dar 
Al-Funun, was inaugurated. The main person behind the establishment of this school 
was Nasir al-Din Shah's first premier, Mirza Mohammad Taqi Khan Farahanj , also 
known as Amir Kabir (Ekhtiar, 2001). Influenced by the Écoles Polytechniques in 
France, the school admitted around 250 students per year and offered secular sciences 
including military sciences, medical sciences and, modern languages (Yazdanjoo, 
20 12). The school was created since Am ir Kabir believed that a "disciplined Iranian 
standing army would not be possible without a single uni fied body of Iranian officers" 
(Ekhtiar, 2001 , p.153). Hence, the principal goal of the school was to train the next 
generation ofmilitary officers. Alongside ofDar al-Fonun, a translation office was also 
created and the two organizations were responsible for translation of many European 
books into Farsi in varying topics such as military subjects, scientific matters, 
medicine, and Persian literature. The body also translated European works on Western 
history and the infamous History of Persia by John Malcom that lead Iranians to "see 
their own history through the eyes of nineteenth-century Europeans" (Abrahamian, 
1979, p.393). As a place that produced and distributed knowledge in the country, it was 
impossible for the school to restrict its affairs to military trairung only. As Ekhtiar 
(2001) argues, "the mere use ofbooks such as Fenelon's Tilimaque and the History of 
Napoleon as textbooks in its language classes was bound to open the door to European 
ideas of every kind, a repercussion unforeseen by the school's founders" (p .1 54). Other 
publications such as The travelogues of Ibrahim Beig ofZeinol'abedin Maragheh ' i and 
The his tory of Persia by Sir John Malcom can be seen as works of political cri tic of 
the decline oflran (Yazdanjoo, 2012, p.36). 
In 1858, a faculty member of the Dar al-Funun, Malkum Khan, with the help of his 
father Mirza Yaqub, formed a secret society called faramoushkhaneh (house of 
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oblivion) in Dar al-Funun (Algar, 1970). Malkum Khan was an Christian Armenian 
from Julfa near the city of Isfahan. His father, an English and French teacher in the 
royal court and an enthusiast of the west, sent Malkum to France on astate scholarship 
to study engineering (Algar, 1970; Abrahamian, 1979). When he came back from 
Europe, he joined the faculty of Dar al-Funun and impressed Naser al-Din Shah with 
"his scientific experiments, converted to Islam (probably to further his public career), 
and formed a secret society named the Far'amushkhaneh (House of Oblivion) which 
was modelled on, but not attached to, European Masonic lodges" (Abrahamian, 1979, 
p.396). Beside the house of oblivion, Malkum Khan also drafted daftar-i Tanzimat 
(Book of Reform) where he proposed severa! reform proposai including "general 
waming that the country would soon be engulfed by the foreign powers unless the Shah 
immediately decreed new laws for reform" (Abrahamian, 1979, p.396). The term 
Qanun was used to describe these laws and to separate them from the two traditional 
concepts of justice that was prominent in Iran, the Sharia and the urf The 
faramoushkhaneh , hence, played a role as a society that furthered the ideas for the 
establishment of Qanun (law) in the country. For securing its establishment, the society 
presented itself as a harmless group that diffused scientific knowledge and strengthen 
the Shah's power (Ekhtiar, 2001). The society was able to attract many graduates and 
faculty of Dar al-Fonun toit and this, along with the fact that Malkum Khan was liked 
by Naser al-Din Shah, made the king see it as a scientific society (Algar, 1970). As it 
became more separate from the court and secretive, it started gaining "support by 
advocating govemmental reform, the rule of law, and the need for a constitution" 
(Ekhtiar, 2001 ). The society was shut down for severa! reasons in 1862 (Algar, 1970). 
From one side, the rise of Babism (a dissident religious fraction of Shi'a Islam) sorne 
years earlier and their practice of taquiya (religiously justified concealment of beliet) 
and their attempt of the assassination of Naser al-Din Shah made the king suspicious 
of the society as a Babi society (Ekhtiar, 2001). On the other side, the society 
dissatisfied the ulama because, for the ulama, Qanun was a European invention that 
would pollute the country. They also accusedfaramoushkhaneh of having an agenda 
68 
of bringing European-style republicanism to the country, something that was not 
greatly appreciated by the court of Qajar. After the closure of the society, Malkum 
Khan was exiled and the dar.ftar-i Tanzimat was shelved (Abrahamian, 1979). 
Malkum Khan was part of an ever-growing number of intellectuals who were exposed 
and influenced by western philosophy specially the French Enlightenment. Usually 
called munaver-al.fekr (enlightened thinkers) or intelligentsia, they had the beliefthat 
"history was the March of Human Progress" and human progress "was not only 
desirable but also attainable, provided mankind broke the three chains of royal 
despotism, clerical dogmatism, and foreign imperialism" (Abrahamian, 1979, 395). 
These intellectuals were either trained inside Iran in Dar al-Funun or in European 
countries, especially England and France. They were one of the strongest forces that 
saw "constitutionalism, secularism, and nationalism as the three vital means for 
attaining the establishment of a modem, strong, and developed Iran" (Abrahamian, 
1979, 359). 
Before and during the constitutional revolution, many newspapers started promoting 
the ideas behind constitutionalism inside and outside of Iran. These included Qanun, 
sur-i Israfil, Musavat, and Iran-e naw (Tavakoli-Targhi, 1990). These papers were 
influential in introducing very central concepts before and after the constitutional 
revolution such as the idea of millat (People), dmvlat (state), and qanun (Law). ln the 
discourse ofthe intelligentsia during the revolution, millat was re-defined from the Shia 
Nation millat-i Shi'ah-y i isna'ashara (the shi'a nation oftwelve Imam) oflran to millat-
i iran (nation oflran) where the idea of nation was no longer limited to religious nation 
and considered minorities in the country as part of the nation (Tavakoli-Taraghi, 1990). 
The discourse of millat was also constructed as a pole in opposition to dawlat 
(government) since the government was depicted as mustabdid (despotic) and zalim 
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(unjust) and nation was articulated as muzlem (oppressed) and adalatkhwah (justice 
seeker) (Tavakoli-Taraghi , 1990, p.96). Law, hence, was proposed to protect the right 
ofthose who live in the land, the nation. 
After his exile from Iran, Malkum Khan went to London and started publishing the 
famous newspaper Qanun. While a one-man enterprise, Qanun was able to appeal to a 
broad audience. In fact, the newspaper shaped "the demand for qanan into a populist 
slogan unifying a diverse ensemble of social and ideological forces" (Tavakoli-
Taraghi, 1990, p.94). This can be seen from the first edition of the newspaper: 
God has blessed Iran. Unfortunately, His blessing has been negated by the lack of laws. 
No one in Iran feels secure because no one in Iran is safeguarded by laws. The 
appointment of govemors is carried out without laws. The dismissal of officers is done 
without laws. The monopolies are sold without any laws. The state finances are 
squandered without laws. The stomachs of innocent citizens are eut open without laws. 
Even the servants of God are deported without laws. (Malkum Khan in Abrahamian, 
1979, p.398). 
Here, Malkum Khan is appealing to a broad audience in denouncing the fact that there 
was a lack accountability and coherence in the affairs of the country and the sole 
solution for this was to establish law based on a constitution. Alongside him, 
Mustasher al-Dawleh, one of his students, wrote an essay called Yek Kalameh (One 
Word) where he "propagated the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 
by foregrounding each of its seventeen articles on the Qur'an and hadith" (Tavakoli-
Taraghi, 1990, p.94). People like Malkum and others alsotried to establish a selective 
remembrance of pre-Islamic Iran in order to create a new national identity that would 
separate Iran from Islam. As Tavakoli-Taraghi argues, "in the emerging nationalist 
discourse Islam was defined as the religion of Arabs and the cause of Iran's weakness 
and decadence" (Tavakoli-Taraghi, 1990, p.82). To this extent, undesuable costums 
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were contributed to Islam and Arab while European mannerisms were depicted as 
originally Iranian (Tavakoli-Taraghi , 1990). This is because in the process towards 
constitutional revolution, the intelligentsia "found itself, at times, allied with the Shah 
against the 'ulama'; at times, with the 'ulama' against the Shah; at other times, with the 
Shah against the imperial powers" (Abrahamian, 1979, p.395). 
One can see the importance of education and Dar al-Fonun as one of the spaces for the 
sharing of the fundamental concepts of the constitutional revolution. While the student 
movement in Iran evolved later on during the 1979 revolution, the educated from mid-
1800 until the constitutional revolution played a great role in the construction of the 
discourse of the constitutional revolution and the fundamental discourses that seem to 
reappear within social movements in Iran during the 1979 revolution and the Green 
Movement of 2009. The intelligentsia were able to put into question the concept of 
arbitrary rule and bring a way to shift the Grace of God to Grace of Man. In other 
words, by introducing mi/lat in the linguistic discourse of the country, the Grace of 
God was given from people to the king and the body responsible for assuring this was 
the majlis (parliament). In this manner, the monarch was still a monarch. However, it 
bad to respond to a parliament in decisions affecting the people of Iran. The 
intelligentsia were able to change the meaning of the term siyasat from "punishment, 
usually execution of fallen state officiais" (Katouzian, 2011 , p.759) to the process of 
participation of the millat in the affairs of the country. In other words, they formulated 
the notion of politics with the nation as its political entity. While the reasoning for 
constitutionalism within the intelligentsia was nationalism, secularism, and the 
establishment of a rule of law that would protect the people equally, the ulama joined 
the constitutional cause for different reasons. What this led to was an internai conflict 
between the constitutionalists on the one side and the ulama on the other side. 
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4.1.1.2 Ulama and Bazzar 
The intelligentsia came from a class of educated people who majoritarily took position 
in the bureaucratie systems in the country. They indeed became a new force that 
introduced ideas about how Iran can move towards a modem society. However, their 
influence has been overestimated by many such as Tavakoli-Taraghi since what moved 
people to come to the streets and protest during the constitutional revolution was not 
only the intelligentsia, but also the bazar population of merchants, traders, craftsman 
that totalled in hundreds ofthousands and the leadership of ulama (Abrahamian, 1979, 
p.413). This was partially due to the fact that the high rate of illiteracy of the country 
removed much of the millat from the discourse of the intelligentsia that was largely 
circulated through constitutionalist newspapers of the time. The power of the ulama, 
bence, was in their ability to calllarge congregations of crowds that included the Bazar. 
The ulama's involvement in politics was largely due to the ever-increasing conviction 
that "the Qajar Prime Minister and the Shah himself did not fulfill their duties i.e. did 
not protect Islam and Iran against the alien Europeans" (Schaghayegh, 2001 , p. 22). 
For the most part, the ulama were supporters of the Shah and those who were in the 
constitutionalist camp "had reformist, not revolutionary purposes" (Schaghayegh, 
2001 , p.22). This can be seen in the discourse of Sayyid Muhammad Tabatabai, a 
prominent pro-constitutionalist voice amongst the ulama. Son of the Sayyid Sadigh 
Tabatabai, one of the members of the faramoushkhaneh, he made the demand of "the 
establishment of a house of justice and an assembly to serve the people's needs" (Hairi, 
1976, p.128). According to him, "The removal of these corruptions depends on the 
foundation of an assembly and the union of the government with the people and the 
'ulama'" (Tabatabai quoted in Hariri, 1976, p.l29). For him, an assembly of justice was 
a solution to stop the arbitrary rule of the king and reduce the influence of the west in 
Iran. The ulama were part of an economy that made them powerful and influential at 
the time. They were supported by the Quajar court through funds to maintain masques, 
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traditional schools (madrasa) and other projects proposed by the mujtahids (Poulson, 
2002). They also made financial gain from religious taxes and funds supporting 
religious ceremonies from lranian population as well as the merchant class (Poulson, 
2002). In retum, they would support the cornmunity by contributing to local projects, 
supporting merchant enterprises, and help with dispute resolution and other legal 
affairs. Most importantly, they played a great role in supporting the Quajar legitimacy 
and maintaining this legitimacy as Islamic. Hence, the religious elite had a great 
economie as well as political power in the country at the ti me of Qajar. 
The merchant class rose in power at the beginning of the establishment of the Qajar 
dynasty because of a commercial expansion that was a result of the "consolidation of 
the state power under the [ ... ] Qajar dynasty" (Moaddel, 1992, p. 453). In 1870s and 
l880s, the Quajar government mostly abstained from the affairs of the tujjar and, in 
return, they did not parti ci pate in any form of anti-state pro tests (Schaghayegh, 2001 ). 
However, in the late 1880s, due to the shift from a pre-capitalist to a market economy, 
many of Iran's merchants faced an increasing pressure from foreign economies 
(Schaghayegh, 2001). This also meant that the merchants were slowly losing their grip 
on the local market as weil to the extent that "towards the end of the nineteenth-century, 
it was complete! y dominated by the Russian and British" (Schaghayegh, 200 l, p.24). 
The tujjar and merchants were also angered because their Joss of control over the 
economy of the country was largely due to failed modemization attempt by the shah 
that lead to the dependency of the economy of the country on European countries. This 
included a taxation system that favoured foreigners over local merchants. Sorne of 
these taxation systems were also put due to the Joss of Iran to English and Russian 
army. The result ofTurkmanchai treaty, for instance, was a fixed custom pay of 5% on 
foreign trade which gave "foreigners an economie advantage because the Iranian 
merchants had to pay higher taxes" (Moaddel, 1992, p. 456). 
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4.1.1.3 The Tobacco Revoit 
In 1891 , Nasir al-Din Shah solda 50-year monopoly of production, distribution, and 
exportation of Tobacco to Major Talbot of England (Abrahamian, 1979). This lead to 
major protests that started from Shiraz, the Tobacco region in Iran and spread 
nationally, thanks to the usage of the telegraph, to other major cities in Iran such as 
Tehran, Tabriz, Mashhad, Qazvin, and lsfahan to name a few (Abrahamian, 1979). The 
revoit started in April of 1891 when the bazar in Shiraz was shut down as a way of 
protesting the treaty. This lead to the closure of other bazars in the country and a general 
strike by the tujjar. Following this was a religious fatwa against the use of tobacco in 
the country. Thefatwa lead to a nation-wide boycott that received support from variety 
of groups. As Janet Afary (1996) argues, the opposition at the tobacco concession came 
from four main directions: 1) the merchants and small traders who found their economy 
threatened 2) the members of ulama with "close financial or family connections to the 
merchants or a vested interest in the production of tobacco on vaqf lands under their 
control" (p.32) 3) reformist and liberal-minded politicians such as Amin Al-Dawlah 4) 
the Russian government who "bribed sorne members of the ulama and encouraged 
them to join the opposition to the British concession. The revoit was indeed ignited by 
the merchants since they were able to frame the concession by showing how "Muslim 
interest was in conflict with the non-Muslim" (Moaddel, 1992, p.459). However, it was 
also supported by the intelligentsia because they saw that turning to ulama was the only 
solution to mobilize people for political action and clear a broad-based nationalist 
movement (Afary, 1996). As Nikki Keddi argues: 
" The creation of alliance between the ulama leaders and the reformers was a tactic begun by 
Sayyed Jamal al-Din al-Afghani , achieving its first success in the tobacco movement, and 
carried on through the lranian [ constitutional] revolution. Advanced reformers were wil ling to 
put their own liberal , freethinking, or heretical notions into the background in order to achieve 
an active alliance with ulama leaders against the government. Afghani and others recognized 
that only the ulama were powerful and influential enough to lead a successfu l mass movement; 
in the absence of wide-spread demand for modernization, the use of religious language and 
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appeals was necessary to move the masses." (Keddie in Afary, 1996, p.28) 
Afghani was able to strategically position the ulama, specifically Mirza Hassan Shirazi 
who was the leading cleric of the time, to support the tobacco revoit. With phrases such 
as "do not allow the Pharao to des troy religion" and "dea th to this monarch", in a letter 
that he wrote to Mirza Hassan Shirazi, he was able to mobilize the ulama 
"simultaneously flattering and threatening them, reminding them of their exalted 
position as guardians of the faith and yet dependent on the masses following and 
goodwill, promising a greater share in political process and even political authority 
should they join the cause and support the dissent" (Bayat, 1991 , p.24). The importance 
of Afghani was his proposition ofPan-Islamism. Pan-Islamism believed in uniting the 
Islamic world against the colonial occupation of Muslim land. Indeed, his plight for 
such idea at the time of the tobacco revoit in Iran came to be very effective in uni ting 
ali the different fractions around a unified discourse. 
The tobacco revoit was unique in three ways. First of ail, it demonstrated the possibility 
for local revolts to "spread to general rebellions" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.73), making 
the tobacco revoit a precursor to the constitutional revolution (Abrahamian, 1983). 
Secondly, it allowed for a collection of different groups with different ideas to create a 
network that opposed the threat of the west to the economy of the country. It indeed 
showed the intertwined relationship between the merchants and the religious elite and 
the power of using Islamic discourse as a way to frame an economie issue. Finally, 
and this is something that has not been clearly articulated by historians of the 
constitutional revolution in detail , it showed the importance of technology, especially 
printing press and telegram (Abrahamian, 1983), as forces that helped propagating the 
articulation of a local revoit into general rebellion. 
We can clearly use the theoretical frameworks that we have established to look at the 
tobacco revoit. The revoit started with a dissatisfaction. Between ali sorts of 
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concessions that Naser Al-Din Shah gave to the Europeans, this concession was not as 
grand as the other ones. However, it was something that could be used as an opportune 
moment given the economie and social status of the country. Indeed, the tobacco revoit 
started in a kairos, an opportune moment, to articulate a political discourse. However, 
this political discourse had to be coated within a religious discourse in order to be 
legitimized. Within this discourse, one sees the dissatisfaction towards the influence of 
the West on the economy of the country. However, the Russians, who also profited 
from large concessions from Iran, also used the tobacco revolt as a kairos to advance 
their influence on Iran by instigating hatred against the British. This shows that kairos 
can be used as a strategy of dominance as muchas it can be used as a strategy ofprotest. 
Hence, we see the idea of articulation of discourses, the political, and using one 
hegemonie order to question another hegemonie order within the tobacco revoit. In 
addition, the analysis of the collective practices are also important. The closure of the 
bazar and a collective will to do so as an act of solidarity is important. The bazar used 
the collective practice of closure as a way to unify itseif and recognize itself as a force 
that can influence the poli tics of the country. More importantiy, the collective will to 
ban the consurnption of tobacco because of the fatwa is an exampie of how the 
collective practice shaped the identity of the protesters as a Muslim collective who 
opposed the dominance ofnon-Muslims in their everyday affairs. Lastiy, the impact of 
the printing press and the telegraph cannot be missed in the tobacco revoit. As it was 
mentioned above, the telegraph was used as a tool to communicate the events that 
started in the Shiraz bazar to other regions of the country. Therefore, it played an 
important roie in spreading the news about the protests in other parts of the country and 
propagating thefatwa across the country. The telegraph was used as a tooi in a creative 
way that had a function of serving the cause of the revoit. 
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4.1.1.4 Mobilization and revolution 
This thesis can in no way capture the complexity of the constitutional revolution. For 
this, I will briefly ex plain sorne of the key elements of the event and the results that it 
gave. The first important event was the assassination of Nasser al-Din Shah by one of 
Sayyed Afghani's followers in 1886 and his replacement by Muzafar al-Din Shah 
(Abrahamian, 1979, p.400). The new king, seeing the result of his predecessor's 
policies, sought to reverse many policies of Naser al-Din Shah (Abrahamian, 1979). 
He relaxed censorship in the country and "lifted the ban on travel , appointed Malkum 
Khan ambassador in Rome, opened the Schools of Agriculture and Political Science, 
and, most impmiant of ali, permitted the formation of commercial, cultural, and 
educational associations" (Abrahamian, 1979, p.400). This lead to the establishment of 
first stock market (Sherkat-i Islami) as weil as many influential publishing circles and 
anjumans (Societies). In Tabriz, the Tabriz circle started the publication of Ganji-
Funun (treasury of knowledge) while in Tehran the influential Anjuman-i Ma-arif 
(Society of Learning) was formed . The latter was responsible for the establishment of 
Ketabkhane-i Melli (National Library) by gathering and collecting books from its 
members (Abrahamian, 1979). While the hope of Muzafar al-Din Shah was to satisfy 
the opposition by allowing more liberty of association, the exact opposite effect took 
place. Many semi-secret societies such as Anjuman-i Makhji (Secret Society) Markaz-
i Gheybi (The Secret Centre), Hizb-i ljtima'yun-i Amiyun (Social Democratie Party) 
Jama-i Adamiat (Society of Humanity) and Komite-i Inqilabi (Revolutionary 
Committee) were formed (Abrahamian, 1979). Each of these societies had their own 
separate agenda. The Secret Society was formed by members of ulama and merchants, 
the Secret Centre and Social Democratie Party were allied with social democrats in 
Baku that were influenced by the revolutionary socialism ofRussian Marxism, and the 
Society of Humanity, formed by a follower of Malkum Khan, followed Liberal 
humanism of August Comte and John Stuart Mill (Abrahamian, 1979). The 
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Revolutionary Committee was influential in effectuating radical change. The 
committee consisted of 57 members that "reflected the sociological composition of the 
intelligentsia" (Abrahamian, 1979, p.403). 
The 57 included 15 civil servants, 8 educators, 4 translators, 1 doctor, 14 clergymen (ali of 
whom had studied modern subjects), 1 tribal chief, 3 merchants, and 4 craftsmen . Ail were 
acquainted with Western civilization through either the Dar al-Funun, the study of European 
languages, the reading of recent translations, or the influence of Malkum Khan (Abrahamian, 
1979, p.403) 
Hence, what started as a strategy to make peace with the opposition suddenly became 
a kairos for the opposition to mobilize against the shah and demand for a liberal mode! 
of democracy with the parliament as its institution and a constitution as its pillar. While 
ali the groups knew that there needs to be a change, their idea of the kind of change 
they were looking for played a great role in the outcomes of the constitutional 
revolution and, to an extent, the modem history of the country. 
The second important event came from a breakout in bazar of Tehran. In December 
1905, govemor ofTehran bastinadoed two sugar merchants for not complying with the 
demand of the governor for reducing the priee of sugar (Afary, 1996). This lead to 
months long protests that lead to a large bast (sit-in) of over two thousand people in 
the Shah Abd-al-Azim Shrine. The demand of the protesters were 1) dismissal ofNaus 
from his post 2) dismissal of the governor Al ah al Dawleh 3) establishment of a ho use 
of justice. This lead Muzaffar al-Din Shah to issue a "statement calling for the 
formation of a 'house of justice that would incorporate the ruling of the Shari ' at" 
(Afary, 1996, p.52). 
At this point, the constitutionalists saw an opportunity to push the idea of majlis 
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(parliament) forward through a series of shabnameh (secret leaflets) in Tehran (Keddie, 
2003) warning the ulama that " if they abandon the public cause no one would supp01t 
them when the government turned against [them]" (Afary, 1996, p.53). They 
articulated two demands: 
" 1) A house of justice would be an institution resembling a court of appeal , where petitions 
were sent and grievances were addressed, whereas a consultative majlis would be a parliament 
along European lines, with delegates representing the provinces and the capital, and would be 
a legislative body 2) The formation of a majlis required the writing of a constitution" (Afary, 
1996, 53) 
The efforts by the supporters of constitutionalism continued in different forms of 
protests such as general strikes, basts (sit-ins) and peaceful protests led Muzafar al-Din 
Shah to sign the " royal proclamation that called for the formation of a National 
Consultative Majles and the writing of a constitution" (Afary, 2005, p. 344). Within 
the first six months of the establishment of National Assembly, over 30 Societies 
started appearing, many from minority groups such as Society of Jews and Society of 
Armenians (Abrahamian, 1979). During the same time, the number of papers and 
journals pub li shed in Iranjurnped from 6 to over 100 publications (Abrahamian, 1979). 
This lead to the influence of many voices that otherwise could not articulate their vision 
ofhow a society based on a constitution and a parliament would look like. The National 
Assembly opened in October 1906 and began to draft a constitution that would 
safeguard the role of the parliament. The document that came to be know as the 
Fundamental Laws gave National Assembly extensive power as: 
"the representative of the who le People [ with the] the right in ali questions to propose any 
measure that it regards as conducive to the well-being of the Government and the People [and 
the] final determination over ali laws, decrees, budgets, treaties, loans, monopolies, and 
concessions. 1t was to hold sessions lasting two years, during which period its members could 
not be arrested without the permission of the assembly" (Abrahamian, 1983, p. 88) 
The fundamentallaws were ratified by Muzafar al-Din Shah five days before he died 
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(Abrahamian, 1979). The shah's successor, Muhammad Ali Shah, came to power and 
quickly showed his opposition to the parliamentary system. He refused to sign the 
completed document that formulated the role of the National Assembly known as the 
Supplementary Fundamental Laws. This included two sections including a "bill of 
rights" guaranteeing every citizen "equality before the law, protection oflife, property, 
and honor, safeguards from arbitrary arrest, and freedom to publish newspapers and to 
organize associations" . It also gave additional power to the legislature to "appoint, 
investigate, and dismiss premiers, ministers, and cabinets, to judge ministers for 
"delinquencies," and to approve annually all military expenditures" (Abrahamian, 
1983, p.89). Muhammad Ali Shah argued that he cannot accept these laws because as 
a "good Muslim he could accept the Islamic term mashru' (lawful) but not the alien 
concept mashrut (constitutional)" and showed enthusiasm to the German constitution 
that would allow him to appoint ali ministers while enjoying "real as weil as nominal 
command over the armed forces" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.91). 
The ratification of the Supplementary Fundamental Laws threatened the opponents of 
the majlis including conservative ulama who saw Islam being threatened by two 
elements in the Bill: 1) the Bill of Rights for all citizen where all citizens are treated 
equally. 2) the power of the majlis to pass laws. One of the elected members of the 
assembly, Shekh Fazllolah Nuri, was able to add a clause to the supplementary law 
where ali "parliamentary legislation had to pass the ratification of a committee of fi ve 
mujtaheds of the highest rank" (Arjomand, 1981 , p.178). He continued his 
dissatisfaction to the constitution arguing that the equal rights of all nationalities and 
religions as well as the freedom of press were contrary to shari'a laws (Arjomand, 
1981 ). He saw the Bill of Rights as a threat because he believed that Muslims are not 
equal to non-Muslims. As well, women and men should not be treated equally because 
it is against the shari'a law. His opposition to the majlis gained him support with the 
royalists as weil as traditionalist ulama who saw that Islam was being threatened by a 
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Western ideological system. Nuri sought the help ofmujtahids from the city ofNajaf 
(most high-ranking shia' clerics lived in Najaf) and was able to produce three telegram 
from three different high-ranking mujtahids "demanding the inclusion in (the 
Supplement to) the Fundamental Law of a Clause conceming the heretics and the 
execution of divine commandment" (Arjomand, 1981 p.l80). Hence, Nuri proposed 
the qualification ofmashru'a (Islamic law) to be added to mashrut'a (constitutionalism) 
coining the term "mashruta-ye mashru- 'a" or "Islamic constitutionalism" (Arjomand, 
1981 , p.l80). N uri indeed articulated a vision of constitutionalism that gave birth to a 
very fundamental conflict between traditionalists and modernists until today. The 
conflict between constitutionalists and royalists/traditionalist ulama escalated when 
Muhammad Ali Shah closed the parliament and resisted the constitutionalists. As a 
result, a civil war broke out between the constitutionalists and royalists between 1908-
1909 in many cities in the country (Abrahamian, 1979). The war ended when the 
constitutionalists took over Tehran, overthrew the Shah and replaced him with his son, 
Ali Shah, and executed many anti-constitutionalists including Nouri. 
4.1.1.5 Where are women? The roots offeminism in Iran 
Women participated greatly in the constitutional revolution. As Afary (1996) argues in 
her book The 1ranian Constitutional Revolution 1906-1911 , the "roots of modem 
Iranian feminism were firmly planted during that earl y turn of the century revolution" 
(p.178). Afary later explores this role in her book Sexual Politics in Modern Iran (2009) 
where she details the shift in the notions of sexuality in Iran as modernism started to 
change the perception of the society on concepts like marriage, homosexuality, 
health,specifically sexual health, as a result of new notions of sexuality that were 
introduced at this time. During the constitutional revolution, intellectual women started 
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questioning male dominated leadership of the constitutional movement and critiqued 
conservative wings of the ulama, such as Sheikh Fazlullah Nuri , who "issued a 
religious edict fatwa against girls' schools" (Afary, 1996, p.178). At the same time, 
severa! progressive male intellectuals supported women's rights during this period. 
Again, the importance of printing press becomes vital in the articulation of discourse 
in support of women's rights in many newspapers including sur-i Israfil (/ 907-1908) 
Hab! al-Matin (190 7-1909), Musavat (190 7-1908) and !ran-i Naw (1909-1911) (Afary, 
1996). 
During the constitutional revolution, severa! societies were formed for women. Sorne 
ofthese include Anjuman-i Azadi-yi Zanan (The Anjuman for the Freedom ofWomen), 
Ittihadiay-yi Ghaibi-yi Nisvan (The secret Union of Women), and Anjuman-e Nisvan 
(Women's Society) (Afary, 1996, p.184). Sorne ofthese societies were established to 
help with the welfare of women by funding schools, hospitals, and orphanages while 
others had political agendas to make the cause for representation of women in the 
public sphere more prominent. The Anjuman of Women's letter, for instance, was 
"discussed during the First Majlis, which briefly looked up the issue of recognizing 
women's councils" (Afary, 1996, p.184 ). Amongst issues that women's societies 
concentrated on was education. They argued that the reason why Iranian society is not 
advanced is because its women, who are responsible with educating their child, are not 
educated (Afary, 1996). Hence, establishment of girls ' schools and adult school for 
women became an important task of many of these Anjumans. 
Women were also critical ofpolygamy, homosexuality, and arranged marriage in their 
discourse before and during the revolution. Taj al-Saltaneh, the daughter ofNasir al-
Din Shah and member of the Anjoman i Nisvan (Women's Society), saw the lack of 
courtship between boys and girls before marriage and the need for love within the 
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institution ofmarriage as the main reasons why men would seek other wives, temporary 
wives, or boys as company (Afary, 2009). According to Afary (2009), Taj "became 
one of the first Iranian women to call for romantic love within marriage" (p.134). Taj's 
articulations about marriage were also reflected in major newspapers in the country. 
For example, Mullah Nasreddin, an Azari-language satirical newspaper that advocated 
a progressive reading oflslamic texts, "challenged the conservative social and political 
practices of the of orthodox clerics"(Afary, 2009, p.135) by publishing humoristic 
pieces that criticised polygamy and homosexuality and promoted heteronormative 
marr1ages. 
4.1.1.6 Concluding remarks 
The constitutional revolution in Iran was an Event. This Event did not happen in one 
day but through severa! years as a result of the introduction of modernism and modem 
concepts in the country. The Event brought new multiplicities with it into the state of 
Being of the society and hence resulted in new ways of discourse articulation. It would 
not be wrong to assume that the constitutional revolution was the first time in the 
modem history of Iran where the poli ti cal entered poli tics in the country in a profound 
way. It did so by questioning the hegemonie discourse of the Shah's legitimacy coming 
from the Grace of God and shifting this power into the hands of a body that was 
represented by the people oflran. Wh ile the revolution ended with the constitutionalists 
executing the leaders of the traditionalist camp, it was the ulama that were able to rally 
the crowd against the Shah and for the institution of the first majlis. In a very complex 
and bizzare way, constitutional revolution saw a forrn of antagonistic pluralism that 
Mouffe and Laclau speak of. 
83 
The constitutional revolution had another aspect as weil which is sporadically talked 
about in history books but never really analyzed in dept. This is the formation of 
networked opposition through the usage of communication technologies. The printing 
presses piayed a large roie in articulating the discourse of the opposition and created 
the spaces for antagonism during the constitutionai revolution. Besides the printing 
press, the telegraph played an important role in spreading the news about the unrests in 
the country and spreading the regional unrest nationally. This was seen in how the 
usages of telegraph during the Tobacco Revoit lead to the spread of revoit from the 
bazar ofShiraz to other parts of the country. Hence, constitutional revolution is greatly 
indebted to the usage of ICTs in creating Network Social Movements. 
The forms of protestations during this period are also an important point of discussion. 
The practice of bast (religious sit-ins), for instance, shows the way protesting crowds 
formulated a nationalistic identity against the concession by using a practice that 
identified them as religious and oppositional at the same time. The collective practice 
of bast shaped the identity of the protesting crowds of the Tobacco Revoit as a crowd 
that is religious and concemed with the threat of the West toits property. One can see, 
hence, how bast is a form of collective action that results from a collective care. During 
the hasts, many people joined the ulama in the protestation while others took care of 
them by bringing food and supplies to them. Hence, the collective practice resulted in 
practices of caring for the collective and forming a collective identity against the Shah. 
Also, by stopping the consumption of tobacco across the country, the collective 
recognized themselves as a protesting crowd through the shared practice of following 
the fatwa that banned the consurnption of tobacco. In other words, in every step of the 
way, the collective practices of protesters made them realize a collective ethos and 
made them identify themselves as protesting crowds. 
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4.1.2 Modernity on steroids: from Reza Shah to Mohammad Reza Shah 
In 1909, the British, realizing an opportunity in the instability of the country caused by 
the civil war and discovering oil in the southwest of the country, founded the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company (now known as British Petroleum) (Keddi, 2003 , p.72). Five 
years later, in 1914, the World W ar I broke out. White Iran declared its neutrality, the 
geographie position of the country made it valuable to both sides. The Germans took 
to appease Iranians by promoting the anti -British and anti-Russian sentiment while the 
Russians and the British decided to become allies by splitting the country into two 
regions with the North controlled by the Russians and the south by the British (Keddi, 
2003). The war ended in 1919 but the effects devastated Iran economically and 
politically. Many of the war battles started being held in Iran, especially the Northern 
Region, destabilizing the regions. Regional conflicts, such as that of Mirza Kuchak 
Khan, with nationalist and/or Marxist tendencies started appearing in many parts of the 
country. At the same time, the first unions in the country formed in 1918 and were 
instrumental in many successful strikes (Keddi, 2003). Between 1919-1925, the 
government of Iran tried to win back the heart of the Iranians but the conflicts and 
changes that resulted from war and regional conflicts did not allow this to happen. In 
1921 , Reza Khan, a self-made commander of the Cossak Brigade, staged a military 
coup and convinced the Shah that the only way the dynasty would survive would be to 
make him the commander of the army. In 1923, the majlis terminated the Qajar dynasty 
and by 1925 Reza Khan, as the prime minis ter of the country, was able to gain the 
support of "an overwhelming majority of the assembly [who] voted to bestow the 
throne upon the Pahlavi family" (Abrahamian, 1981 , p.135). 
Reza Shah was an influential character in the history of the country. Between 1926-
1941 , he made many crucial changes to the coun.try. He started all of this by securing 
his power and control over the country through the creation a new unified army, 
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strengthening governrnent bureaucracy, and gaining of support from the court 
patronage (Abrahamian, 1983). "For the first time since the Safavids, the state was able 
to control society through extensive instruments of administration, regulation, and 
domination" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.136). Having such power and influence over the 
country now, he embarked on major social, cultural, and economie changes. First, he 
established three sets of codes: the Commercial Code (1925), the Criminal Code 
(1926) and the Civil Code (1928). Based mostly on the French madel of laws, these 
codes came to reduce the power of the ulama economically and socially sin ce many of 
these matters were handled by the ulama at the time (Keddi, 2003 , p.89). These codes 
were able to unify different forms of punishment across the country. Second, he 
embarked into great infrastructure projects such as major dams and the Trans-Iranian 
Railroad project (Abrahamian, 1981). Reza Shah also made major educational reforms 
by unifying the school curriculums based on the French curriculum and shift 4% of the 
parliamentary budget on education reform (Keddi, 2003 , p.91). Again, this move 
reduced the power of ulama si nee their religious schools (madras a) were no longer the 
only option for education (Keddi , 2003). Sorne ofthe seeds that the women's movement 
planted during the constitutional revolution came to bear fruit during this time as well 
since many girls and women were able to attend schools and get educated in secular 
schools. Higher education was also reformed with the establishment of the first civilian 
university in the country in 1934, Tehran University (Abrahamian, 1983, p.145). Just 
like the Dar al-Fonun in the late 191h century, the Tehran University created the next 
generation of intelligentsia that were becoming more and more familiar with the 
western sciences. The number of enrolled students in the university jumped from 600 
in 1934 to 3300 in 1941 , for instance. The changes in governmental and educational 
system also led to a new class of society. These were educated bureaucrats that he id 
governmental jobs and were part of a new middle class in the society. By implementing 
these changes, Reza Shah became more and more unpopular amongst the ulama and 
traditionalists who saw his reforms as threat to Islam and Islamic shari'a law. ln 1936, 
Reza Shah passed a law that banned the hijab and forced ali women to unveil (Girgis, 
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1996). While he faced many criticisms especially from the traditionalist side, he was 
able to suppress the opposition and implement the project. The project lead the ulama 
to mistrust Reza Shah even more and this mistrust continued until the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979. 
While Reza Shah was able to modernize the country in a fast pace, he also struted to 
become pessimistic of the capability of the parliament and those around him. He also 
started mistrusting the British and the Russians and sided more with the Germans in 
his modernization projects especially in the south oflran (Abrahamian, 1979). In 1939, 
the World War Il broke out and the Germans invaded parts of the Soviet Union (Keddi, 
2003 , p.1 05). While the Germans wanted to use Iran as a base to attack the Soviets, the 
Allies saw the country as the most strategie route to transfer supplies to fight the 
Germans on the Russian side (Keddi, 2003). This lead the British and the Russians to 
attack Iran from North and South respective! y, abdicating the Shah in September 1941 , 
replacing him with his son Muhammad Reza and forming an alliance between Great 
Britain, Russia and Iran in January 1942. Hence, another chapter in modern history of 
Iran came to an end. 
4.1.2.1 The Reign of Moharnmad Reza Shah 
The period between 1941-1979 can be divided into two separate periods. The first, 
between 1941-1953, saw a rise in nationalist sentiments and ended with the second 
proto-democratie movement after the constitutional revolution with the nationalisation 
of oil and the 1953 coup d 'état that overthrew the democratically elected Mohammad 
Mosadegh (Khosrokhavar, 2012). The second, between 1953-1979, saw a series of 
developments that resulted in major social changes including urbanisation, land 
reforms, and greater rights for women and minorities. The same period also saw the 
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rise in anti-shah and anti-western sentiments and resulted in the coalition between the 
left and the traditionalists against shah and the west. The period ended with the 
infamous 1979 Iranian Revolution and the establishment of the current system of 
governance in the country. In this section, I will explore the oil nationalisation period. 
I will explore the second period concluding with the Islamic Revolution of 1979 further 
in the thesis. 
4.1.2.2 Nationalism in Iran and nationalization of oil (1941 -1953) 
Reza Shah, during his reign, started a project of dynastie nationalism by using the 
symbolism ofpre-Islamic Iran. One of his orders was to "use 'Iran' in order to establish 
a particular historical narrative which would connect the modern state toits Aryan past" 
(Ansari, 2007, p. 1 03). The new nationalist movement that rose in the 1940's and 50's 
sought to make the nation of Iran and Iranian as an inclusive and pluralistic notion that 
evoked unity amongst all different ethnie backgrounds in the country (Ansari, 2007). 
The 1940's and 50's also was a period of competing political fractions (Ansari, 2007). 
The strongest political fraction, however, came from two major parties: Tudeh Party 
(Part of Masses) and Iran Party. The Tudeh Party was formed in 1941. It divided the 
society into two major classes of "those who own the main means of production; and 
those who have no significant amounts of property" and aimed to "mobilize the 
workers, peasants, progressive intellectuals, traders, and craftsmen of Iran" (Tudeh 
Party's firs program in Abrahamian, 2008, p.l 08). Tudeh was not the frrst communist 
party in the country but was the first to unite Marxist sentiments amongst the masses 
across the country. By 1945-46, Tudeh party had "six parliamentary seats in addition 
to that of Isfahan. lt bad three cabinet ministries: education, health, and trade" and 
claimed to have 50,000 members and 10,000 affiliate members (Abrahamian, 2008, 
p.l08). It's newspaper, Rahbar (Leader) , "boasted a record-breaking circulation of 
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more than 100,000 - triple that of the semi-official Ettela' at" (Abrahamian, 2008, 
p.1 08). The Iran Party was also formed in 1941 out of an Engineering Association by 
Mehdi Bazargan with members from professional associations such as lawyers, doctors 
and professors and campaigned "on behalf of the highly respected Dr. Mossadeq as 
weil as their own party leaders" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.189). 
Mossadeq's contribution to the history of Iran is indeed of great importance. He saw 
the influence of the British and Russians and the concessions given to them as 
something that needed to be stopped. In 1949, Mossadeq formed the National Front. 
He purposefully avoided the name Party because he "insisted that Iran was suited more 
for a loose coalition of organizations with a general goal than for a structured political 
party with disciplined members and elaborate programs" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.253). 
The National Front included plurality as one of its core principles and brought together 
the traditional middle class and the intelligentsia to form the organization together 
(Abrahamian, 1983). The traditionalists were more religious and had ties with the 
ulama and bazar while the latter was secular. In the 1950's the National Front shifted 
its attention from domestic to external affairs . This was through an opposition to the 
revision of the 1933 agreement with Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. At the same time, 
Mossadeq was able to acquire the support of the Tudeh party, a party that had great 
power and capability for staging large scale protests due to its success in establishing 
and uni ting many Trades Unions across the country. In 1951 , Mossadeq became the 
prime minister and was able to convince the parliament to nationalize the oil industry 
(Abrahamian, 1983). In response, the British decided to fight the matter in International 
Court of Justice at The Hague and !ost to Mosadeq in the court. In the next two years, 
Mossadeq tried to fend off economie pressure resulting from the worldwide embargo 
that the British imposed on Iran on the purchase of Iranian Oil. In 1953, seeing that the 
Mosadeq government is weakened, the British and the American government joined 
forces with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and staged a coup d' état against Mossadeq 
and overthrew his government (Gasiorowski, 2013). This event marked the first period 
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of shah's rein. 
4.1.2.3 Women's right movement in the period 
Probably the two biggest achievements in this era for women were in education and 
cultural practices. With the public education project, Reza Shah aimed to "integrate 
women, ethnie minorities, Sunni Muslims, and non-Muslims into the state" (Afar, 
2009, p.145). By 1933, for instance, around 45,000 girls were attending 870 girls 
schools across the country (Afary, 2009). However, Reza Shah also started controlling 
the activities of women during the same era. For instance, he dismantled the activities 
of the Patriotic Women's League and replaced it with the government controlled 
Kanun-e Banuan (Ladies' Centre) (Afary, 2009). The organization called for reform in 
"marriage, divorce, inheritance laws, equal wages for equal work, greater political 
rights for women, greater emphasis on women's education, and especially unveiling" 
(Afary, 2009, p. 151). lnterestingly, the Civil and Penal codes that Reza Shah 
introduced excluded the family law and ali matters regarding marriage, divorce and 
appointment of trustees and guardians rested under the control of the clerics (Afary, 
2009). As it was mentioned before, the unveiling laws were sorne of the most dramatic 
initiatives that aimed to create what Afary, using Foucault's notion, calls the "making 
of modem, docile bodies" (Afary, 2009, p. 155). Culturally, women participated more 
in public activities. At this time, cinema became an important instrument in learning 
and emulating the western mannerism. This in tum contributed to the discourse of 
normative heterosexuality amongst the middle class. Cinema also becan1e the 
instrument to teach western courtship and thea tres became spaces of intimacy for boys 
and girls who "found the darkness and safety of the movie houses conducive to the 
charged moments of privacy, intimacy, and eroticism" (Afary, 2009, p. 159). Lastly, 
the role of women and topics conceming women's issues became more prominent at 
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this time in the literary circle. The era saw the rise of Parvin E'tesamie, an acclaimed 
female poet, as weil as novels critiquing the exploitation of women and the pain and 
trauma associated with modern marriage (Afary, 2009). Overall , while many issues 
around women's rights did not get addressed during this era, a Pandora' s Box opened 
where speaking publicly about these issues, especially through literature, became more 
comrnon. 
4.1.2.4 Concluding remarks 
Severa! key elements relating to the thesis must be addressed at this point. First of ali , 
on top of printing press and telegraph, which were the tools of articulation and 
organization during the constitutional revolution, another technology was added to this 
list, the radio. During 1940s, the Soviet government supported the Tudeh Party in 
establishing severa! radio stations. The result of this was that the party could reach a 
large area of the country through a dissemination tool "which required no literacy, 
allowed immediate reception of political news and propaganda, and was dependent 
upon no one" (Ansari, 2007. p.1 01 ). This meant that large population of illiterate 
people in villages showed interest in poli tics and became political. The second element 
was the role of protesting crowds as collective action to question the decisions of the 
Shah and articulate their political discourse. As it was articulated by the royalist 
newspaper ltila'at (Information) "Mossadeq constantly resorted to street 
demonstrations to pressure the opposition and thereby, 'bring parliament under his 
influence" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.267). We can also see this in Jamal Emami's 
discourse in the Majlis regarding what he coined "street politics": 
"Statecraft has degenerated into street politics. lt appears that this country has nothing better 
to do than hold street meetings. We now have meetings here, there, and everywhere. Meetings 
for this, that, and every occasion, Meetings for university students, high school students, seven-
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year-olds, even six-year-olds. lam sick and ti red of street meetings. ls our premier a states man 
or a mob leader? What type of premier says '1 will speak to the people' every time he is faced 
with a political question?" (Emami in Abrahamian, 1983, p. 267) 
While during the constitutional revolution the major forms of collective action were 
bast (religious sit-ins) and closure of the bazar, the events in late 1940's and early 
1950's in Iran primarily resulted from a form of protestations that was more common 
in the Occident. This was because of the power of Tudeh Party to organize large scale 
strikes and form large protesting crowds in the streets. While protesting crowds existed 
during the constitutional revolution, the occidental form became the most prominent 
form of protestation during nationalization cri sis. Moreover, due to the ad vent of radio, 
the political discourse was able to travet wirelessly to areas where it would not normally 
reach before and this lead to an increase in articulation of the political in politics of the 
country at the time. Unfortunately, the Iranian historians that I have studied have not 
really focused on the impact of communication technologies as a force in creating 
networked political oppositions during this era and I do not have enough information 
to make a conclusive observation. However, the fact of the matter remains that 
communication technologies helped in expanding the network of the opposition in the 
country. Lastly, the idea of collective identity came to play a great role in this period. 
Facing the collective memory of Reza Shah's version of nationalism, the oil 
nationalization movement came to establish an identity oflranian Nationalism that was 
inclusive and pluralistic. The west was no longer only a threat to Islam, as it was 
formulated during the constitutional revolution. lt was a threat to the nation of Iran in 
its plurality of religions and ethnicities. Hence, the ethos of the collective that came 
from the collective practices of the crowd in this era, formulated a secular and 
nationalistic identity that sought to modernize the nation of Iran without a direct 
dependence to the west. 
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4.1.3 Islamic Revolution (1977-1979) 
During the nationalization crisis, Mohammad Reza Shah fled the country (Abrahamian, 
1979). With the help of the West, he came back to the country and continued in the 
footsteps of his father by starting, "full speed the drive to expand the three pi !lars that 
held up his state: the military, the bureaucracy, and the court patronage system" 
(Abrahamian, 2008, p.123). He increased the military budget and established a secret 
service organization that would stop future military coups called SA V AK with the help 
of the FBI and Israeli Mossad in 1957 (Abrahamian, 2008, p.l26). He also increased 
the number of ministries from twelve to twenty and indirectly financed quasi-
governmental institutions such as the Central Bank, National Iranian Radio and 
Television Organization, National Iranian Oil Company, and National Film Company 
(Abrahamian, 2008, p.126). Lastly, he used the wealth of the dynasty to found a 
foundation that included not only lands and estates but also over 207 companies active 
in "mining, construction, automobile manufacturing, metal works, agribusinesses, food 
processing, banking, insurance, and tourism (casinos, cabarets, and grand hotels)" 
called the Pahlavi Foundation (Abrahamian, 2008, p.127). He was successful in 
implementing these and much more changes because of the sudden increase in the priee 
of oil due to the Israel-Arab War of 1947 (Abrahamian, 2008). 
Seeing that his popularity was not improving amongst the majority of the population 
in the country, the Shah staged what I would like to call a public relations stunt that 
backfired at him and cost him his throne. He introduced a set of reforms and staged a 
referendum to legitimize these changes as a 'revolution' (Abrahamian, 1983). The event 
came to be known as the "White Revolution. These reforms included: " 1) 
nationalization of forests , 2) sale of state factories to private entrepreneurs 3) profit-
sharing for industrial workers 4) extension of the vote to women, and 5) establishment 
of the rural literacy corps" (Abrahamian, 1983 , p.424). The official results of the 
referendum stated that 99.9% of the voters said yes to the referendum question. In June 
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1963, however, Ayatollah Rouholah Khomeiru staged a protest in the month of 
Muharram against the Shah's so called "White Revolution" that became the dress 
rehearsal for the It·anian Revolution (Abrahamian, 1983). The upheaval of June 1963 
started on June 3rct when Khomeiru gave a speech that defined the ideological 
framework of the revolution. In it, he compared the Shah oflran to the Baril Umayyad 
family and the actions of his police force against political activists to the battle of 
Karbala, an important event that saw the army of the grandson of Mohammad, Hossein 
Ibn-i Ali, get brutally defeated and murdered by the military ofYazid, an army general 
of the Bani Umayyad caliph. Khomeini started the speech with following declaration: 
" ft is now the afternoon of Ashura . .. Sometimes when I reflect upon the events of Ashura, a 
question occurs tome: If the Bani Umayyad and the regime ofYazid ibn Mu'awiya were at 
war with Husayn, then why did they commit such savage and inhuman crimes against 
defense less women and innocent children on the day of Ashura? What were the women and 
infants gui lty of? It seems to me that their concern was far more basic, they did not wish the 
Bani Hashim to exist; the Bani Umayyad were hostile toward the Bani Hashim as a whole and 
their goal was to root out this goodly tree.[l] 
The same idea prevailed in Iran. What business did they [the Shah regime] have with our 
sixteen and seventeen-year-old youngsters? What had the Sayyid aged no more than sixteen or 
seventeen years done against the Shah? [2] What had he done to upset the government? What 
had he done to upset the tyrannical regime? One is led to conclude that it is towards underlying 
principles that they are hostile rather than children. They do not wish these principles to exist, 
nor do they wish any of us to exist; the young and the old alike." (Khomeini, 1963) 
The articulation that Khomeini used in this discourse was not new. It was born of the 
discourse of constitutional revolution where "the political space was divided into the 
two antagonist camps of people (millat) and state (dawlat). Dawlat was depicted as 
despotic (mustabidd) and unjust (zalim), and millat as oppressed (mazlum) andjustice-
seeking ('adalatkhwah)" (Tavakoli-Targhi, 1990, p.96). The difference this time, 
however, was that Khomeini was able to rearticulate this discourse in a narrative that 
connects the most important historie event in Shi'a Islam to the relation between the 
people oflran and the Shah. Instead offocusing on the concerns of the rest of the ulama 
relating to the land reforms and women's rights, Khomeini "denounced the regime for 
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living off corruption, rigging elections, violating the constitutional laws, stifling the 
press and the political parties, destroying the independence of the university, neglecting 
the economie needs of merchants, workers, and peasants, [and] undermining the 
country's Islamic beliefs" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.425). The upheaval in June lasted three 
days and was ruthlessly oppressed leaving hundreds of people dead (Ansari, 2007). 
4.1.3.1 Dr. Ali Shariati , the ideologue ofthe revolution 
After Mossadeq was overthrown, the Shah, with the help of its new organization, 
SA V AK, cracked down on many of the major parties that formed opposition to the 
Shah. Of these groups, the Tudeh Party was repressed significantly by the police and 
later by SA V AK (Abrahamian, 1983). By 1970s, the Tudeh was no longer a threat to 
the establishment. The second group, National Front, was also suppressed by the 
regime to the extent that by 1965, it broke into two rivais of the Second and Third 
National Front respectively, working mostly outside oflran through the publication of 
newspapers (Abrahamian, 1983). Sorne of the members of the National Front also 
formed a new organization called Hezb-i Azadi (Liberation Movement). These were 
mostly educated young professionals and technocrats who sought to synthesize Islam 
and Western Sciences together (Abrahamian, 1983). They would become the strong 
force in establishing the ideology behind the Islamic Revolution. Beside these three 
groups, the clerical opposition came mostly from Ayatollah Khomeini. Last but not 
!east, two major guen·illa organizations also took part in the opposition movement that 
lead to the Iranian Revolution. The first, Sazaman-i Cherikha-yi Feda'i Khalq-i Iran 
(The Organization of the Iranian Peoples' Guerrilla Freedom Fighters) was a Marxist 
group that saw the "victories of Castro, Giap, and Mao, as weil as the newbom 
confidence of the Latin American guerrillas" as examples of the effectiveness of 
guerrilla warfare in overthrowing the Shah (Abrahamian, 1983, p.488). The second was 
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Sazman-i Mujahedin-i Khalq-i Iran (The Organization of the Iranian Peoples' Freedom 
Fighters) that has its origins from the religious wing of the National Front and saw that 
"Iran was dominated by Imperialism, especially American imperialism, that the White 
Revolution had transformed Iran from a feudal society to a bourgeois one heavily 
dependent on Western capitalism [and] the only way to shatter this atmosphere ofterror 
was through heroic acts of violence" (Abrahamian, 1983, p. 492). 
While ali these groups held their positions strongly, they all saw Imperialism and the 
influence of the West as a problem and the solution was either in socialist, 
traditionalism or both. It was in this spirit that the work of Ali Shariati influenced many 
religious as well as Marxists to join forces against the Shah. In the 1940s, Ahmad 
Fardid, a philosophy professorat Tehran University, coined the term Westoxification. 
In the 60s, Jalal Al-Ahmad, a member ofTudeh Party, wrote a book by the same title, 
which "played the founding role in the effort to articulate a local, Islamic modernity as 
a blueprint for revolutionary social change in Iran" (Mirsepassi, 2006, p. 418). The 
term, referring to "the aggregate of events in the life, culture, civilization, and modes 
of thought of a people having no supporting tradition, no historical continuity, no 
gradient of transformation" (Mirsepassi , 2006, p.418), was used by Al-Ahmad as a 
Heideggerian critique of the nihilism that western modernity has brought to Iran in the 
form of consumerism and obsession with technology. He argued that "from a 
metaphysical point of view, Russia and America are the same [in their] dreary 
technological frenzy [and] unrestricted organization of the average man[ .. . ] all ofthese 
' isms ' and ideologies are roads leading to the sublime realm of mechanization" (Al-
Ahmad in Mirsepassi, 2006, p.422). He saw that the only way to exit "mechanosis", 
"the compound of nihilism and technological frenzy that grew indigenously within the 
West and extended itself like a plague to the world as a who le", as the 'disease' that has 
plagued Iran is "the subordination of technology to the power of authentic traditional 
Iranian culture" (Mirsepassi, 2006, p.423). What Al-Ahmad did, more or Jess, was to 
take the critique of technology by Heidegger and rearticulated it in the context of 
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consumerism and obsession with the west in the Iranian society at the time. 
Al-Ahmad's work captured the minds of intelligentsia during the 1960s. During the 
1970s, however, Dr. Ali Shariati's re-articulation of Al-Ahmad's work came to 
articulate Shi'a Islam as a modern revolutionary Ideology. Shariati was educated in 
France and was greatly influenced by revolutionary movement in Algeria and the works 
of Martin Heidegger, Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre. He "promoted the notion of 
Islamic ideology in his search for a reinvigorated collective conscience through the 
reform oflslam" (Arjomand, 2002, 720). More importantly, he painted the Shi'a Islam 
as "a revolutionary ideology that perrneates ali spheres of life, especially poli tics, and 
inspires true believers to fight against ali forms of oppression, exploitation, and social 
injustice" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.466). Shariati's appeal came in his capacity to "split 
Shi ' a Islam into a subterranean authentic tradition, which is called on to overthrow the 
tyrannical injustice of any powers that be, as well as to oppose the dominant yet 
inauthentic strain of the tradition that lingers in the mire ofpassivity and conservatism" 
(Mirsepassi, 2006, p.427). By doing so, he sough to give another narrative to Islam that 
was an alternative to that of Marxist-Leninist in its articulation. According to 
Abrahamian, Shariati argued that Islam and specifically Shi'a Islam was a revolutionary 
idea against despotism and for the greater good of people: 
"The prophet Mohammad had been sent to establish not just a new religion but a dynamic 
society in permanent revolution moving towards a classless utopia. Imam Ali had opposed the 
earl y Cali phs not just because they had usurped authority but because they had beyrayed the 
true mission by compromising with the powers-that-be. Imam Hussein had died in Karbala not 
just because ofpredestined fate but because of the burning desire to keep alive the true content 
of Islam." (Abrahamian, 2008, p.l44) 
He hence established Shi'a Islam as an alternative to the Marxist-Leninist Movement 
in Iran (Ghamari-Tabrizi , 2004) by describing Imam Hossein as an earl y day Che 
Guevara and "Zaynab -Hussein' s sister- as an exemplary woman who kept alive the 
revolutionary message" (Abrahamian, 2008, p.145). Shariati also criticized many of 
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the ulama in their passiveness and apolitical attitude to poli tics. He saw Shi 'a Islam as 
politically active and redefined/rearticulated many ofthe meanings ofterms used in the 
Shi'a literature. 
He transformed ummat (community) into dynamic society in permanent revolution ; towhid 
(monotheism) into social solidarity; imamat (rule of the imam) into charismatic leadership; 
jihad (crusade) into liberation struggle; mojahed (crusader) into revolutionary fighter; shahid 
(martyr) into revolutionary hero; momen (pious) into genuine fighter; kafer (unbeliever) into 
passive observer; sherk (idol worship) into political submission; entezar (expectation of the 
Messiah) into expectation of the revolution; tafsir (scriptural commentary) into the ski li of 
extracting radical meaning from sacred texts; and, perhaps most significant of ali , mostazafen 
(the meek) into the oppressed masses- as in the wretched of the earth . He also transformed the 
Cain- Abel fable into a metaphor for the class struggle; and the Karbala paradigm into a 
moral ity lesson on revolutionary self-sacrifice (Abrahamian, 2008, p.l45). 
So, just like constitutional revolution where new terms started surfacing as a result of 
articulations, the Iranian Revolution saw the introduction of a new vocabulary. Shariati 
was able to capture the educated middle class of Iran and special! y " Iranian youth, to 
underprivileged university students, to those from the traditional middle classes, and to 
educate young women from traditional backgrounds" (Mirsepassi, 2006, p.427). He 
was also able to capture the imagination of Marxist-Leninists. 
Shariati's speeches were mostly recorded on cassette tapes and were copied and 
distributed to the public. One sees again the role oftechnology as a tool for articulation 
of the political and the use oftechnology as a creative way to mobilize and disseminate 
information. However, the impact of his ideas on the revolutionary generation came 
from a different medium, Television. In 1973, the Iranian government charged two 
young Marxist-Leninists, Khosrow Golsorkhi (his last name means red rose, a 
revolutionary symbol) and Keramatolah Daneshian, with a plot to kidnap the crown 
prince and televised the trial live on TV (Dabashi, 2011 ). The trial became a public 
spectacle where "people of capital were transfixed watching the wide face, handsome 
demeanour, and heavily moustached lip of the young poet and journalist" (Dabashi, 
2010, p. 73). The discourse of Golsorkhi publicized the Islamic Ideology of Shariati in 
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the words of a secular, Marxist-Leninist: 
"Verily! Life is [naught but] conviction and struggle!' 1 began my statement with a passage by 
Master Hossein, the great martyr of the Middle Eastern masses. [Thought] 1 am a Marxist-
Leninist, for the first ti me 1 fou nd social justice in lslamic ldeology and th en became a socialist. 
ln this court 1 do not [intend to] haggle for my fife and living. 1 am but an insignificant drop in 
the great... in the great suffering of the revolutionary lranian masses" (Golsorkhi in Dabashi, 
2010, p.74) 
In essence, Golsorkhi was able to connect two ideas of Marxist-Leninist social justice 
with the notion of martyrdom of lslamic ldeology for the revolutionary cause of the 
lranian masses. Golsorkhi was found guilty and executed by the regime. However, his 
articulation of mixing Islam and Marxism was one of many that gave rise to the support 
of the left for Khomeini and his leadership during the Iranian Revolution. The two ideas 
ofwestoxification and Islam as a revolutionary ideology came to play a crucial part of 
the lranian revolutionary and post-revolutionary discourse. Between 1977-1979, many 
mass protests started to appear around the country. The lranian Revolution became a 
globalized spectacle when many of the strikes around the country were televised in the 
global media and this in tum "generated solidarity among different groups of strikers, 
especially among oil workers, railway workers, copper, coal and steel workers, 
electrical workers, and white-collar employees" (Rasler, 1996, p.146). During the same 
time, many new forms of collective practices by protesting crowds started forming 
including the infamous shouting of Allah-a-Akbar Khomeini Rahbar (God is Great, 
Khomeini is our leader) from the rooftops at night (Mottahedeh, 20 15). In 1979, Iran's 
last king escaped the country. Immediately after, a referendum was called by Khomeini 
where the majority of the population voted to establish what is now known as the 
Islamic Republic system of govemance (Abrahamian, 2008). 
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4.1.3.2 Concluding Remarks 
The shift in the articulation of discourse from 1953 onwards was from nationalistic to 
pluralistic. The pluralism, as we showed, came from the left and the intelligentsia as 
well as the traditionalist and the ulama. These articulations were transformed by the 
works of Jalal Al-Ahmad and Shariati in two ways. The first was a critique of Western 
Imperialism that resonated with the Marxists. This critique was indeed a continuation 
of constitutional revolution's plight for independence from Western influence as well 
as West's threat to Islam. Westoxification, in a way, was the continuation of this 
thought with the difference that instead of using Quran and religious texts, Al-Ahmad 
used Heidegger's critique of modernity against modernism and the West itself. The 
Shah's era saw a great increase in the influence of the West in the country. It also saw 
a ri se in consumerism and Al-Ahmad's work was a reaction to this materialism without 
historicity and authenticity. What Shariati did was to take Al-Ahmad's argument to a 
new level by making Islam a revolutionary ideology and the solution to the disease of 
Westoxification. Shariati's formulation of the cause of the protesting crowd of the 
Iranian Revolution as a Shi'a Islamic cause gave Khomeini a platform to hamrner the 
Shah by framing the Iranian revolution as an Islamic one with the symbolism of the 
battle of Karbala as the major platform for the cause. Khomeini's strategy is not 
something new since Seiyyd Jamal Al-Din Afghani used a similar logic to promote his 
idea of Pan-Islamism during the constitutional revolution and support the ulama in 
rallying the crowds during the Tobacco Revolution. 
What we can see, hence, is that many of the articulations of the constitutional revolution 
came to be articulated and re-articulated during the Islamic Revolution. The innovation 
of the Islamic Revolution was the usage of the Shi 'a narrative of the battle of Karbala 
in uniting the traditionalists and the leftists for the cause of overthrowing the king. 
Khomeini , by putting himself in the role ofHussain and portraying Shah as Yazid, used 
the narrative to formulate the collective practices of the protesting crowds within the 
------· ·---- ---- ------------' 
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framework of Shi'a Islamic practices such as Tazi'ye (Afary & Anderson, 2004, p. 36). 
After the revolution, Khomeini's discourse of the hattie of Ashura and the value of 
martyrdom for the cause of the Islamic Revolution becarne the hegemonie frarnework 
of his government. He was able to rally millions of Iranians to join the Iran-Iraq war 
with the same discourse and used it as a framework to silence any opposition to the 
government. In the next section, I will briefly talk about Iran after the 1979 revolution 
by talking about the emergence of three main social movements before the Green 
Movement. 
4.1.4 Post revolution Iran 
Four important changes happened in Iran after the revolution. The first was the 
unification of religion and state under one authority. The second was the Cultural 
Revolution and the revision of ali scholar curriculums in the country. The third was the 
disciplination of the bodies, especially for women, and a push for legitimization of the 
hegemonie power of the state through the myth of Karbala. The fourth was the ri se of 
the reform movement and a move towards civil society and Islamic Democracy. 
4.1.4.1 Governance in Iran and the State 
Following the revolution, the Islamic Republic system of governance was installed in 
the country with Khomeini as its supreme leader. This meant "the transfer of ali power 
- theological and political - to the highest religious authority, the marja-e taqlid (source 
of imitation), or, as the concept becarne known in revolutionary parlance, the velayat-
e faqih (guardianship of jurisconsult)" (Menashri, 2001 , p. 13). Following a popular 
referendum in 1979, 99% of the e1ectorate in the country, over twenty million, voted 
L___ _ _______ ----·-
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for the Islamic Republic as a form of govemance. From this, a new constitution was 
written that replaced the constitution of 1906 that was a hybrid product between "divine 
rights and the rights of man; between theocracy and democracy; between vox dei and 
vox populi ; and between clerical authority and popular sovereignty" (Abrahamian, 
2008, p.165). Under the constitution, "the 12-man Council of Guardians (shura-ye 
negahban), comprising of six clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader and six jurists 
chosen by the Majlis with his approval, is charged with reviewing laws passed by the 
Majlis to determine whether they are in conformity with Islam and compatible with 
Iranian constitution" (Menashri, 2001 , p.14). The people of Iran vote for two major 
bodies. The first is the leader of the Executive Branch, who becomes the president 
every four years, while the second is the members of Majlis who are responsible with 
passing laws. All the members who run for office in the executive and legislative 
branch of the govemment must be verified by the Guardian Council and approved by 
the Supreme Leader to do so (Menashri , 2001). 
With such fundamental changes in the constitution and form of governance in the 
country, the sou! ofthe con:flict and civil warin Iran during the constitutional revolution 
came to !ife. In essence, the dream ofNouri to have a Mashruteh-y Mashru'a (Religious 
Constitutional) form of constitution was transformed into an institutionalized 
government that formed a constitution with Shari'a at its foundation. In such manner, 
another change in the articulation of the Grace of God was born in the sense that the 
Supreme Leader came to be the authority to judge this Grace according to his 
knowledge of Shari'a. The fight to transfer the Grace of God directly to the hands of 
the people during the constitutional revolution was hence rearticulated by adding the 
Supreme Leader that assures its execution according to the laws of Shari 'a. 
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4.1.4.2 Cultural Revolution and the new student movement 
While the first change in the new government in Iran was the establishment of power, 
the second was the control over knowledge. After the Nationalization crisis, the student 
movement in Universities started flourishing due to a crackdown on political parties at 
the time (Mahdi , 1999). This in turn expanded to a large and diverse group of student 
associations that were active before and during the 1979 revolution. After the 
revolution and the election ofBanisadr as president, the student associations continued 
their activities and as Mahdi (1999) clearly points out, "Being young, active, energetic, 
and mostly influenced by the secular groups [ ... ] were a major obstacle in the way of 
consolidation of power" (p.8). After months of struggle between the leftist student 
associations and the government, the revolutionary council ordered Universities closed 
on June 5, 1980 (Mahdi, 1999). Following the closure, Ayatollah Khomeini established 
the Shoraaye Enghelab-e Farhangi (The Council for Cultural Revolution) on June 12 
of the same year (Mahdi , 1999). For the next two years, a project of Islamization of 
knowledge took place in the country where all programs of the Universities in the 
country were verified by the council to follow the values of Islam and the Islamic 
Revolution (Mahdi, 1999). 
When the Universities opened in 1982, "they were purged of leftists, nationalists, 
secular, and opposition students and faculties . Female students were barred from 
studying certain disciplines like agriculture, engineer and the law" (Mahdi, 1999, p.9). 
At the same time, new Islamic associations were formed and quotas were established 
for the admission ofmembers of Basij (Mobilization Force), Passdaran (Military), and 
high-ranking governmental officiais (Mahdi , 1999). In the light ofthese changes, many 
Islamic associations were established as the arm of the state. Many organizations 
started shaping in the 1970's and 1980's and many of them supported the government. 
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The 1990's in Iran saw many changes in the country. The most important of these 
wasthe ri se of the reform movement and the election of Mohammad Khatami. In 1994, 
before the election ofMohammad Khatami, a student organization called the Tabarzadi 
Group published an article making allegations against the then president Hashemi 
Rafsanjani's family and their associations (Mahdi , 1990). This was one of the first times 
after the cultural revolution where an Islamic student association critiqued a high 
ranking official in the governrnent. The 1990s saw the rise in the baby boomers that 
were born before and during the 1980-88 warin Iran. This high birth rate gave rise to 
the number of students in universities from 117,000 at the beginning of the 1980s to 
1,150,000 before the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997 (Mahdi, 1999). At the 
same time, for the first time in the history, presence ofwomen Iranian higher education 
drastically increased to the extent that by 1999, the number female students surpassed 
the number of admitted male students "by a figure of about 20,000" (Mahdi, 1999, 
p.l4). Ali these changes lead to a great participation of the student associations during 
the election of Mohammad Khatami , the first reform president after the 1979 
revolution. 
The election of President Khatami was a turning point as it was the result of the 
coalition of severa! forces in the country including "disenchanted and angry masses of 
youth and women, politically isolated and angry supporters of Islamic left [ ... ] and a 
large segment of the public variably dissatisfied with the policies of the Islamic 
Republic" (Mahdi , 1999). The election a1so led to the rebirth of the student movement 
and parallel organizations outside of the University that "took on a life of their own 
and became major players in the events of July 1999" (Mahdi, 1999, p.15). The 
activities of students and the violent response to these activities including a series of 
unsolved murders of severa! important political activists in the country. In July 1999, 
the Majlis approval of a tough new press law a day after Salam, a newspaper run by 
the reformist cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Mousavi-Khoeiniha, published "a letter by 
Said Emami, the intelligent officer who had mastermind the seriai murders (of several 
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reformist intellects)" resulting in its closure (Mahdi, 1999, p.18). On July 8, 1999, sorne 
200 students staged a peaceful protest demanding for more freedom of the press and 
the reopening of the Salam newspaper. Later in the evening, at 3:30AM, an organized 
force of 400 plainclothes men broke into the dormitories of Kooye Daneshgah and 
"ransacked student rooms, and assaulted students indiscriminately" (Mahdi, 1999, 
p.19). The events, known as Vaghe-ye Kooyeh Daneshgah escalated into major protests 
in the streets ofTehran and by July 12, the govemment put a ban on ali protests (Mahdi, 
1999). What followed was a struggle between the students and government forces that 
ended with biarne games and arrest of many students as weil as closed door trials. The 
events of Kooye Daneshgah left a bad taste in the mouth of not only students but also 
ordinary Iranians who sympathized with the students. After these events, the student 
movement continued and the crackdown on these movements also continued from the 
government's side. This was until the students reorganized their force and came to play 
a major part in the Green Movement in 2009. 
4.1.4.3 Women in post revolution 
The role of women after the revolution also greatly changed. Before the Iranian 
Revolution, the major player as women's advocacy group was the Women's 
Organization oflran (IWO) (Afary, 2009). Its biggest success, amongst many, included 
the changes in Family Law that allowed women to have equal rights in the matters of 
marriage, divorce and child custody (Afary, 2009). Continuing in the line with other 
women's organizations during the Constitutional Revolution as weil as the reign of 
Reza Shah, IWO set up centres for literacy and vocational training as weil as legal 
counselling on marriage, divorce and inheritance (Afary, 2009). Changes in the fabric 
ofthe society lead many women to leave their families in rural areas and move to urban 
centres to go to University and work (Afary, 2009). This also led to a fear from 
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modernity amongst rural families who saw their children go to cities to later not come 
back home (Afary, 2009). Religious intellectuals such as Al-Ahmad and Shariati 
articulated these fears . Al-Ahmad saw consumerism and its impact on the purity of 
women. Al-Ahmad criticized the "eroticized female bodies" by stating the following: 
" ln fact, what have we done? We have on ly given women the right to show off [their bodies] 
in society [ ... ] ln other words, we have pushed women, who are the guardians of tradition, 
family , ancestry, our very blood, into adopting loose manners of behaviour" (A l-Ahmad in 
Afary, 2009, p.240) 
Shariati also proposed a vision of "modern woman" by arguing that "her embrace of 
modernity was not to interfere with her responsibility as a wife or mother, nor with her 
commitment to authentic Islam" (Afary, 2009, p.241). Using symbolisms from the 
Shi'a Islam's history, he spoke of Fatimah, the youngest daughter of Muhammad, the 
wife of Ali and mother of Hossein, as the ultimate role madel with "her total devotion 
to her father, her unconditional support for her husband, her never-ending love and care 
for ber sons, and ber sacrifices for Islam" (Afary, 2009, p.242). Shariati, by doing this, 
made the archetype of the madel oflslamic woman who participated in the political by 
the mere act of being a traditional woman. Shariati's discourse indeed became the 
backbone of the archetype of women that the Islamic government came to promote. 
During the revolution, many unveiled women started wearing the hijab during protests 
as a protestation symbol (Afary, 2009). Many leftist women saw the hijab as a sign of 
resisting consumerism and westoxification. The symbolism of the war of Karbala that 
united the Iranian women used the strongest symbol of Islam as a tool for protest. 
Immediately after the revolution, a long and harsh process of the disciplining of bodies 
started. A series of specifie measures particularly targeted at the urban women 
happened immediately after the revolution. These included the abrogation of the 
Family Protection Law, prohibition ofwomen from serving in the military or as ajudge, 
limitation ofwomen from working in many professions, and a project ofre-veiling took 
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place (Afary, 2009). After March 71h speech of Ayatollah Khomeini who declared that 
he requires all female government employees to wear the hijab (veil). The next day, 
and for the next five days, demonstrations in Tehran lead to the "last largest feminist 
demonstration" in the country on March 12 (Afary, 2009, 273). Ironically, many ofthe 
leftist leaning organizations, including the Fadayeeon, refused to support the women's 
rights movement seeing it as a secondary problem that would di vide the unity of the 
revolution (Afary, 2009). By echoing the regime's charges, "major leftist organizations 
like Fadayeen and the Mojahedeen labelled the women's rights activists as 'agent 
provocateurs' whose purpose was to derail the revolution" (Moghissi in Afary, 2009, 
p. 274). 
By 1983, women were stripped of many of their rights through the reinstatement of 
laws that limited their power in marriage, divorce, and chi id custody as weil as defining 
them as second-class citizens. H(jab became compulsory and women were banned 
from many activities including sporting events and a ban on singing and dancing in 
public (Afary, 2009). While these restrictions were in place, Khomeini also encouraged 
women to become active citizens by following the footsteps of women such as 
"Fatimah, the prophet's daughter and mother of Hossein, and her daughter Zainab, who 
bravely embraced the death of her brother Hossein in the desert of Karbala" (Afary, 
2009, p.297). The war of 1980-88 saw an increase in the usage of the narrative of 
Karbala through immortalizing and honouring those who died in the war by naming 
streets, hospital , and schools after them and installing memorial shrines in corners of 
streets (Afary, 2009). The mothers and widows of the war veterans also got preferential 
legal, educational, and employment training treatment from the government. What this 
did was to bring a large workforce of women in many governmental positions and 
increase the number of women who went to universities (Afary, 2009). However, 
women faced and still face discriminatory laws and institutional segregation in regards 
to employment in the country. 
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Just like women activists in other periods of the Iranian modem history, women saw 
education as the solution to entering the social space. The late 1980's and 1990's saw a 
rise in the proportion of literate women especially those from rural areas. Before the 
revolution, many girls from traditional families were not allowed to go to school 
because of the fear of corruption of the Islamic values in these places (Khosrokhavar, 
2013 , p. 8). After the Islamization of schools, "not only in the rural areas, but also in 
many urban conservative families, girls were sent to school by their parents who 
become confident about the Islamic value of the educational system" (Khosrokhava, 
2013 , p.9). While the textbooks in universities have "ascribed different roles to women 
and men, [ .. . ] teaching science and related topics and introducing social sciences and 
other topics have opened up new visas for women, in particular, discussing, arguing, 
debating, and contesting the views of authority figures" (Khosrokhavar, 2013 , p.8). 
This indeed has led to an attitude amongst women to share the same worldview as men 
and challenge "the Islamic Republic in its claims to maintain the disparity between men 
and women in the name of Islam" (Khosrokhavar, 2013 , p.9) and denounce the 
restrictions put on women to join the workforce in many fields in the country in many 
ways. 
The 1990s gave rise to the so-called Islamist Feminist movement in Iran. The decade 
saw an increase in the publication of magazines that were dedicated to women's issues. 
Sorne ofthese publications such as Payam-e Hajar (Hajar's Message), Payam-e Zanan 
(Women's Message) and Neda (Voice), committed to the state while "they claimed 
more rights for Islan1ist women within the state" (Afary, 2009, 316). Others, su ch as 
Zan-e Ruz (Today's Woman), Khanevadeh (Family), and Rah-e Zendegi (Way ofLife) 
published articles on pressing social and legal issues such as divorce and child custody. 
The decade saw a number ofjoumals that defined themselves asfeminist such as Zanan 
(Women), Hoquq-e Zan (Women's Rights) and Jens-e Dovvom (Second Sex) (Afary, 
2009). Again, the printing press, as a communication technology, came to play an 
important role in shaping the political and introducing the political discourse in the 
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politics of Iran. Of importance for discussion in this thesis is the Zanan magazine and 
its influence in shaping the feminist movement in post-revolution Iran. 
Zanan was the first independent journal after the Iranian Revolution that dealt with 
women's issues specifically (Eftekhari, 2003). It came to !ife from a suggestion by 
prominent religious intellectuals, particularly Abdolkarim Soroush, to Shahla Sherkat, 
the only prominent intellectual woman in the religious intellectual circles at the time, 
"out of political calculations than concerned with women' s issues per se" (Eftekhari , 
2003 , p.16). The religious intellectual circle "believed that if their general project of 
rationalizing and modemizing religion was successful , the problems of women, along 
with many other social problems, would be solved" (Eftekhari, 2003 , p.16). However, 
Sherkat saw women's issues as specifie and set three objectives that would enhance the 
position ofwomen in legal, social cultural , and political arena. These objectives were: 
1) religious discussions; 2) feminist discussions; and 3) social discussions (Eftekhari , 
2003 , p. 18). The religious discussions started with interpretation and re-articulation of 
Islamic Jurisprudence and continued towards philosophical and theological discussions 
on women's issues (Eftekhari , 2003). The feminist discussions aimed at debunking the 
negative perception of feminism as something that "has always been equated with 
'Westoxication', social permissiveness, violence against women by men, and 
homosexuality" and move towards seeing feminism as "a scientific, social , and 
philosophical phenomenon that must be seriously studied by intellectuals and elites" 
(Eftekhari , 2003 , p.l9) . Lastly, Zanan dealt with social issues as well by looking at 
"Iranian women's contemporary reality" by bringing together "many male and female 
experts to talk about what they consider to be most important issues for women in Iran" 
(Eftekhari, 2003, p.20). The magazine published reports on women's prisons, women 
beggars and runaway girls as weil as reporting on successful women in the private 
sector such as lawyers, publishers, painters, and filmmakers (Eftekhari, 2003). 
Zanan was successful in developing a new feminist interpretation of Shi'a Islamic 
109 
doctrine and introducing the political discourse ofwomen in the politics of the country. 
In doing so, it articulated the political in the sphere of politics of Iran. lt was also 
successful in bringing a pluralistic voice to women's issues in Iran by articulating the 
discourses of religious intellectuals as weil as voices from activists in NGOs and the 
private sector. In doing so, it aimed to treat women's issues as a pluralistic issue that 
impacts the society as a whole. Just like Mustasher al-Dawleh who saw the use of 
Quran as an important tool for legitimizing the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man during the constitutional revolution, Zanan was able to "de-legitimize the 
authenticity of sorne of the most blatantly sexist statements and provided alternative 
readings of orthodoxies", by emphasizing, "Qur'anic verses and narratives that 
suggested a more egalitarian treatment of women and reinterpreted those that seemed 
to caU for restrictions on women" (Afary, 2009, p.318). This indeed shows the 
articulation of poli ti cal discourse in poli tics in Iran. 
4.1.4.4 Reform movement 
I will not focus much on the reform movement because much of the information that 
is related to this movement was provided in the previous two sections. The reform 
movement officially started after the election of Moharnmad Khatami in 1997. 
However, it came from "a silent ideological revolution" during the 1990s 
(Khosrokhavar, 2013 , p.12). At the heart of this ideological movement was a rejection 
of the interpretation oflslam that was developed by Jalal Al-Ahmad and Shariati during 
the l960's and l970's. lt instead looked at "a new interpretation of Islam that rejected 
tenets of Islamic radicalism and opposed autocracy in the name of Islamic pluralism" 
(Khosrokhavar, 2013 , p.12). This was indeed the beginning of what is now called 
'religious intellectuals' whom Abdokarim Soroush is an important part of. 
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Soroush is a theologian philosopher who became part of the Cultural Revolution 
Council in revising the University courses during the Cultural Revolution (Ghamari-
Tabrizi , 2004). He graduated from Tehran University in 1969 and moved to London 
where he studied history and philosophy at Chelsea College in London (Gharami-
Tabrizi, 2004). There, he was influenced by Carl Popper's philosophy and wrote a body 
of work critiquing the Marxism's historical determinism by echoing the "assertion that 
at the core of Marxist ' scientific philosophy ' lies an irrepressible urge toward ' holistic 
utopian engineering"'(Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2004, p.514 ). Soroush continued his 
philosophical work where he critiqued Shariati's notion oflslam as ldeology by arguing 
for '"de-ideologization' of Islam through a distinction between religion and religious 
knowledge" (Gamari-Tabrizi , 2004, p.514). He makes this argument by stating that 
"Based on the conviction that no understanding of Islam is ever complete or final, he 
dismisses any attempts to formulate an official Islamic political ideology" (Vakili, 
1996, p.3). V akili (1996) outlines the arguments of Soroush as followed: 
1) No understanding ofrslam is ever complete or final. 2) No religious government should rule 
on the basis of an official lslamic political ideology. 3) Human rights are the fundamental 
political criterion, and democracy is the only form of government that can both protect human 
rights and preserve a proper role for religion in politics.4) lnstitutional links between the 
clerical establishment and the government in religious states must be severed, in order to 
protect the integrity of religion and clerics alike. 5) lranian and Western cultures are not 
mutually opposed, but require continuous dialogue and constructive interaction. (Vakili , 1996, 
p. l) 
Referring to the theoretical framework of Mouffe and Lac lau, we can see that Soroush 
argues that religion must be part of the politics and not the political. ln other words 
"unlike Shariati , for Soroush, the religiosity of the state is not defined by a canonized 
rendition put fmward by a Muslim polity. The state is religious and democratie insofar 
as it reflects and realizes the general values and goals of the society" (Ghamari-Tabrizi, 
2004, p.517). This indeed critiques one of the centrepieces of the Islamic Revolution, 
the concept of Supreme Leader, because Sorush "distinguishes religion, 'as intended 
by God ', from the temporal human knowledge of it (religious knowledge or Shari'a)" 
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(Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2004, p.515). Hence, for Soroush, religious knowledge is no longer 
absolute and its interpretations hence are not absolute. As Ghamari-Tabrizi (2004) puts 
it "Soroush introduced an epistemological pluralism in the context of which any 
absolute truth-claim was suspect. In this light, he rebuked the foundation of the 
revivalist (reformist or revolutionary) project ofreconciling what was etemal with what 
was ephemeral, what is text and what is context" (p.516). 
Soruosh's ideas come to play a great role in the formulation of the discourse of 
President Khatami's 1997 election. The success of Khatami was in his discourse for 
change and his address to the youth generation or "children of revolution" (Menashri , 
2001 ). These were children who were born right after the revolution during the baby 
boom of the 1980s and were called that name because they were the first generation of 
children after the revolution. Khatami translated two ideas from Soroush in his political 
discourse: civil society and Islamic Democracy (Ansar, 2007. P.319). Khatami was 
able to articula te these ideas by " identifying 'civil society' (jarne 'eh-ye madani) with 
what Khatami called the 'golden age of the prophet', i.e., his community in the town of 
Medina (medinat al-nabi) being ruled by democratie ideals after his exodus from 
Mecca" (Khosrokhava, 2013 , p.l6). In a way, Khatami's comparison made possible 
"the demand for limited forms of political pluralism within the theocratie regime" 
(Khosrokhavar, 2013 , p.16). Khatami advocated for "social liberalization, political 
tolerance, greater rights for women, and the rule of law" (Menashri, 2001 , p.82). He 
also focused on national interests instead of ideological re-articulation and chose "the 
great nation of Iran has a great Islamic and national heritage" as a platform (Menashri , 
200l ,p.83). The establishment, seeing that Khatami was a low-profile clergy, did not 
see him as a threat to the conservative candidate of the time, Nateq Nouri. He hence 
was able to get the approval of the Guardi an Council and became an official candidate. 
The reformist press, mostly consisting of Soroush and intellectual circle, and the 
student associations backed the campaign of Khatami and mobilized on his behalf 
(Ansari, 2007). The women's rights advocates and a large population of women who 
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were looking for reform saw that he would be able to adopt a "more liberal stance on 
gender relations" and overwhelmingly supported him during his election (Afary, 2009). 
To the surprise of many, 29 Million from the 33 Million eligible voters participated in 
the election and 20 Million amongst those voters voted for Khatami (Afary, 2009, 
p.328). Khatami faced great opposition from the conservatives during his presidency. 
He was able to execute sorne policies to provide more opportunities for cultural 
expression and political criticism (Afary, 2009). However, he also faced repression in 
every step of the way because the police and legal system remained under control of 
the Supreme Leader (Afary, 2009). A great example of the lack of control over the 
military and the police was explained above during the Kooye-Danshgah incident in 
1999 where student dormitories were attacked and many students were arrested and 
killed during the protests at the time. This being said, the election of Khatami trickled 
something that never stopped until its reappearance during the June 2009 elections that 
brought with it the Green Movement. 
4.1.4.5 Concluding remarks 
During the 1980s, the Islamic governrnent in Iran used two main ideas to create a 
hegemonie state. The first was Al-Ahmad's Westoxification and the idea that the west 
has within itself a disease that would pollute the authenticity of the Iranian people 
through its logic of consumerist modemity. What this lead to was a retum to the Shi'a 
Islam values and Shariati's notion of Islam as ideology. Shariati was able to convince 
the left in his conviction that Islam, at its heart, is a socialist project that goes beyond 
materialism and promises authenticity and value to a society. The Islamic govemment 
saw Westoxification as a threat to the values oflslam and immediately started a project 
of disciplining the body that had the veiling law as its centrepiece. The govemment 
also intruded in the way people, men and women, dressed and acted in the public. In 
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essence, the 1980s saw the re-articulation of the term Westoxification as a hegemonie 
power that legitimized forced disciplination of the body. During the 1990s, the three 
major forces started to articulate severa! counter-hegemonic discourses. The Cultural 
Revolution of 1980-1982 saw a complete eradication of oppositional voices . However, 
many new organizations that formed started shifting their attitudes towards the 
government and its policies during the 1990s. This developed a great mobilization force 
that lead to the election ofMohammad Khatami in 1997. This also led to the first major 
student protest in 1999, with the incident of the Kooye Daneshgah. The 1990s also saw 
arise of the Islamic Feminist movement in the country with the rise in the number of 
educated women during the 1980's and 1990's and an opposition to institutional 
discrimination during the same period. Of importance, as we saw, was the Zanan 
magazine and its aim to push for the issues of women exclusively instead of mixing it 
with the new Islamic Intellectual circle. We saw that women also contributed greatly 
in the election of Khatami in 1997. Lastly, the 1990s saw the rise of a new group of 
intellectuals who started critiquing the two ideological roots of the Islamic Revolution, 
namely Shariati's Islam as Ideology. By doing so, they pushed for a distinction between 
Islam as religion versus Islamic knowledge Shari'a and argued that Islamic knowledge 
is not absolute but interpretive. This was articulated by Soroush amongst others and 
led to the articulation of a discourse around civil society and Islamic Democracy with 
the rule of law as i ts central pillar during the 1997 election campaign of Khatami . 
CHAPTER V 
THE GREEN MOVEMENT 
Khatami, during his presidency 1997-2004, tried to implement many reforms in the 
country. White he could not influence the policies in TV and Radio, he did bring about 
changes in the Ministry of Culture and lslamic Guidance (Farhi, 2004). Renee, the 
period saw a rise in the number of newspapers and journals. However, in the same 
period, "more than a hundred newspapers were closed down, and the state targeted 
political dissidents, joumalists, and even some reform politicians" (Afary, 2009, 
p.350). This was due to the reaction of the conservatives to the policies proposed by 
Khatami and the reformists. The It·anian people, seeing that ali their avenues of 
communications were blocked, used another avenue for communication and 
articulation of discourses, the internet. Two factors are important to mention at this 
point. First, as it was mentioned in the previous chapter, the literacy rate in the country 
rose dramatically. Between 1979 and 2003 , the literacy rate jumped from 59% to 77.1% 
(Rahimi, 2003). Also, the so-called "children of revolution" came to dominate the 
demography of the country. By 2005 , 70% of the 68 million population of the country 
were under the age of 30 (Cohen, 2006). The recipe is simple, you produce a country 
full of youth that did not experience the trauma of its revolution and barely remember 
its war, you take ail forms of expression away from them and, meanwhile, introduce a 
too l called the internet in the middle of them where they can express themselves 
anonymously. The results, as it would be expected, was a boom in the usage of the 
internet as a tool for expression in not only political, but also social and cultural 
discourse. As Rahimi (2003) argues, the internet "opened a new domestic arena of 
contestation, accommoda ting numero us dissident groups online" (p.l 07). From 2001-
2009, the number of Internet users in Iran increased from 200,000 to 25,000,000 and 
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the considerable growth in educationallevel of the country lead many youth to use the 
internet as a tool in their everyday !ife (Sohrabi-Haghighat & Mansouri, 2010). 
In 2004, the Guardian Council disqualified many of the reformist candidates. At the 
same time, many of the disillusioned voters who saw this decided not to vote. Renee, 
"the decision of nearly 20 million disillusioned pro-reformist voters to boycott the 
election, voting fraud engineered by the office of the Supreme Leader, and the zeal 
with which the Basij got out the vote certainly helped bring Ahmadinejad to power" 
(Afary, 2009, p.331). The Ahmadinejad's election in 2005 was a setback to the 
movement that started in 1990s. Ahmadinejad came into power with an appeal to the 
working class voters and was able to beat Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a high-ranking 
cleric and the president of Iran during the 1980s, to become the first non-cleric 
president of the Islamic Republic oflran (Hassan, 2007). He "drew on a populist policy 
which explicitly aimed to support poor people and systematically disregarded middle 
class demands in social, economie and political arenas" (Sohrabi-Haghighat & 
Manso uri , 201 0). Besides the economie challenges, many of his policies played against 
the idea of civil society and left no place for the opposition in the country (Sohrabi-
Haghighat et al. , 201 0). The 2009 election, hence, came out of a desire for a retum to 
the 1997's promise of the establishment of a civil society and an Islamic Democracy 
with the reformist camp, student organizations and women's organizations coming 
together to support the two reformist candidates : Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi 
Karoubi. 
In what follows , I bring forward the key elements of my theoretical framework and 
show how the Green Movement emerged as a Networked Protesting Crowd (NPC). In 
doing so, I make reference to other instances in history to show how this movement is 
a continuation in the history of social movements in the country. 
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5.1 Event and Kairos 
Badiou's notion of Event speaks of how an event is a trans-being that enters the realm 
of being to introduce new multiplicities in Being. To this extent, the Event changes 
Being by modifying it through the introduction of new multiplicities. The constitutional 
revolution of 1906 in Iran was indeed that Event. lt forever questioned the legitimacy 
of the King and new concepts such as parliament, people, law, and constitution to the 
state of Being of Iran as a country. Through the articulation and re-articulation of new 
discourses, the discourses that were introduced during this era were articulated and re-
articulated through the history of the country. To this extent, the Event of the 
constitutional revolution and its discourses appeared and reappeared in the Being of 
Iran as it introduced new multiplicities (discourse formations) through the history of 
the country. To this extent, the Green Movement is not far off from another re-
emergence of what started as the Event of the constitutional revolution. Hence, 
ontologically, the Green Movement was an Event. However, it was an Event in a chain 
of Events that emerged and re-emerged through the history of modem social 
movements in the country. 
This brings us to the second concept, Kairos. U sing of opportune moments as a way to 
gather protesting crowds to articulate counter-hegemonic discourses is fairly evident in 
the history of modem Iran. During the tobacco revoit, we saw how the protesting 
crowds emerged when they became aware of the tobacco concession. While there were 
many concessions before and after the tobacco revoit, the opportune moment and the 
mobilisation of not on! y the bazar of Shiraz but also other places in the country shows 
how the concession was used as an opportune moment by a pluralistic force in the 
country to articulate the dissatisfaction of the country with its state of politics. Kairos 
is not just usage of opportune moment, but also a moment to articulate a counter-
argument at the right moment and the events of the tobacco revoit clearly demonstrate 
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that. Furthermore, the usage of opportune moment by the ulama and the bazar to 
articulate their desire for a bouse of justice carne after the unrest in bazar of Tehran 
when two sugar merchants were bastinadoed in public. The event may have seemed 
insignificant. However, the chain of events that came from the articulation of a political 
discourse after this event again shows how seeing an opportune moment to articulate 
their desires formed protesting crowds. The result of such a small event was years of 
conflict that led to the establishment of the first parliarnent, first constitution and a civil 
warin the country. We can also see the usage of opportune moment during 1950s and 
the nationalization of oil in the country. Mossadeq intelligently saw the potential of 
using every opportune moment to cali for protests and general strikes during this time 
to push for what resulted as the nationalization of the oil in the country. Last but not 
!east, during the Islamic Revolution, as we saw, Khomeini gathered the crowds in 1963 
after the so-called 'White Revolution' of the Shah by using the event as an opportune 
moment to articulate what becarne the backbone of his discourse, the comparison of 
the struggle of people of Iran to the battle of Karbala. We can also see this idea after 
the revolution with the protests during the International Women's Day who used the 
day to articulate their disagreement with the discourse of Khomeini a day before the 
protests. Lastly, the 1999 student pro tests after the closure of the Salaam newspaper is 
another great exarnple that shows how university students formed protesting crowds to 
articulate the ir demand for the reopening of the newspaper. Wh at we see, bence, is that 
there is coherence in the history of Iran's social movements in the use opportune 
moments to form protesting crowds to articulate political discourses. 
The Green Movement was no different. Immediately after the election, many Iranians, 
believing that the election was rigged, started coming to the streets and using the result 
of the election as a Kairos to articulate the poli ti cal discourse that the ir democratie right 
to vote must be respected. The election results were an opportune moment because it 
concerned a broad base of people from different backgrounds. The use ofthe event was 
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indeed a strategie move by the people to show the pluralistic opposition to the action 
of the government. The government, hence, could no longer biarne the protests on one 
group since the protesting crowds consisted of a large pluralistic force. Severa! 
examples can be used to complement this argument. 
5.1.1 The Epie of Dirt and Oust 
After the elections, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad organized a rally to celebrate his victory 
(Tait, 2009). During a speech, in response to the violence of the police in arresting and 
killing protesters in the Green Movement, he declared "The nation's huge river would 
not leave any opportunity for the expression of dirt and dust" (Tait, 2009). As a result, 
on June 1 71h, a large crowd of protesters came to the street holding a massive sign by 
calling the event Hamaseye Khaso-Khashak (Epie of the Dirt and Dust). The event was 
reported in the first page of the Iranian reformist newspaper Etemad-e Meli with a 
picture of the banner on the front page (Tait, 2009). What this shows is that the 
protesting crowds used the articulation of "dirt and dust" and turned into a language 
that is used in the Shahnameh (The Persian book of mythology) to explain the struggle 
between Good wins against Evil. ln this case, the Good is the dirt and dust and the evil 
is the one who called the people in the streets as dirt and dust. ln this way, the protesting 
crowds used the day after the public speech of Ahmadinejad as an opportune moment 
to come together as a protesting crowd and frame their collective action as an epie 
conflict between good and evil. 
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5.1.2 Neda and the Voice 
Seven days after the first protest in the country, two videos emerged where it showed 
a woman getting shot in the head and die in from of the camera (Delphine, 2009). The 
video showed the moments after she was shot and continued until she bled to death 
(Y outube, 2009). The gruesome video immediately became a trending topic on Twitter 
after its viewing by millions on YouTube (Vincent, 2009). For Green Movement Neda 
becan1e the image of the repressed voice in the country. The name Neda in Farsi means 
' vo ice'. Hence, the connection between the slogan "where is my vote?" and the murder 
of an innocent woman called "Voice" provided an opportunity for the protesting 
crowds to use the moment as a kairos to produce themselves and articulate their 
discourse. Neda's incident was greatly used amongst the protesting crowds outside of 
Iran. In Paris, for example, a group of protesting crowds gathered in front of Eiffel 
Tower holding the picture ofNeda Agha-Soltan in front oftheir face and a large banner 
in the back reading "we are ali one Neda, we are all one Voice" (Figure 5.1). Protesting 
crowds in other cities in the world used the picture ofNeda as the symbol of repression 
ofthe governn1ent oflran (Figure 5.2) and the slogan "I am Neda" became one ofthe 
major slogans of the protesting crowds of the Green Movement around the globe 
(Figure 5.3). 
1 2 0  
F i g u r e  5 . 1  P r o t e s t i n g  c r o w d s  h o l d i n g  t h e  s i g n "  w e  a r e  a l i  o n e  N e d a ,  w e  a r e  a l i  o n e  
V o i c e "  ( J a c k s o n ,  2 0 1 2 )  
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Figure 5.2 A vigil with the photo ofNeda at the center of the table in Dubai (Fathi, 
2009) 
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Figure 5.3 A woman holding the sign reading "I am Neda" in a protest in New York 
(DailyMail , 2009) 
5.1.3 Majid Tavakoli , the veiled man 
Since 1953, the 7th ofDecember is known as "Student Day" in Iran (Sahimi, 2009). For 
this event, the students in different universities organize rallies and general assemblies 
to commemorate the three students that died by the government of Reza Shah on the 
5th of December of 1953 during a protest against the visit of President Nixon to Iran 
(Sahimi, 2009). On December 7th of 2009, Maj id Tavakoli, an Iranian student activist, 
gave a controversial speech at the Amir Kabir University in Tehran where he criticized 
the Iranian regime because of their violence towards student activists (Tavakoli, 201 0). 
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After the speech, Majid was arrested by the police and was incarcerated at Evin prison 
(a notorious prison that houses political prisoners in the country) (BBC, 2009). The 
next day, Fars News, a semi-official news agency close to the government of Iran, 
published a photo of Majid Tavakoli wearing woman's headscarf or hijab (Fars News 
Agency, 201 0). The news quickly travelled in the social media and a social media 
campaign called "We are ali Majid" started where Iranian men took selfies of 
themselves wearing the head scarf (hijab) (Mackay, 2009). The campaign continued 
for sorne days and many important Iranian figures like Hamid Dabashi participated by 
wearing the hijab and taking selfies of themselves (Figure 4). ln this instant, the 
protesting crowds were only online and they did not expand their presence outside of 
the internet. This produced an online protesting crowd with the same tendency to use 
the opportune moment for producing a political discourse whereby the intimidation 
tactics of the government were put into question. This is an example of how a 
globalized network of protesting crowds used the story of Majid Tavakoli as a kairos 
to produce themselves as a collective political force to critique the move from the 
government to intimidate its dissident. 
5.2 Protesting Crowds as The Political 
As we saw, discourse, for Mouffe and Laclau, is what is said and what is not said. 
Therefore, it includes textual practices as well as non-textual ones. Articulation of 
discourse is probably one of the key parts of this thesis. As we saw, in the modem 
history of Iran, many discourses were articulated and these discourses were at times 
complementary while at other times contradictory. Tavakoli-Taraghi (1990), in his 
analysis of the linguistic aspects of the constitutional revolution, clearly explains the 
importance of discourse articulation in formulations of the demands of the 
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revolutionaries during this era. Nationalism during the 1950s had its own form of 
discourse articulation with independence from the West as its central pillar. We can 
also see that the feminist movement in Iran was able to establish itselfthrough different 
forms of articulation that started during the constitutional revolution and continues now 
with Islamic Feminism as its new articulation of discourse. We have shown through 
the history of Iran that the articulation of discourse has played a great role in bringing 
together protesting crowds. What is of importance is not only the discourses that were 
articulated but also the way they were articulated. Hence, I look at sorne of the political 
discourses that the protesting crowds of the Green Movement articulated during the 
Green Movement. I then look at how the protesting crowds of the Green Movement 
used technology as tools of organize global grievances, mobilize the movement, and 
turn the Green Movement into a mediatized spectacle. 
5.2.1 Articulations ofthe political 
What makes a protesting crowd different from other forms of crowd are two 
characteristics: 1) their set of collective practices that are unique to this form of crowd; 
2) their emergence as political agents who articulate political discourse in the realm of 
poli tics. 
The protesting crowd, during the movement, started by formulating their discourse 
around the demanding for their vote. However, as the movement continued, other 
political discourses came forward. At every stage, the protesting crowds used an 
opportune moment to articulate certain discourse. For instance, on September 18, 
during the annual Qods rail y, where the regime organizes a rail y in support of Palestine, 
the protesting crowd of the Green Movementjoined the rally with the slogan "No Gaza, 
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No Lebanon, I sacrifice my !ife for Iran" (Davinci Code, 2009). In another video from 
the same time, one sees the protesting crowd who have integrated themselves in the 
pro-Palestinian rally, shouting "Death to Russia" and "Death to Palestine" when the 
caller is asking them to shout "Death to America". This indeed brought another 
dimension to the movement because the protesting crowds entered the realm of 
international politics by criticizing the politics oflran in the region and internationally. 
This can also be seen in other periods of the country. During constitutional revolution, 
the protesting crowds criticized the influence of the west in the affairs of the country. 
The nationalization crisis of 1953 and the 1979 revolution also formulated discourses 
around the poli tics of the country in relation to international influence. However, this 
ti me around, the protesting crowds of the Green Movement criticized the government 
of its influence on the region and support for other countries in the region. 
One of the most interesting formulations ofthe political discourse in 2009 post-election 
movement was the use of the subject as a slogan. What 1 mean by this is that many of 
the slogans were either about a specifie person i.e. "Neda" "Majid" or about how the 
"l" is central in the slogan. Sorne of these examples include: "Where is my vote?"; "1 
am Neda"; "1 am Majid"; " dust and dirt is you, the enemy of the soil is you" 
(shahram257, 2009), and "I will take back your vote, my martyred brother". These are 
sorne of the examples that show a sort of individualist discourse in the collective 
discourse of the protes ting crowds during the Green Movement. 
During the Green Movement, there were many political articulations that were formed 
through the usage of symbolism, and re-appropriation of many collective practices that 
were used during the Iranian Revolution. In a sense, the protesting crowds of the Green 
Movement used the collective practices and symbolism of the 1979 revolution to re-
create the Green Movement as a struggle for justice. First of ali, the color green, as 1 
have said previously, is the symbolic color of the battle of Ashura. Hence, the re-
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appropriation of the color by the movement was to identify the movement with the 
Shi 'a Islam's symbol of the struggle for justice. On top of that, the name of the leader 
of the movement, Mir Hossein Mousavi, is also the name of the grandson of 
Mohammad who was killed during the battle of Ashura. Therefore, just like Khomeini, 
who compared the struggle between the Shah and the people of Iran to the battle of 
Ashura, the protesting crowd of the Green Movement used this symbolism to do the 
same with the Iranian regime. In doing so, they used the strongest hegemonie discourse 
that was used to justify the Iranian government's authority as the counter-hegemonic 
discourse for a social justice movement in the country. In this way, the true followers 
of Hossein became the followers of Mir-Hossin. The protesting crowds used many 
symbolic chants and slogans to make this connection. They for instance chanted two 
of the songs from the Iranian Revolution during the protests. These chants were sung 
inside and outside oflran. The first, Yar-e Dabestani (My High-School Friend) is the 
glorification of the revolutionary student that fight the Shah while Sar-Oomad 
Zemestoon (The Winter is Over) is the song symbolizing end to repression and a new 
beginning. They also chanted Allah-a Akbar from their rooftops at nights during the 
Green Movement (Kheshti, 20 15). This was a very co mm on practice during the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979 (Mottahedeh, 20 15). 
ln short, protesting crowds are political actors since they are collective actions that 
articulates the politica1 discourse in the realm of politics. The Green Movement did 
exactly that through not only the collective practices of writing and chanting slogans 
but also through the usage of symbolism and symbolic collective practices. In doing 
so, they were able to articulate the ir grievances and establish an identity as a movement. 
This is why I would like to argue that the Green Movement was a social justice 
movement because it came about as a coalition of multiple social movements that 
already existed and whose main concern was the question of democracy and social 
justice in the country. The Green Movement was violently shut down after the Ashura 
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protest of 27th of December 2009. On the day, many protesters, wearing black and 
green, both symbolic colors of the day of Ashura, took to the streets and marched from 
Imam Hossein Square to Freedom Square on the Revolution street (Time Magazine, 
2009). The protesters during this day saw the most violent response from the police 
and the basij where 5 people were killed including the nephew ofMir Hossein Mousavi 
(Time Magazine, 2009). The event led to the house arrest of both leaders of the 
movement and the ir wives (Offiler, 2013 ). The sheer symbolism of this event is very 
important since the movement was seemingly crushed by the state. However, what 
came out of this was a clear articulation of the Green Movement as a social justice 
movement, the Green Movement manifesta. The manifesta (Soroush, Kadivar, 
Mohajerani, Ganji , & Bazargan, 2010), written and signed by many ofthe founders of 
reform movement including Abdolkarim Soroush, articulated the demands of the Green 
Movement in 10 separate sections. These demands included the resignation of 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the releasing of ail political prisoners, free means of mass 
communication, recognition of ali lawful political groups, independence of 
universities, independence ofjudiciary by electing its head, and electing ail the officiais 
who must become responsive to criticism, and limiting the number of the terms that 
they can be elected (this last one is directed at the Supreme Leader indirectly) (Soroush 
et al. , 2010). The manifeste, hence, was able to capture the desires of Green Movement 
and show that the movement is not a post-electoral turmoil but a social justice 
movement. 
5.2.2 Technology, networks and the political 
One of the points that Mouffe is unclear about in her works is the question of how the 
political is ruticulated. What this brings us to is the importance of Information 
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Communication Technologies (ICTs) as tools that can be used for articulating, 
propagating, and sharing political discourses. This also means that ICTs, through the 
sharing of political discourse, are important tools for forming and maintaining 
networks of dissent. What is different with the Internet is its multi-directional capacity 
and its reach whereby ail its users can participate in the network while coming from 
different parts of the globe. Thus, what becomes a media spectacle (Kellner, 2003) on 
the internet is not only seen by a globalized audience but also shared and commented 
on by that audience. What I would like to argue here is that the usage of the ICTs by 
protesting crowds of the Green Movement was part of a historie culture of creative 
usage of technology as tools for protestation in the country that dates back to the 
tobacco revoit of 1891 . Hence, the principle of creative usage has never changed. What 
has changed is the type of technology and its capabilities. 
As we saw, during the tobacco revoit, the telegraph was an important instrument to 
spread the revoit to other parts of the country. Later, during the constitutional 
revolution, both the telegraph as weil as the printing press came to play a crucial role 
in not only shaping the political discourse and articulating counter-hegemonic 
discourses, but also as tools to inform the public of news of the day. Taking the 
theoretical framework of Harold Innis (1949), we see how the telegraph was able to 
shorten the time and space by reducing the time that it would take to transfer 
information. This as a result was able to mobilize the tobacco revoit from a small 
regional protest to a national revoit that showed the capacity of the people to defy the 
power of the king. Constitutional revolution also profited from communication 
technologies to mobilize pluralistic resistance movements across the country and 
articulate the political discourse in the realm of politics in the country. The 1950s, as 
we saw, brought another important technology, radio, to the forefront of protest 
movements in the country. The radio, with its capacity to wirelessly reach large regions 
of the country, was able to mobilize people in the rural areas of the country and 
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propagate the poli ti cal discourse of mostly Marxist poli ti cal parties at the time. Again, 
communication technologies played a crucial role in not only mobilization but also 
propagation of political discourse in the country. The era also saw another technology 
for articulating political discourse, the cinema. Cinema, as we saw, was not really a 
tool for mobilization but more of a tool for expression. It played an important role in 
shaping the discourse around sexual desire in the country. AU this to say that 
communication technologies, during the nationalization crisis, played an important role 
in articulating political discourses and forming networks. The Islamic Revolution also 
saw the usage of communication technologies as tools for mobilization and forming 
networks. But most importantly, the era saw the first usage of communication 
technologies as tools for turning a revolutionary struggle into a televisual spectacle. 
This is because "Iran was the world's first televised revolution, and its passion and 
brutality was brought into people's living room in 'living colors"' (Fair, 2004). 
However, the revolution also saw a return to more authentic network creations since 
many of the communication tools were controlled and managed by the state. We saw a 
return to the usage of mosques as places for gathering and networking and a heavy 
reliance on printing press and cassette tapes as tools for articulating political discourse 
amongst revolutionaries. 
What I have shown here is that the usage of networks as tools for protestation, 
mobilization, and political articulation did not just start in June 2009 after the election 
of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Jack of perspective of many analysts in seeing the 
creative usage of ICTs as a very common collective practice in the history of social 
movements in the country indeed made them jump on the band wagon of calling the 
Green Movement a "Twitter Revolution". What is important is that Iranians were using 
mobile phones and the Internet since the 1990s in the country and because of the 
existence of a large population of educated youth who knew how these technologies 
work and how they can be used to propagate news, the usage ofiCTs during the Green 
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Movement was bound to happen. As a society with one of the highest number of 
bloggers per capita in the world (Sreberny & Khiabany, 2010), Iran was more than 
ready to turn these events into a media spectacle and make the Green Movement a 
globalized movement. The success of the 1979 revolution in painting the Shah as a 
tyrant through making the revolution a televised spectacle left a collective memory 
amongst the protesting crowds of the Green Movement who saw that the only way they 
can make their plight for social justice and civil rights relevant in the globe was to use 
the technologies of reaching the globe as tools for mediating the events in Iran and 
sharing it with the world so that the globe becomes the judge of what is happening on 
the streets of Tehran. The government of Iran tried very hard to curtail this effect by 
for example cutting the cellphone networks and text messaging services just after the 
announcement of the results of the election and banning international j ournalists from 
leaving their hotel and reporting from the streets. However, the government was caught 
off guard wh en the news got out through the usage of Twitter, Face book, and Y outube. 
The ICTs were used by protesting crowds to create networks of solidarity around the 
world, to make a spectacle of the violence on the streets of Iran and share it with the 
world, and to organize global grievances by calling the Iranian diaspora to form their 
protesting crowds in their countries of residence. The ICTs, therefore, should be seen 
as tools that played an important part during the Green Movement. In essence, they 
helped shape the Networked Protesting Crowds of the Green Movement. However, one 
must not give all the credit to ICTs since, as we saw in this thesis, what made the Green 
Movement was the formation of movements that were given rise to in the 1990s with 
the ri se of reformists, students, and women's rights movements. 
To sun1marize, networks are not new. As Castells himself said, networks should be 
treated with a double meaning. The first is a social meaning while the second includes 
the role of ICTs in shaping what he terms "Networked Societies". Following the same 
logic, we saw that networks in Iran were al ways social and consisted of a coalition of 
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forces that came together to articulate counter-hegemonic discourses. The Green 
Movement was also a social network at its core. They consisted of multiple groups and 
coalitions who came together to articulate severa! counter-hegemonic discourses and 
form an identity as a movement for social justice. The Green Movement also was a 
network because of its usage of the internet as a tool to articulate its poli ti cal discourse 
and organize global grievances. While this is important, looking at Green Movement 
as solely a product of the ICTs networks is shallow since this movement is a 
continuation of social movements and collective practices that started a hundred years 
ago with the constitutional revolution. Therefore, one must see the usage oftechnology 
as a creative way to articulate the political and organize grievances. Technology is not 
a means to an end, it is a tool that is used in conjunction with other collective practices 
of a protesting crowds such as the one during the Green Movement. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section, the conclusion, will provide 
the definition of a Networked Protesting Crowds and answer the central question of the 
thesis. I will then sumerize the main chapters of this thesis including the theoretical 
framework, the methodology, and the two chapters on analysis. The second section, 
the discussion, examines the main findings of the thesis. At this point, It will also show 
the relevance of this thesis in the field of communication. This section concludes with 
making a broader observation about the state of the Iranian society by arguing that Iran 
is in the midst of a Quiet Revolution (Revolution Tranquille) just like Quebec was 
during the 1960s and this Quiet Revolution is slowly shifting Iran in profound ways. 
Through this, it shows the potential research that can be conducted in the near future. 
6.1 Conclusion 
Going back to our theoretical framework, we can now clearly define a protesting crowd 
and Networked Protesting Crowds: 
1) A protesting crowd is a form of collective action that produces itself in a kairos and 
acts as the articulator of the political discourse in the realm of politics.2) A Networked 
Protesting Crowd (NPC) is a protesting crowd that expand its reach of 
articulating its discourse by establishing globalized networks through the usage of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). 
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As for our central question, we can now argue that the Green Movement emerged as 
NPCs and these NPCs were able to communicate and articulate their political discourse 
in the realm of politics with the help of the usage of Information Communication 
Technologies. The NPCs of the Green Movement were part of a bigger picture that 
reflected the struggles in the history of the social movements in the country. 
The idea of looking at a protesting crowd was born of an interest in learning about the 
study of crowds, specifically crowd psychology, during my bachelor's degree in a 
course given by Professor Roman Onufrijchuk. What started as an interest became a 
two-year-long quest to articulate the notion of protesting crowds and distinguishing it 
as a collective that articulates the politicaJ in the realm of politics. During 2009, 1 
became involved in the Green Movement protests in Vancouver and it became clear to 
me that ifl am writing a thesis, it will be on the subject. Hence, 1 do have a bias towards 
this subject since, as an Iranian living outside of the country, 1 personally participated 
in the crowds who gathered every day to show support for the protesters in the country. 
This thesis has its limitations in the fact that 1 could not visit Iran for conducting this 
research. Hence, 1 could not interview people who had experienced the Green 
Movement first handedly and who lived through the events. This limitation was 
resolved by focusing on the theoretical side ofthe notion ofprotesting crowds. Another 
limitation to this thesis was the fact that 1 could not really choose one theory and apply 
it to the case of the Green Movement. For one, as 1 showed in my thesis, there is no 
notion of protesting crowds. There are categories that include protesting crowd as one 
act of contestation (Collective action or contentious politics). Hence, 1 was left alone 
for the most part to come up with a theoretical framework that can explain this idea 
clearly. Another limitation to my thesis was the fact that 1 was not working on an 
occidental problem. Therefore, I was not really able to full y use theoretical frameworks 
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that I studied on social movements and democratie theories. This was when the notion 
of "tools in a toolbox" of Foucault came handy because I was able to assemble severa! 
pieces of different theories to form a conceptual framework. 
I started working on the thesis by reading the literature on crowd the01·y as well as 
social movement theory. It was not long before I noticed a gap in the literature. On one 
side, crowd theories categorized ali types of crowds under one category and saw them 
as either rational entities or irrational entities. Moreover, they did not really explain in 
a clear way as to how crowds emerge. On the other side, social movement theorists 
also generalized ali forms of political action into categories. For RM theorists, these 
were termed contentious politics (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996) while for NSM 
theorists they were referred to as collective action (Melluci, 1996). Moreover, I saw 
limitations in both theories. With RM theories, I saw a limitation in the realm of 
expression and identity formation because of their focus on rational choice and 
mobilization ofresources as the framework ofthinking about social movements. I did 
find their idea of historical continuity important as something that I can reflect upon. 
With NSM theories, I found the idea of a shift towards identity movements from class 
movements useful. However, unlike the Occident, the social movements in Iran have 
al ways centred on identity. Hence, what I decided to take from both of these theories 
was to search the formation of identity and poli ti cal discourse in the history of modem 
Iran's social movements. I could not use one school precisely because they were both 
right and wrong when it came to the case of Iran. 
1 took the historical approach as methodology because of two reasons. My thesis was 
a theoretical thesis and historical analysis would give me a unique perspective in how 
my theoretical framework can pass the test of time. This means that by looking at 
history, 1 was able to sample different instances in the history of social movements in 
the country and see if the conceptual framework that I established can be applied to 
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different eras in the history of Iran. I also wanted to show that the only way that one 
can understand the Green Movement as a social movement and its protesting crowds 
as articulators of the political discourse of this movement is to look at this movement 
in relation to the history of social movements in the country. This is because unlike 
many social movements in the occidental world, Iran's social movements have always 
been the continuation of previous social struggles. Therefore, I could not isolate Green 
Movement in order to search for the answer to my central question. 
The theoretical framework of this thesis included severa! elements. lt first formulated 
protesting crowds as a form of collective action that produces themselves in an 
opportune moment (Kairos). lt then continued to argue that protesting crowds, as a 
collective action, articulate the political discourse in the realm of politics. This idea 
indeed became the theoretical piece that showed the relevance of protesting crowds in 
communication studies. In other words, protesting crowds are articulators, and hence, 
communicators of the poli ti cal discourse in the realm of poli tics . Lastly, by using the 
idea ofNetworks in its social and technological sense, I have argued that the protesting 
crowds of the Green Movement were a Networked Protesting Crowds (NPC). From a 
social perspective, protesting crowds come together as coalitions of different groups 
around a common discourse. Hence, there is an established social network that already 
exists amongst protesting crowds. The technological aspect of the protesting crowds 
showed that through the usage of network technology, especially the internet, 
protesting crowds rem ove two very important dimensions of ti me and spa ce sin ce they 
are able to appear simultaneously in different parts of the world at different times. 
Hence, by using networked technologies, protesting crowds are able to always be 
present and participate in organization and articulation of political discourses . Lastly, 
1 spoke of the idea of care of the collective and argued that protesting crowds, as a 
collective, recognise themselves as such through several practices that identifies them 
as protesting crowds. This also meant that through collective practices, protesting 
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crowds form an ethos through practices of care. 
I used historical analysis as a methodology to show that the Green Movement is a 
continuation of a historical struggle for a civil society that began with the constitutional 
revolution of 1906. Hence, in order for one to understand why the Iranians used the 
Green as a symbol of their movement or wh y the term "where is my vote?" was so 
important to them, one needs to revisit modern history of the country in order to fi nd 
the answers as to the root causes of the struggle of Green Movement. The historical 
section detailed the five main eras of the Iranian modern history. The tobacco revoit 
and the constitutional revolution, the reign of Reza Shah and his replacement during 
the WWII by the British and the Russians, the Nationalisation of oil and the crisis that 
followed, the Islamic Revolution, and the Green Movement. In each section, I have 
purposely attended to the history ofwomen's movement separately because I found that 
this his tory needed a specifie attention. This is because as a patriarchal society, 
women's issues have mostly been put on the sidelines so that other issues can be dealt 
with at first. The two most dramatic events in the history of women in Iran came from 
institutionally disciplining the women's body through unveiling (during Reza Shah) 
and re-veiling (after the Islamic Revolution). Hence, as one of the three movements 
that gave rise to the protesting crowds of the Green Movement, I tried to give a special 
importance to the his tory of a movement that at many times is pushed to the sidelines. 
6.2 Discussion 
The Islamic revolution saw the emergence of a new form of protesting crowd. One that 
not only articulated discourses but also used the opportunity ofbeing televised as a way 
to reach a globalized audience. This era saw a very complex articulation of the political 
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in the sphere of politics that lead to the formulation of Westoxification. By doing so, 
the protesting crowds were able to create a collective identity as the army of Hossein 
who is fighting the army of the Shah. With this, the collective identity became an 
Islamic civilliberties movement that saw the west as a barrier toits liberty. What came 
from the Islamic revolution was a system of govemance that used the narrative of 
Hossein and the fear of westoxification to create new docile bodies. This was done by 
literally taking control of power and knowledge and systematically, and violently, 
imposing many codes of conduct in the public space. 
Ali this to say that the Green Movement carried with it a baggage of frustration from 
not only economies but also a failed process of disciplination that worked with both 
forces of power and knowledge to create docile bodies. It also came from a long his tory 
of the struggle for social justice and independence from the west that was rooted in 
1906 and was re-articulated in 1953 and 1979. The Green Movement did not happen 
ovemight. It happened as a coalition of three major social movements that already 
existed in the country and were mobilizing their forces to get people to vote. These 
three movements were: The student movement, the women's rights movement, and the 
reform movement. 
As I demonstrated in three clear examples, the protesting crowds seized every 
opportunity to gather as a force and articulate their discourses. Moreover, the protesting 
crowds of the Green Movement used technology constant! y to articulate their political 
discourses globally and engage the global public in the events that were happening on 
the grou nd through the usage of Y outube, Facebook, and Twitter. They were also able 
to create a global spectacle of the Green Movement in Iran with the footage that they 
captured and the news that they shared. This crowd was a NPC in two ways. For one, 
they had social ties with the Iranian diaspora around the world. Hence, when the news 
of the post-electoral unrest broke, many Iranians outside of Iran organized their own 
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gatherings and protests in solidarity with the Iranians in Iran. Secondly, they used 
networked technologies to communicate their message and mobilize globally. This was 
do ne by recording videos of protests on the street and posting them online as weil as 
constantly updating severa! twitter feeds to inform the global public of what is 
happening in the country. The Internet was one of the many tools that the protesting 
crowds of the Green Movement used to produce themselves as communicators of the 
Green Movement. 
The Iranian protesting crowds, through their collective practices, recognized 
themselves as a political force. From their practices offline such as marching on the 
streets and chanting slogans and songs collectively, to their practices online such as 
posting videos and twitting the events as they happen, they were able to forman identity 
that made them recognize themselves as protesting crowds of the Green Movement. 
The usage of the Green co lor, as the re-appropriation of the symbol of the battle of 
Karbala, was also very important in shaping the identity of the Green Movement. What 
ail these collective practices brought was a sort of ethos of the collective. This ethos 
was formulated through the narrative of Karbala as the collective used the symbolism 
of this narrative to characterize themselves as the collective who are fighting for their 
right. Thus, the Iranians, during the 2009 Green Movement were able to create a unique 
character, an ethos, through their collective practices as Networked Protesting Crowds. 
The relevance of this thesis as an academie piece in the discipline of communication 
lies in the idea that understanding a social movement requires the understanding ofhow 
discourses are specifically produced by collectivities through certain historical 
conjunctures. This means that, on the one hand, one needs to identify the discourses 
that are articulated by a movement and, on the other hand, the way in which these 
discourses are produced and diffused. To tackle the first challenge, one must 
understand discourse in a historie context. this is wh y understanding the slogan "where 
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is my vote?" required me to take a journey into the historical articulation of political 
discourse since the constitutional revolution in iran in order to show how this slogan is 
connected to the struggles ofpopular movements in iran since the institution ofthe first 
constitution in the country. To face the second challenge, one must look at collective 
practices of a social movement in order to understand how discourses are articulated 
and difused. The usage of technology as a tool for protestation is a form of collective 
practice. Studying NPCs as a research subject allows one to focus on these collective 
practices by focusing on a particular group. This in return reduces the ambiguity of 
theoretical frameworks such as contentious politics and collective action and forces the 
researcher to look at concrete examples. 
During the 1960s, Quebec went through a quiet revolution whereby the society shifted 
from a predominant! y religious society to a secular one. A centrepiece of this change 
was a shift in the culture of the society through different means of communications. 
Many important artists came to express the Quebec identity and produce cultural works 
that expressed this identity. As history shows me, the first step in every shift in the 
Iranian society has started with the articulation of discourse. This is why I would like 
to argue that Iran, since the 1990s, has started its own quiet revolution. This is a 
revolution where the practice of disciplining the body has been challenged through 
every day cultural practices of young Iranians who no longer see the docile body as an 
option. It is the revolution where the works of art are challenging the social and the 
political inside and outside of the country. It is a revolution where new articulations of 
Islamic discourse are questioning the fundaments of the Islamic ideology by 
articulating new discourses that are more inclusive and pluralistic. Above all , it is a 
revolution where expressing the self and communicating about it to others has become 
the most imp01tant way of challenging the system. Communication and the usage of 
communication tools are central to the continuation of this quiet revolution. The Green 
Movement was a burst within this quiet revolution. As we saw, the usage of ICTs 
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became a very important part of the Green Movement. This was because the ICTs were 
already being used by the Iranian youth before the Green Movement. The protesting 
crowds in Iran already had the knowledge of using these tools and all they did was to 
apply it as a protesting tool during this period. While the Green Movement was 
violently crushed, this quiet revolution continued. The avenue that I would like to open 
from writing this thesis is for communication scholars to look at this quiet revolution 
from a communicational perspective. Indeed, a great body of work has already been 
established that looks at the cultural changes in Iran from many perspectives. However, 
by seeing these changes as a quiet revolution, one may be able to get a better insight as 
to how these shifts are changing the society and the everyday lives of the lranian 
people. 
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